Distributions and Relations: A Hybrid Account
| Author | Andres Moles,Tom Parr |
| Published date | 01 February 2019 |
| Date | 01 February 2019 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0032321718755589 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321718755589
Political Studies
2019, Vol. 67(1) 132 –148
© The Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/0032321718755589
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Distributions and Relations:
A Hybrid Account
Andres Moles1 and Tom Parr2
Abstract
There is a deep divide among political philosophers of an egalitarian stripe. On the one hand,
there are so-called distributive egalitarians, who hold that equality obtains within a political
community when each of its members enjoys an equal share of the community’s resources. On
the other hand, there are so-called social egalitarians, who instead hold that equality obtains within
a political community when each of its members stands in certain relations to other members
of the community, such as non-domination and lack of oppression. In this article, we have three
aims. Our first aim is to cast doubt on the helpfulness of characterizing the debate in this way.
Our second aim is to reconstruct this debate in alternative and more precise terms, so that
disagreements between advocates of either side are easier to evaluate. Our third aim is to advance
a hybrid account that integrates element from both views.
Keywords
Relational equality, distributive justice, egalitarianism
Accepted: 31 December 2017
Introduction
There is a deep, perhaps even fundamental, divide among political philosophers of an
egalitarian stripe. On the one hand, there are so-called distributive egalitarians, who hold
that equality obtains within a political community when each of its members enjoys an
equal share of the community’s resources.1 On the other hand, there are so-called social
egalitarians, who instead hold that equality obtains within a political community when
each of its members stands in certain relations to other members of the community, such
as non-domination and lack of oppression.2 As egalitarians, then, we must choose between
these two rival positions. Does equality consist in the equal distribution of resources or
certain relations among individuals?
Our first aim in this article is to cast doubt on the helpfulness of characterizing the
debate in this way—that is, in terms of mutually exclusive claims about the nature of the
1Department of Political Science and Department of Philosophy, Central European University, Budapest,
Hungary
2Department of Government, University of Essex, Colchester, UK
Corresponding author:
Andres Moles, Central European University, Nador u. 9, 1051 Budapest, Hungary.
Email: molesa@ceu.edu
755589PSX0010.1177/0032321718755589Political StudiesMoles and Parr
research-article2018
Article
Moles and Parr 133
demands of equality. Framing the debate in these terms can hide some similarities between
these views, delaying progress with a range of social and political issues.
Our second aim is to reconstruct the debate between distributive egalitarianism and
social egalitarianism in more precise terms, so that disagreements between the contribu-
tions of advocates on either side are easier to evaluate. Our strategy makes use of the idea
that reasons should be the unit of analysis for our purposes. Accordingly, while many
political theorists characterize the debate in terms of the nature of the demands of equal-
ity, we propose re-articulating it in terms of claims about reasons. Instead of analyzing the
concept of equality, we must examine the reasons in favor of equality. When put in these
terms, distributive egalitarianism holds that we have reasons to secure an equal distribu-
tion of resources among members of a community, and social egalitarianism holds that
we have reasons to ensure certain relations between them.
When stated in this way, distributive egalitarianism and social egalitarianism are not
rival positions, in the sense that we must choose between them. We may have reason to
secure an equal distribution of resources, and we may have reason to ensure certain rela-
tions. Under some conditions, the two claims may even be supportive, such that we have
reason to secure an equal distribution of resources because we have reason to ensure
certain relations (Anderson, 1999: 313–314; Scheffler, 2005). Our third aim is to delve
deeper into this possibility, as well as more generally to explore the complex relationship
between these two types of reasons. This is an under-explored question.3 The lack of lit-
erature here reflects the fact that many commentators have mistakenly been drawn to the
idea that distributive egalitarianism and social egalitarianism offer mutually exclusive
possibilities that we must choose between.
We develop a hybrid account that incorporates both distributive egalitarianism and
social egalitarianism. This account reflects the fact that both positions describe funda-
mental reasons, which may sometimes conflict, but often are mutually supportive of each
other. We call this account hybrid so as to emphasize how distributive egalitarianism and
social egalitarianism continue to make distinct claims and, thus, also to highlight distinct
sources of our fundamental moral reasons. By shedding light on the relationship between
distributive and social egalitarianism, we contribute to developing an attractive egalitar-
ian view.
It is worth noting that both distributive egalitarianism and social egalitarianism are
themselves diverse positions. Famously, there is widespread disagreement among dis-
tributive egalitarians about what makes a distribution of resources equal, in the relevant
sense. Whereas some claim that it is equal when each individual enjoys equally valuable
opportunities for preference-satisfaction, others deny this.4 Similar disputes surround the
conditions under which deviations from equality that result from choice may remain just
(Dworkin, 2011: ch. 10). Similarly, there is room for widespread disagreement among
social egalitarians about what makes relations between individuals valuable, in the rele-
vant sense. Whereas some focus exclusively on the demands of democratic citizenship,
others incorporate a concern for other features of potentially valuable relations between
individuals.5 There is also disagreement about the site of the demands of each position.
Do they apply only to society’s basic structure or also to an individual’s choices within
that structure?6
Many of these disagreements are germane to our task. To understand the relation-
ship between distributive egalitarianism and social egalitarianism, we need to under-
stand which versions of the two positions we are considering. One way to proceed,
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