Disruption and deniable interventionism: explaining the appeal of covert action and Special Forces in contemporary British policy
| Author | Rory Cormac |
| Date | 01 June 2017 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0047117816659532 |
| Published date | 01 June 2017 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117816659532
International Relations
2017, Vol. 31(2) 169 –191
© The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/0047117816659532
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Disruption and deniable
interventionism: explaining
the appeal of covert action and
Special Forces in contemporary
British policy
Rory Cormac
University of Nottingham
Abstract
The United Kingdom has long engaged in covert action. It continues to do so today. Owing
to the secrecy involved, however, such activity has consistently been excluded from debates
about Britain’s global role, foreign and security policy and military planning: an important lacuna
given the controversy, risk, appeal and frequency of covert action. Examining when, how and
why covert action is used, this article argues that contemporary covert action has emerged
from, and is shaped by, a specific context. First, a gap exists between Britain’s perceived global
responsibilities and its actual capabilities; policy elites see covert action as able to resolve, or
at least conceal, this. Second, intelligence agencies can shape events proactively, especially at
the tactical level, while flexible preventative operations are deemed well suited to the range of
fluid threats currently faced. Third, existing Whitehall machinery makes covert action viable.
However, current covert action is smaller scale and less provocative today than in the early Cold
War; it revolves around ‘disruption’ operations. Despite being absent from the accompanying
debates, this role was recognised in the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, which
placed intelligence actors at the heart of British thinking.
Keywords
British foreign and defence policy, covert action, intelligence, Special Forces
Britain has long engaged in covert action, the interference in the affairs of another state
or non-state actor in a detectable but plausibly deniable manner. The late 1940s saw
Corresponding author:
Rory Cormac, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK.
Email: rory.cormac@nottingham.ac.uk
659532IRE0010.1177/0047117816659532International RelationsCormac
research-article2016
Article
170 International Relations 31(2)
operations to ‘liberate’ Albania. In the 1950s, attention turned to ambitious attempts at
regime change in Iran, Egypt and Syria. Over the following decade, covert action
extended to supporting rebels in the Yemeni civil war and disrupting Indonesian forces
during Confrontation. The 1970s saw a slight dip but did include covert action closer to
home in Northern Ireland – as well as a continuation on distant shores, this time interven-
ing in Oman. Under Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s, covert action increased with opera-
tions supporting the Afghan Mujahedeen against the Soviets. Another dip occurred in the
1990s, but the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or more commonly known as MI6) still
sought to disrupt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction covertly. This contin-
ued into the 2000s, alongside a renewed emphasis on propaganda and Special Forces as
part of the so-called War on Terror.1
Covert action has continued since 2010. Examples include activity against Muammar
Gadaffi during the Libyan civil war, operations to disrupt the Iranian nuclear programme,
cyber operations against terrorists and organised criminals and efforts to discredit
Argentina through circulating false propaganda and implanting computer viruses.2
Meanwhile, David Cameron sanctioned the use of Special Forces in Libya, Iraq and
Syria – and was keen to use them in Algeria and Mali too. Through official documents,
whistle-blowers, press reports and interviews – and a rigorous methodological process of
source triangulation – it is possible to move beyond the realms of speculation and uncover
a surprising amount of detail on such activity.
Nonetheless, scholarship on covert action inevitably suffers, owing to intense secrecy,
from greater epistemological fragility, or uncertainty around what we can and cannot
know, than studies of other means of policy execution. E.H. Carr famously wrote that
history ‘has been called an enormous jig-saw with a lot of missing parts’,3 but when it
comes to covert action, scholars have to deal with misleading, as well as plenty of miss-
ing, pieces while simultaneously lacking an overall picture to guide their efforts. It is a
world, to use Donald Rumsfeld’s famous, if clumsy, phrase, of known unknowns and
unknown unknowns. Covert action scholarship also suffers an evidence bias. Paramilitary-
type special operations often receive the most press and parliamentary attention – unsur-
prising given that they are among the more tangible and dramatic forms of deniable
interventionism. However, this bias belies a range of nebulous and more subtle covert
action existing further below the radar.4
Importantly, such issues do not mean that covert action should automatically be
excluded from academic inquiry. Far from it, the inherent controversy, frequency, risk
and appeal of covert action make it too important to ignore. Guided by the available
evidence, this article perhaps inevitably focuses on paramilitary-type special operations
– although it does discuss covert propaganda, technical and influence operations in detail
where possible. However, this should not be taken to imply that Special Forces activity
necessarily outweighs less tangible operations.
Interrogating when, how and why Britain has used covert action since 2010, this arti-
cle argues that contemporary covert action has emerged from, and is shaped by, a specific
context. After revealing British understandings for the first time,5 it highlights three areas
– ideational, functional and bureaucratic – that enable covert action to flourish. First, the
United Kingdom seeks to maintain a global role – a powerful idea long driving foreign
policy – but is constrained by economic, military and political factors. This creates a gap
between perceived responsibilities and actual capabilities (or a responsibility–capability
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