<p>The history of Jewish experiences of English law is an important subject which has not yet received the scholarly attention it deserves. In this book, Herman seeks to “begin mapping the terrain of judicial representations of Jews and Jewishness” by examining the language of judgments in reported cases in the superior courts since the turn of the twentieth century. After an introductory chapter setting out the arguments of the book, she turns to explore the views expressed by judges of Jewish “character” in a number of cases spanning the century. Two chapters follow examining the approach taken by courts in trust and child welfare cases involving Jewish (and Muslim) litigants. She then explores the changing uses of the concept of the Holocaust, before turning to an examination of how discourses of Jewishness have influenced interpretations of the Race Relations Act. The book ends with a discussion of the controversial decision of the Supreme Court in the <italic>JFS</italic> case.</p>
<p>The introduction sets out the argument which runs throughout the book. Judges, she notes, are “active creators of official <italic>racial discourse</italic>”. They are “<italic>nation-builders</italic>, defining what it means to be – and not to be – English” (9). Judicial practices towards Jews are characterised as “orientalist” and “racializing”, depending on an abstract vision of “the Jew” which has “nothing whatsoever to do with actual Jews or Jewish issues of any sort” (19). Although not antisemitic, judges display “distaste” and “unease and confusion” when it comes to Jews (25). At the centre of her argument is the contention that the courts are essentially Christian, with English law being “the embodiment of good Christian values” and Jewish behaviour its opposite. Orientalism is hence at its heart “Christian imperialism” (15), which permits courts to sanction “de facto ‘conversions’”, which constitute “a form of symbolic ethnic cleansing” (16–17) leading to the “de-Judification of England” (158).</p>
<p>This book does not aim to be comprehensive. Firstly, Herman states early on that she omits discussion of cases involving judicial review of Bet Din decisions, for they “are often lengthy disquisitions on conflict of law principles” which “do not lend themselves to the analysis I pursue in this project” (23). Criminal law cases are also left out, both because they “were too easy a target” and because they are generally decided by juries, without lengthy judicial discourse. Secondly, she does not wish to explore the background...</p>
