Determinants of Post-Conflict Economic Assistance

AuthorJames Meernik,Seonjou Kang
Published date01 March 2004
DOI10.1177/0022343304041062
Date01 March 2004
Subject MatterJournal Article
149
Introduction
International and intrastate conf‌licts often
unfold in dramatic fashion as saber-rattling
rhetoric, tension-escalating movements of
armies, and high-stakes diplomatic brink-
manship mesmerize the world and grab
major headlines. The political problems and
economic damage left behind in the wake of
these events, however, rarely enjoy this sort
of attention. Bureaucrats take over from
presidents to sort out the conf‌lict resolution
arrangements, the media f‌ly off to another
international hotspot, and if the affected
states and peoples are fortunate, the political
and economic experts take over from the
military planners to rebuild shattered
societies. When the major powers assume the
responsibility for those nations affected by
conf‌lict, the results can be singularly impres-
sive, as we saw in Europe and Japan after
World War II. When states disengage after
conf‌licts and let participants resolve and
rebuild on their own, the results can be dis-
astrous, as we recently saw in Afghanistan
after the Soviet Union and the United States
largely left the scene in the late 1980s.
Increasingly we have heard politicians and
diplomats speaking about end game and exit
strategies and even nation-building which
suggests a greater appreciation for the need
to consider the legacy they are bequeathing
to conf‌lict-torn nations. But such variation
in response over the recent past, in a sense,
suggests that post-conf‌lict situations are
© 2004 Journal of Peace Research,
vol. 41, no. 2, 2004, pp. 149–166
Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA
and New Delhi) www.sagepublications.com
DOI: 10.1177/0022343304041062 ISSN 0022-3433
Determinants of Post-Conf‌lict Economic Assistance*
SEONJOU KANG & JAMES MEERNIK
Department of Political Science, University of North Texas
Given the importance of violent conf‌licts and their consequences in global politics, the increasing atten-
tion paid to rebuilding conf‌lict-stricken nations by the major powers, and the growing interest in
scholarship on these phenomena, theory-building and empirical analysis of post-conf‌lict economic
assistance are essential. This article analyzes the determinants of foreign economic assistance given by
nations of the OECD, in aggregate, to nations that were involved in international and internal con-
f‌licts. The model is designed to address three specif‌ic questions. First, in the aftermath of conf‌lict does
foreign economic assistance by the OECD increase to conf‌lict-affected nations, or does aid allocation
continue as before? Second, does the allocation of foreign economic assistance to conf‌lict actors con-
tinue to be inf‌luenced by those same factors that determine aid during normal times? Third, to what
extent do factors relevant to the conf‌lict itself inf‌luence the amount of foreign economic assistance pro-
vided by OECD nations? The article contends that both the national attributes of the conf‌lict nations
and the characteristics of the conf‌licts from which they have emerged explain the amount of economic
assistance OECD states provide. The f‌indings reveal that such national attributes as humanitarian need,
economic openness, and regime transition, as well as conf‌lict characteristics such as military inter-
vention and conf‌lict issues affect aid levels. Aid levels also tend to increase after conf‌licts, but then begin
to level off after several years.
* The authors may be reached via e-mail at skang@unt.edu
and meernik@unt.edu respectively. Data are available at
http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets.asp.
90T 02 041062 (ds) 3/2/04 1:10 pm Page 149
politicized and that not all post-conf‌lict
nations are granted the same level of assist-
ance (Collier & Hoeff‌ler, 2002).
There is now a burgeoning research on
post-conf‌lict politics and economic develop-
ment. There are multitudes of books and
articles studying the origins of crises (e.g.
Goertz & Diehl, 1995; Reed, 2000; Regan,
1998; Reiter & Stam, 1998; Smith, 1998),
and a substantial amount of research dedi-
cated to understanding when and how con-
f‌licts end (e.g. Ball, 1996; Diehl, Druckman
& Wall, 1998; Lalman, 1988; Mor, 1997;
Stedman, Rothchild & Cousens, 2002;
Werner, 1999). Given the importance of
international and intranational crises and
their consequences in global politics, the
increasing attention paid to rebuilding
conf‌lict-stricken nations by the major
powers, and the growing amount of scholar-
ship on these phenomena (e.g. Ball, 1996;
Collier, 1999; Collier & Hoeff‌ler, 2000,
2002; Collier et al., 2003; Murdoch &
Sandler, 2002; Pugh, 2000), theory-building
and empirical analysis of post-crisis
economic assistance are essential. In
addition, general theories of foreign policy-
making would be well served by analyses of
post-conf‌lict assistance. Much research has
focused on either policymaking in ordinary
and ongoing foreign policy behavior, such as
the allocation of foreign assistance (e.g.
Meernik, Krueger & Poe, 1998), or policy-
making during extraordinary and discrete
events, such as war. Thus, the development
of a model incorporating both routine calcu-
lations of foreign policy interests in conf‌lict-
affected nations and non-routine assessments
of the signif‌icance of the particular conf‌lict
will signif‌icantly expand our understanding
of foreign policymaking in general and post-
conf‌lict strategies in particular.
Because of these theoretical imperatives,
we are interested in establishing a model of
post-conf‌lict assistance. We develop a model
of foreign policymaking toward post-conf‌lict
societies premised on both ordinary and
extraordinary considerations. Specif‌ically, we
will analyze the determinants of foreign
economic assistance given by nations of the
OECD, in aggregate, to nations that were
involved in interstate or intrastate conf‌licts.
We contend that these major aid donors,
although not necessarily always acting in
concert, respond to conf‌licts through a
combination of standard bureaucratic evalu-
ations and conf‌lict-specif‌ic assessments of
the utility and value of foreign assistance.
The model is designed to address three
specif‌ic questions. First, in the aftermath of
international conf‌licts, does foreign
economic assistance by the OECD increase
to conf‌lict-affected nations, or does aid allo-
cation continue as before? Second, to what
extent does the allocation of foreign
economic assistance to conf‌lict nations
continue to be inf‌luenced by those same
factors that determine aid during normal
times? Third, to what extent do factors
relevant to the conf‌lict itself inf‌luence the
amount of foreign economic assistance
provided by OECD nations? By analyzing
the extent to which economic assistance is
determined by routine national interests
and/or non-routine conf‌lict attributes, we
can better understand the risks, costs, and
benef‌its faced by all nations involved in post-
conf‌lict societies.
In the f‌irst section of this article, we review
the relevant literature on the allocation of
foreign assistance and the emerging policy
evaluation studies of post-conf‌lict assistance.
Premised on this literature, we next develop
our model of foreign policymaking by
OECD nations in the aftermath of conf‌licts.
At the core of the model is the assessment by
these major powers and donors of the import-
ance of conf‌lict-affected nations and the
conf‌lict itself. We derive several hypotheses
from these foreign policymaking assumptions
to test their impact and to determine if
economic assistance increases in post-conf‌lict
journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume 41 / number 2 / march 2004
150
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