Democratic development and increased militarism in East and Southeast Asian rivalries
| Published date | 01 March 2018 |
| DOI | 10.1177/2057891117715919 |
| Date | 01 March 2018 |
| Author | Chaekwang You |
| Subject Matter | Research articles |
Research article
Democratic development and
increased militarism in East
and Southeast Asian rivalries:
Perverse political accountability
and military conflicts
Chaekwang You
Chung-Ang University, Korea
Abstract
This article asks the simple question of why East and Southeast Asian rivals have experienced a
sharp increase in military activity despite their decisive shift to democracy. To explain this puzzle, I
develop a “theory of perverse political accountability” in East and Southeast Asian rivalries. Central
to my theory is that perverse political accountability, in which a hawkish leadership adopting a
more conflictual policy toward foreign rivals is rewarded by a hard-line constituency or selecto-
rate, makes democratic leaders in rival states highly conflict-prone. In addition, the theory claims
that democratic rivals will likely initiate military conflicts against autocratic rivals due to their
leaders’ hawkish preferences and to perverse political accountability, and that autocratic rivals will
likely initiate conflicts against democratic rivals and against each other due to their leaders’ hawkish
preferences and to the absence of perverse political accountability. The article finds strong
empirical evidence for these theoretical arguments. The findings contribute to an enhanced
understanding of the causes of increased militarism in East and Southeast Asian rivalries.
Keywords
East and Southeast Asia, hard-liners, incipient democracy, MIDs, perverse political accountability,
rivalries
Introduction
For years following the end of the Cold War, there have been a growing number of studies
about the prospects for war and peace in Asia, more specifically in East and Southeast Asia.
1
The potential for competition over regional hegemony, the worsening of tension in territorial
Corresponding author:
Chaekwang You, Chung-Ang University, 84 Heucseok Ro, Dongjak Ku, Seoul 156-756, Korea.
Email: you.36@osu.edu
Asian Journal of Comparative Politics
2018, Vol. 3(1) 25–45
ªThe Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/2057891117715919
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disputes, the varying mixes of autocracy and democracy, and the rise of exclusive nationalism
all lead to growing scholarly attention to East Asia (Acharya, 2003; Berger, 2000, 2012;
Betts, 1993; Calder, 2004; Friedberg, 1993; Fukuyama, 2005). Amongst other factors is a
sharp rise in military expenditure and, consequentially, an increased chance of military con-
flictinEastandSoutheastAsia,whichisofconcern to scholars of international and Asian
security.
The countries in East and Southeast Asia have experienced an increased militarism since the
mid-1980s. Rising China, Japan’s ardent effort to check China, routinized militarized competition
between China and Taiwan and between North and South Korea, maritime disp utes between
China, Vietnam, and Southeast Asian countries, and ongoing border disputes between Thailand
and Cambodia have all prompted the countries’ efforts to fortify their military capabilities, thereby
increasing the chance of military conflict in the region (Calder, 2006; Cha and Kang, 2003; Guan,
1998; Hughes, 2009; Mearsheimer, 2011; Scobell, 2011).
With regard to the causes of such increased militarism in East and Southeast Asia, the
article gives primary attention to East and Southeast Asian “rivalries” because they are t he
main vehicle of interstate conflict.
2
Most states do not engage in military conflict with
one another. Only rivals have a strong tendency to be involved in series of military conflicts.
This is why most studies on Asian security devote considerable attention to pairs of rivals
such as China and Taiwan, China and Japan, China and Vietnam, South and North Korea, and
Cambodia and Thailand (Calder, 2006; Cha and Kang, 2003; Christensen, 1999; Guan, 1998;
Hughes, 2009; Scobell, 2011).
What is more interesting, however, is that military activity between East and Southeast
Asian rivals has gradually been increasing even as many of these states have become
increasingly democratic. Since the mid-1980s, the so-called “third wave of democratization”
has swept Asia (Huntington, 1991) and many East and Southeast Asian rivals have experi-
enced a systematic development of democracy (Chan, 1995; Diamond, 2012; Fukuyama,
2012). According to scholars of rivalries, such democratic developments reduce the risk of
military conflict and increase the chance of peace (Bennett, 1998; Hensel et al., 2000).
Contrary to the expectation, however, East and Southeast Asian rivals have become more
bellicose in dealing with each other as they have become more democratic. This leads to the
question of why East and Southeast Asian rivals increase their military activities despite their
shift to democracy.
To answer this empirical puzzle, I develop a “theory of perverse political accountability”
in which the democratic leadership adopting a policy of confrontation and conflict against
foreign rivals is electorally rewarded while the leadership appearing to be conciliatory and
weak in dealing with rivals is electorally punished (Colaresi, 2004; Nincic, 1989). The
theory claims that, with the recent democratic developments in East and Southeast Asian
countries, such distorted political accountability has become a major driver of military
conflict.
The article is organized as follows: the first section critically reviews prior studies of Asian
international relations, emphasizing both the strengths and weaknesses of the studies. The second
section develops a novel theoretical framework—i.e. a theory of perverse political accountabil-
ity—and presents some testable hypotheses drawn from the theory. The third section conducts a
series of empirical analyses and offers evidence commensurate wi th the expectations that the
theory generates. The final section provides both the conclusion and possible lines for future
research, followed by some policy implications.
26 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 3(1)
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