Dennis R Klinck, CONSCIENCE, EQUITY AND THE COURT OF CHANCERY IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate (www.ashgate.com), 2010. xii + 315 pp. ISBN 9780754667742. £70.

AuthorIan Williams
DOI10.3366/elr.2011.0071
Pages500-502
Published date01 September 2011
Date01 September 2011

The notion of conscience was at the heart of justifications for the jurisdiction and actions of several courts in medieval and early-modern England, and remains important today. This book seeks to understand what “conscience” meant in reference to the early-modern Chancery, the period which saw the last ecclesiastical Chancellors and the emergence of a more “law-like” Chancery. Klinck identifies several related issues: how did conscience determine the jurisdiction of the Chancery; did “conscience” impose standards, and if so from where did these standards come; were these standards objective or subjective?

The book is divided into nine chapters. Aside from the introduction and conclusion (both of which are excellent), the arrangement is chronological: chapters 2–4 cover the medieval period, early-sixteenth century and later sixteenth-century respectively. Chapters 5 and 6 form a unit, considering the theological material for the early-seventeenth century and then the legal material; chapters 7 and 8 repeat this format for the later-seventeenth century. Due to the continuing use of older ideas, the later chapters cannot be read in isolation.

As any legal historian will admit, English lawyers have not always been forthcoming in explaining the conceptual basis for their activities. Theoretical ideas were rarely clearly, coherently or comprehensively articulated. This challenge to Klinck's project is addressed by using non-legal material. As he rightly observes “what is unarticulated comes from somewhere” (181). Klinck proceeds from the contentious premise that lawyers would reflect wider social ideas about conscience, which a powerful recent article by Michael Macnair (“Equity and Conscience” (2007) 27 OJLS 659) expressly rejected. Klinck relies on the work of theologians known as casuists: divines who sought to provide answers or guidance to particular questions of conscience. Supporting Macnair, parts of Klinck's book show legal writers steadfastly repeating the ideas and words of their predecessors, seemingly oblivious to changes in the wider context (e.g. 219–221). However, in other places Klinck's premise seems justified, with strong parallels (if not clear links) identified between contemporary casuist ideas and lawyers (e.g. Lord Nottingham at 233). Crucial support for Klinck's approach is his consideration of the norms applied in Chancery: if Chancery applied substantive norms derived from conscience, conscience cannot merely refer to the superior...

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