Different fears, same alliance: Multilateralism, assurance and the origins of the 1951 United States–New Zealand–Australia alliance
| Author | Michael Cohen |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221077302 |
| Published date | 01 March 2023 |
| Date | 01 March 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
Different fears, same alliance: Multilateralism,
assurance and the origins of the 1951
United States–New Zealand–Australia alliance
Michael Cohen
National Security College, Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University
Abstract
How do power, interests and threats influence the creation of military alliances? Under what conditions do multi-
lateral and bilateral alliances emerge? Are shared threat perceptions necessary for alliance creation? This article
addresses these longstanding questions through developing and refining theories of alliance creation and design and
tests them using new archival data from Australia and the United States. The theory and empirics refine balance of
threat theory through developing and/or testing other theories regarding the balance of power, threat perception,
assurance, signalling and control. Empirically, the article shows that although after the 1950 Korean War the United
States wanted Japan to be capable of withstanding Soviet and Chinese challenges, Australia, New Zealand and the
Philippines feared that this would allow future Japanese naval militarism. Truman sought to secure regional buy-in to
his Japanese settlement through one multilateral alliance, given bilateralism’s costs of assuring multiple allies, but had
to settle for several bilateral alliances given regional refusal to ally with Japan. The findings show that bilateral
alliances incur previously neglected ‘assurance costs’ and that alliances are possible between states with divergent
threat perceptions.
Keywords
alliance, assurance, multilateralism
What are the effects of power, interests and threats on the
creation ofinterstate military alliances? What are thetrade-
offs ofmultilateral and bilateralalliance designs?Consensus
on these questions remains elusive despite extensive scho-
larly attention and substantial implications for interna-
tional security. These questions have implications for
whether sharedthreat perceptions are necessary for alliance
creation (Yarhi-Milo, Lanoszka & Cooper (YLC), 2016),
and can furtherclarify which threatperceptions tendto give
rise to what alliance dynamics (Walt, 1987). This article
contributes tothese debates by extending the implications
of the theory of biasedthreat perception where leadersand
their populations fear adversaries from theirpast war (here-
after referred to as the ‘selective attention’ theory of threat
perception)(Jervis, 1976; Yarhi-Milo,2013) to the origins
and designof alliances. It develops a theoryof the assurance
costs of bilateral alliances, whereby patrons prefer multi-
lateralism to prevent their partners’ insecurity from
receiving different unequal bilateral alliances, that it tests
against models that emphasize alliances as instruments of
(bilateral) control against war-prone clients (Cha, 2016;
Pressman, 2008). The theories yield determinate predic-
tions for threat perceptions, alliance preferences and alli-
ance design. Empirically, the article explores a heretofore
neglected case of alliance creation using new archival data
from Australia. Focusing on the United States’ 1951 alli-
ance with Australiaand New Zealand (hereafterreferred to
as ANZUS), it both assesses the sources of threat percep-
tion against what balance of power models would predict
and assesses the roleof power, interests and threats andthe
trade-offs of bilateralism and multilateralism in the origins
of this neglected alliance.
Corresponding author:
mike.cohen@anu.edu.au
Journal of Peace Research
2023, Vol. 60(2) 322–336
ªThe Author(s) 2021
Article reuse guidelines:
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DOI: 10.1177/00223433221077302
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