Devi v Roy

JurisdictionUK Non-devolved
Judgment Date1946
Date1946
Year1946
CourtPrivy Council
[PRIVY COUNCIL.]SRIMATI BIBHABATI DEVI APPELLANT; AND KUMAR RAMENDRA NARAYAN ROY AND OTHERS RESPONDENTS.ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA.1946 July 30.LORD THANKERTON, LORD DU PARCQ and SIR MADHAVAN NAIR.

Appeal to Privy Council - Practice - Rule as to concurrent findings of fact - Propositions applicable - Special circumstances justifying departure from rule. - Limitation - Wife's possession of estate not adverse against husband whom she regarded as dead.

From a review of previous decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council the following propositions are derived as to the present practice of the Board to decline to review the evidence for a third time where there are concurrent judgments of two courts on a pure question of fact, and as to the nature of the special circumstances which will justify a departure from the practice:—

(1.) That the practice applies in the case of all the various judicatures whose final tribunal is the Board.

(2.) That it applies to the concurrent findings of fact of two courts, and not to concurrent findings of the judges who compose such courts. Therefore a dissent by a member of the appellate court does not obviate the practice.

(3.) That a difference in the reasons which bring the judges to the same finding of fact will not obviate the practice.

(4.) That, in order to obviate the practice, there must be some miscarriage of justice or violation of some principle of law or procedure, That miscarriage of justice means such a departure from the rules which permeate all judicial procedure as to make that which happened not in the proper sense of the word judicial procedure at all. That the violation of some principle of law or procedure must be such an erroneous proposition of law that if that proposition be corrected the finding cannot stand; or it may be the neglect of some principle of law or procedure, whose application will have the same effect. The question whether there is evidence on which the courts could arrive at their finding is such a question of law.

(5.) That the question of admissibility of evidence is a proposition of law, but it must be such as to affect materially the finding. The question of the value of evidence is not a sufficient reason for departure from the practice.

(6.) That the practice is not a cast-iron one, and the foregoing statement as to reasons which will justify departure is illustrative only, and there may occur cases of such an unusual nature as will constrain the Board to depart from the practice.

(7.) That the Board will always be reluctant to depart from the practice in cases which involve questions of manners, customs or sentiments peculiar to the country or locality from which the case comes, whose significance is specially within the knowledge of the courts of that country.

(8.) That the practice relates to the findings of the courts below, which are generally stated in the order of the court, but may be stated as findings on the issues before the court in the judgments, provided that they are directly related to the final decision of the court.

Where the appellant, on the supposed death of her husband — who was in fact alive — had entered on her widow's estate and thereafter enjoyed it for a period exceeding twelve years, her possession was not adverse to her husband, whom she regarded as dead.

Decree of the High Court affirmed.

APPEAL (No. 17 of 1945), by special leave, from a decree of the High Court in its civil appellate jurisdiction (November 25, 1940) which confirmed a judgment and decree of the First Additional District Judge, Dacca (August 24, 1936).

The following facts are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee: The present suit was instituted in the Court of the First Subordinate Judge at Dacca on July 24, 1930, by the respondent Kumar Ramendra Narayan Roy (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) against the present appellant and others. In the plaint, as subsequently amended on April 15, 1931, the plaintiff sought (ka.) a declaration that he was Kumar Ramendra Narayan Roy, the second son of the late Rajah Rajendra Narayan Roy of Bhowal and (ka. 1), that his possession should be confirmed in respect of the one-third share of the properties described in the schedule, or, if from the evidence and under the circumstances plaintiff's possession thereof should not be established, then possession thereof should be given to him. He further asked for injunctions against obstruction to his possession. The present appellant filed a written statement denying, inter alia, the identity of the plaintiff with Kumar Ramendra Narayan Roy (hereinafter referred to as the second Kumar), and alleging that the suit was barred by limitation. Issues were adjusted, and those now relevant were: 2. Was the suit barred by limitation? 4. Was the second Kumar Ramendra Narayan Roy alive? 5. Was the present plaintiff the second Kumar Ramendra Narayan Roy of Bhowal? After a very long trial, lasting for 608 days, the First Additional District Judge delivered an elaborate and careful judgment in favour of the plaintiff on August 24, 1936, and by his order of the same date he ordered and decreed “that it be declared that the plaintiff is the Kumar Ramendra Narayan Roy, the second son of the late Rajah Rajendra Narayan Roy, Zemindar of Bhowal, and that he be put in possession of an undivided one-third share in the properties in suit — the share now in the enjoyment of the first defendant (the present appellant) — jointly with the other defendants' possession over the rest.” On an appeal by the present appellant, the appeal was heard by a Special Bench of the High Court, consisting of Costello, Biswas and Lodge JJ., and by decree dated November 25 (Lodge J. dissenting) it was ordered and decreed “in accordance with the opinion of the majority of the judges that the judgment and decree of the court below be and the same are hereby affirmed and this appeal dismissed.”

The following is a short account of the family history in the judgment of the trial judge:— Rajah Rajendra Narayan Roy, the Zemindar of Bhowal, one of the largest landed proprietors of East Bengal, died on April 26, 1901. The title was personal, but the family was old, and though not entitled to fame, regarded as the premier Hindu Zamindar family of Dacca. The family-seat was at Jaidebpur, a village about twenty miles from Dacca, and situate in the Pargana of Bbowal, a large and fairly compact estate, spreading over the districts of Dacca and Mymensingh. The Rajah had a residence at Dacca, but he ordinarily lived in his family home, and was undoubtedly a local magnate of the highest position and influence. The rent-roll of the estate was Rs.6,48,353 in 1931. It could not have been much less in the Rajah's time.

The Rajah died leaving him surviving, his widow, Rani Bilasmant, and three sons and three daughters. The sons were: Ranendra Narayan Roy, Ramendra Narayan Roy and Rabindra Narayan Roy. Those, mentioned in order of seniority, were known as Bara Kumar, Mejo Kumar and Chhoto Kumar. The daughters were Indumayee, Jyotirmoyee, and Tarinmoyee. Indumayee was the eldest child, Jyotirmoyee the second, then had come the sons, and then the youngest child, Tarinmoyee Debi.

The Rajah had executed before his death a deed of trust and a will, and, though the exact terms of those were not known, their result, as agreed, was that the estate, on his death, vested in the Rani, his widow, in trust for the three sons. She managed as trustee till her death, which took place on January 21, 1907. On that event the three sons became the owners at law, as they had been in equity; and there was no question that the second Kumar owned a third share in the estate, and would be owning it still, if he were alive, unless he had been prescribed against for the requisite period.

The three Kumars, after the death of their mother, as before, lived as an undivided Hindu family, joint in mess, property and worship. The eldest Kumar was married in 1901 to Sarajubala Debi, the second defendant in this suit. The second Kumar was married in 1902 to Bibhabati Devi, the present appellant, and the third Kumar in 1904 to Ananda Kumari Debi, the fourth defendant in this suit. The family lived at Jaidebpur, and the three sisters, all married, lived as members of the family. Another member of the family was the grandmother, Rani Satyabhama, who had survived her son Rajah Rajendra. The Rajah had a sister, Kripamoyee, who survived him, and who was practically a member of the family, though she lived in a separate block with her husband. The first Kumar died in 1910; the third Kumar died in 1913, and his widow, the fourth defendant, adopted in 1919 a son, Ram Narayan Roy, who was the third defendant. Indumayee and Kripamoyee died in 1920, and Satyabhama died in 1922.

A brief outline of the contentions of the parties was as follows:— there was no dispute that the second Kumar and the appellant, with a large party went from Jaidebpur to Darjeeling in April, 1909, arriving at the latter place on April 20, and took up their residence at a house called “Step Aside,” which had been rented for their stay; and, further, that at that time the second Kumar had gummatous ulcers on or about both elbows and on his legs, being the tertiary stage of syphilis, which he had contracted at some date subsequent to 1905. It was also agreed that he was taken for dead on May 8, 1909. The appellant maintained that the second Kumar died shortly before midnight and that the following morning his body was taken in a funeral procession and was cremated with the usual rites at the new sasan at Darjeeling. The plaintiff admitted that there was a funeral procession and cremation on the morning of May 9, but maintained that the body so cremated was not that of the second Kumar; his case was that the second Kumar was taken for dead about dusk, between seven and eight o'clock, in the evening of May 8, that arrangements were at once made...

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119 cases
  • Bekoe v Broomes
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    • Privy Council
    • 31 October 2005
    ...review the evidence for a third time, unless there are some special circumstances which would justify a departure from the practice. 12 In Devi v Roy [1946] AC 508 the Board reviewed a number of previous decisions in order to set out authoritatively the practice and the nature of such spec......
  • Lopez v Valliappa Chettiar
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    • Privy Council
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  • Jeyaretnam JB v Lee Kuan Yew
    • Singapore
    • Privy Council
    • 24 February 1982
    ...`some miscarriage of justice or violation of some principle of law or procedure`: Srimati Bibhabati Devi v Kumar Ramendra Narayan Roy [1946] AC 508, 521 per Lord Thankerton at p 521. And reluctance to interfere is particularly called for where concurrent findings are dependent upon local co......
  • Toh Kai Chup; Tominam bte Tukimin
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1 firm's commentaries
  • Appeals Against Findings Of Foreign Law: Privy Council Explains Spectrum Approach
    • United Kingdom
    • Mondaq UK
    • 17 July 2023
    ...of the Privy Council to decline to hear appeals against concurrent findings of fact, save in exceptional circumstances: Devi v Roy [1946] AC 508. The claimants in this case argued that findings as to foreign law should be treated differently from other findings of fact, since judges at all ......
2 books & journal articles
  • Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v. Dederer: negligence and the exuberance of youth.
    • Australia
    • Melbourne University Law Review Vol. 32 No. 2, August 2008
    • 1 August 2008
    ...Ibid 826-7. (149) Ibid 827. (150) (1992) 175 CLR 621, 634. (151) Dederer (2007) 238 ALR 761, 828. (152) Ibid 828-9. (153) Ibid 829. (154) [1946] AC 508. (155) Dederer (2007) 238 ALR 761, (156) Ibid 831-2. (157) Ibid 800. (158) Ibid. Kirby J agreed with Heydon J's judgment at 831-2 (Heydon J......
  • MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE
    • Nigeria
    • DSC Publications Online Sasegbon’s Judicial Dictionary of Nigerian Law. First edition M
    • 6 February 2019
    ...9/1977; (1979) 12 N.S.C.C. 151 at 188; (1979) 11 S.C. 1 at 86 - 87. (4) "Lord Thankerton in Bihhadbati Devl v. Kuma Ramendra Narayan Roy (1946) A.C. 508 at p. 521 defined a miscarriage of justice as "such a departure from the rules which permeate all judicial procedure as to make what happe......