Desch, Michael, 2008. Power and Military Effectiveness: The Fallacy of Democratic Triumphalism. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 248 pp. ISBN 9780801888014
| Author | Ulrich Pilster |
| Published date | 01 May 2009 |
| Date | 01 May 2009 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00223433090460030903 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume 46 / number 3 / may 2009
454
Desch, Michael, 2008. Power and Military
Effectiveness: The Fallacy of Democratic Triumpha-
lism. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University
Press. 248 pp. ISBN 9780801888014.
Desch’s book is a critique of what he calls the
‘democratic triumphalism’ literature and its
hypothesized positive relationship between
democracy and military effectiveness. He focuses
on the selection argument (democracies are more
prudent when involving themselves in wars) and
the war-fighting argument (democracies fight
more effectively because of less rent-seeking, bet-
ter alliances, better strategic evaluation, higher
public support and stronger battlefield perform-
ance). Desch claims that his quantitative analysis
and case studies show that these arguments are
flawed. Although he succeeds in highlighting the
need for refinement of the causal mechanisms
of ‘triumphalism’, there are several problems
with his analysis. First, the way Desch deals with
existing quantitative evidence is unconvincing.
His interpretation of interaction terms, which
much of his analysis rests upon, is flawed in that
he incorrectly assumes that significance levels
and marginal effects for interaction terms can
be calculated just as for ordinary variables. In
addition, Desch’s proposal to exclude wars whose
outcome might have been determined by factors
other than democracy from the analysis is quite
unorthodox. Second, ‘democratic triumphalism’
seems at times to be more of a straw man made
up for an easy refutation than a correct reflection
of the body of literature attacked. For instance,
when addressing democratic alliance behaviour,
the author rejects the claim that democracies
are more likely to align. This finding is prob-
ably correct, but ignores the fact that this claim
has also long been rejected by quantitative alli-
ance research and the very body of literature he
attacks.
Ulrich Pilster
Edelstein, David M., 2008. Occupational
Hazards: Success and Failure in Military Occupa-
tion. Ithaca, NY & London: Cornell University
Press. 248 pp. ISBN 9780801446153.
Edelstein provides a convincing explanation for
why military occupations fail or succeed. Reflect-
ing the neorealist emphasis on the causal role
of structural factors in international politics,
he argues that threat environment determines
occupation outcome. Edelstein studies historical
and contemporary cases of occupation intended
as ‘the temporary control of a territory by a state
(or group of allied states) that makes no claim to
permanent sovereignty over that territory’ (p. 3).
He maintains that successful occupations ensure
that the occupied territory does not threaten the
security of the occupying power in the long term,
which consumes time and resources. Yet, long and
expensive occupations frustrate the occupied pop-
ulation’s nationalist desire for self- determinaton
and try the patience of the occupying power’s citi-
zens, thus inviting insurgency and premature calls
for withdrawal. To succeed, the occupying power
must mitigate indigenous nationalism and pre-
serve domestic support for commitment abroad.
According to Edelstein, this is more likely to be
accomplished if the occupied population and the
occupying power agree that the occupied territory
is vulnerable to a third-party military threat and
the occupying power considers the occupied state
as geopolitically valuable. Under such conditions,
the occupied population welcomes the protection
offered by the occupying power and relents its
nationalism. This allows non-coercive occupation
strategies that further assuage indigenous nation-
alism. Edelstein, however, shows that occupations
rarely succeed, because favourable conditions
seldom combine. He warns that multi lateralism
cannot compensate for their absence: since multi-
lateralism complicates decisionmaking, it may
prolong occupations and fuel nationalist resist-
ance. This is a lucid and empirically rich volume.
It is recommendable to anyone interested in mili-
tary occupations and the broader issue of military
power limits.
Fausto Scarinzi
Figes, Orlando, 2007. The Whisperers: Pri-
vate Life in Stalin’s Russia. London: Penguin. xxx-
viii + 740 pp. ISBN 9780713997026.
Montefiore, Simon Sebag, 2007. Young Sta-
lin. London: Widenfeld & Nicolson. xxviii + 397
pp. ISBN 9780297850687.
These two books provide a fascinating portrait
of Russia and the Soviet Union – Young Stalin
covers the period from 1872 until the Bolsheviks
took power in 1917, and The Whisperers starts in
1917 and ends in 1956 with Stalin’s death. He is,
of course, the object of the first book, and while
he is not one of Figes’s focuses, Stalin maintains
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