Determinants of US foreign policy in multilateral development banks
| Date | 01 July 2014 |
| Author | Daniel B Braaten |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343314524219 |
| Published date | 01 July 2014 |
| Subject Matter | Research Articles |
Determinants of US foreign policy
in multilateral development banks:
The place of human rights
Daniel B Braaten
Department of Sociology, Political Science & Geography, Texas Lutheran University
Abstract
The purpose of this study is to identify and explain recent US human rights policy in the Multilateral Development
Banks (MDBs). Foreign aid, whether distributed directly (bilateral aid) or indirectly through multilateral institutions
such as the MDBs, is one of several tools through which the USA furthers its human rights policy. Several studies
show the conflicted human rights policies the USA pursues with bilateral aid, but very few examine the role of human
rights in US multilateral aid policy. It is this deficit that the present study addresses by examining what factors deter-
mine how the USA votes on proposals before the Executive Board in the various MDBs. Using a multinomial logistic
regression model I test whether US votes in the MDBs are conditioned on recipient countries’ respect for human
rights along with other strategic interest variables. The study finds that respect for political rights has an important
role in determining US votes in the MDBs although much of the impact is accounted for by votes specifically against
China. Conversely, respect for rights of personal integrity do not have an impact on US voting. Level of economic
development and whether the country receives military aid from the USA are also important determinants of US
votes, as well as the level of trade between the USA and the recipient country.
Keywords
human rights, multilateral development banks, US foreign policy
Introduction
Are US votes in the multilateral development banks
(MDBs) conditioned on recipient countries’ respect for
human rights? In other words does the USA sanction
countries with poor human rights records by voting to
deny them loans in the MDBs? Human rights have
become an important fixture of US foreign policy over
the last several decades. However, the specific content
of US human rights policy, as well as its place among for-
eign policy priorities more generally, has varied consider-
ably over the years (Forsythe, 2002; Mertus, 2004;
Apodaca, 2006; Blanton & Cingranelli, 2010). Despite
the establishment of a stable body of international law
on human rights from which to draw, there has been sig-
nificant variability in how the USA promotes human
rights in its foreign policy, what rights it promotes, and
what countries are targeted over others. The most com-
mon explanations for this inconsistency is that US
human rights policy is simply a mask for pursuing core
national security or economic interests, or in other words
the liberalism of human rights is trumped by the realpo-
litik of self-interest.
Foreign aid, whether distributed directly through
bilateral aid or indirectly through the MDBs, is one of
the economic tools through which the USA furthers its
human rights policy (Apodaca, 2006). Using foreign aid
to influence another country’s human rights policies
involves either using assistance as a positive reinforce-
ment – providing aid to those countries that have made
improvements in the protection of human rights – or as a
negative sanction – withholding aid to countries that
have an overall awful human rights record or are cur-
rently engaged in massive violations of human rights.
Corresponding author:
dbraaten@tlu.edu
Journal of Peace Research
2014, Vol. 51(4) 515–527
ªThe Author(s) 2014
Reprints and permission:
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343314524219
jpr.sagepub.com
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