Denial and punishment in war
| Author | Keisuke Nakao |
| Published date | 01 March 2022 |
| Date | 01 March 2022 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00223433211009765 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
Denial and punishment in war
Keisuke Nakao
College of Business & Economics, University of Hawaii at Hilo
Abstract
Formal models of war termination have been developed along two major approaches: in one, war is interpreted as a
series of battles, where nations exchange denials that aim to destroy enemy forces; in the other, war is illustrated as a
process of bargaining with mutual punishments that inflict costs on opponents. By integrating these two approaches,
I build a dynamic model of war, where two nations choose between military force and civilian value as the targets of
their attacks in every battle. The war proceeds along one of the following three paths in equilibrium. First, either
nation immediately gives in to the other’s threat of punishment such as nuclear strikes. Second, both the nations
continue to conduct counterforce denial campaigns to weaken each other until either side is fully disarmed (i.e. all-
out war). Third, after significant military imbalance is generated by the exchange of denials in an early battle, the
winner of the battle switches to a countervalue punishment campaign, to which the loser responds by capitulation
(i.e. limited war). My equilibrium analyses suggest that while denials largely determine a war’s outcome, punishments
can influence its duration. Unlike existing models, mine illuminates the two-way causal relationship, where past
battle outcomes can influence the choice of military strategy, whereas military strategies also shape how the war will
further evolve.
Keywords
aerial bombardment, choice of target, denial vs. punishment, military strategy
The Fighters are our salvation but the Bombers alone
provide the means of victory.
– Winston Churchill
Introduction
Theorists in International Relations have modeled the
process of war along two major approaches. Models in
one approach depict war as a political affair, where two
nations strive to compel each other’s surrender, or con-
cession at least, by exerting the power to hurt (Schelling,
1966). By nature, this approach consorts with bargaining
models of war (Fearon, 2007; Leventog
˘lu & Slantchev,
2007; Powell, 2004, 2012; Slantchev, 2003a; Wagner,
2000). In many of these ‘punishment’ models, wartime
costs – in addition to the revealed information as to the
opponent’s resolve and/or strength – constitute a major
motivation for nations to terminate war; in the mean-
while, the relative strength between nations – namely,
the per-period probability that either side defeats its
opponent – remains fixed (but often uncertain) through-
out war. As a logical consequence, either nation collapses
probabilistically but suddenly unless a peaceful agree-
ment is reached.
Models in the other approach portray war as a military
affair, where two nations struggle to overpower each
other by wielding the ability to diminish the enemy’s
military strength, or what might be called the power to
weaken (St Petersburg Declaration of 1868).
1
The latter
approach presumes a war to be a series of battles, where
the relative strength can change through fighting, as
found in random-walk models (Slantchev, 2003b;
Smith, 1998; Smith & Stam, 2003, 2004) and also in
Corresponding author:
keisuken@hawaii.edu
1
The Declaration states: ‘The only legitimate object which States
should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military
forces of the enemy’.
Journal of Peace Research
2022, Vol. 59(2) 166–179
ªThe Author(s) 2021
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/00223433211009765
journals.sagepub.com/home/jpr
To continue reading
Request your trial