Diminished responsibility: Jury verdicts and ‘uncontradicted’ psychiatric evidence
| Published date | 01 February 2015 |
| Author | Tony Storey |
| Date | 01 February 2015 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022018314563892c |
| Subject Matter | Court of Appeal |
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Richardson that the judicial direction at first instance could not be faulted (at [20]), so presumably
such a direction was given as its absence was not raised on appeal.
Assuming that a Turnbull direction was delivered at first instance, this should have necessitated an
emphasis on evidence capable of providing support to the weak identification of the appellant. It is
possible that the evidence of bad character provided could have served a dual function and could
be capable of having provided such support, given that the initial reason for admission turned upon
the similarities across the two offences. This would seem a little implausible, however, when one con-
siders the strength of the bad character evidence in the context of Hanson. If evidence of bad character
should never be used to bolster a weak case, then one must question how appropriate it would be for
evidence that is insufficient to support a propensity inference be used to support weak or uncertain
identification evidence, or indeed identity more generally. The admission of bad character evidence
in this instance is also likely to have brought about a complex summing-up from the trial judge, who
would need to balance a thorough direction on the use of the ABH conviction to support identity (and
not propensity) on that basis that it makes it more likely than not that the appellant committed the
offence, whilst also recognising the weakness in the identity parade evidence and, perhaps, the con-
sequent need for the jury to consider the character evidence in support.
Overall, whilst the Court of Appeal was correct to avoid the making of propensity inferences based
upon the evidence of bad character in Richardson, the previous conviction does not sit comfortably
alongside the evidence arising out of the identity parade, as each seems to serve to ‘bolster’ the other.
The court may have over-estimated the capability of the ABH conviction to render it more likely the
appellant perpetrated the offence, and when this is considered alongside the somewhat uncertain
results of the identity parade, one wonders whether the evidence of bad character was indeed safely
admitted in this case.
Emma Smith and Michael Stockdale
R v Brennan [2014] EWCA Crim 2387, Court of Appeal
Keywords
Murder, diminished responsibility, jury verdicts
Diminished responsibility: Jury verdicts and ‘uncontradicted’
psychiatric evidence
Michael Brennan, 22, worked as a male escort. In May 2013, he sent a text to one of his clients, Paul
Simons, a 54-year-old divorced antiques dealer, inviting him to visit Brennan at a flat in Chelmsford.
The flat was rented by Brennan’s boyfriend, who was on holiday at the time, and so was otherwise unoc-
cupied. There, Brennan stabbed Simons to death with three knives in what was described as a ‘savage
and sustained attack’. The probable cause of death was a stab wound that penetrated Simons’ heart to a
depth of 15 cm. There was a second stab wound to the chest and a blow to the back of his head with a
hammer (probably inflicted post-mortem). There were a total of 22 stab wounds, mostly to Simons’
back, caused while he was lying face down on the floor. Brennan then left the flat and rang the police
to tell them that he had just killed someone.
Brennan was charged with murder and appeared before Judge Ball QC and a jury at Chelmsford
Crown Court in December 2013. Brennan had previously offered a plea of guilty to manslaughter on the
basis of diminished responsibility, but that was rejected by the Crown. At the trial, it was undisputed that
Brennan had killed Simons and that he had done so intentionally. The only defence was diminished
responsibility, under s. 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 (as amended by s. 52 of...
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