Distributive Justice and the Problem of Friendship
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9248.12115 |
| Date | 01 August 2015 |
| Published date | 01 August 2015 |
| Author | Chiara Cordelli |
| Subject Matter | Article |
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P O L I T I C A L S T U D I E S : 2 0 1 5 V O L 6 3 , 6 7 9 – 6 9 5
doi: 10.1111/1467-9248.12115
Distributive Justice and the Problem
of Friendship
Chiara Cordelli
University of Exeter
Friendship distributes critical benefits across society and does so unequally. Income, levels of education and health
vary dramatically according to the quality of individuals’ friendships. Further, friendships shape the motivations and
aspirations of their participants. In light of these facts, this article questions whether and how egalitarian requirements
should apply to personal friendship. I first show that existing theories of distributive justice, whether they are
‘outcomes centred’ or ‘institutionalist’, have reasons to consider personal friendship as a direct subject of justice.
However, both fail to provide reasonable guidelines for how to apply the requirements of justice to friendship. I thus
argue that principles of justice, in particular fair equality of opportunity, ought to assess and govern that part of the
social structure that controls the production and distribution of friendship bonds across society. I theorise a ‘relational
distributive structure’, mainly constituted by civil society associations, as the appropriate subject of justice.
Keywords: friendship;
distributive
justice;
personal
prerogative;
civil
society;
egalitarianism
People with many friends tend to be healthier and to live longer (Berkman, 1995). Income,
wealth and levels of education vary dramatically according to the quality of individuals’
friendships (Lin, 2001). Adolescents’ aspirations are profoundly shaped by their friends
(Buss, 2000). Nowadays, with many individuals living outside the context of nuclear
families, reliance upon friends often also becomes a substitute for family members
(Rosenbury, 2007). Personal friendship, in all of these ways, plays an increasingly impor-
tant role in people’s lives and their societies.
Despite the ever-pervasive effects of friendship bonds on individuals’ lives, and despite
politics scholars’ renewed interest in friendship (see Devere and Smith, 2010), theorists of
distributive justice have paid little attention to personal friendship.1 Friendship is treated
either as being outside the direct purview of distributive justice altogether, or as part of
those personal pursuits that should be exempted from requirements of justice through a
personal prerogative (Cohen, 2008, pp. 10–1, pp. 61–3). Debates about the scope of
distributive justice within the ‘private’ sphere remain confined to the family and the
market.
After clarifying what I mean by friendship and which relationships fall within this
category, I shall investigate whether and how egalitarian principles of distributive justice
apply to friendship. I will first argue that egalitarians (e.g. Cohen, 2008) who are primarily
concerned with the distributive outcomes of personal choices and social structures alike –
hereafter ‘outcomes-centred egalitarians’ – cannot easily exempt friendship choices from the
purview of egalitarian justice. How we choose our friends and distribute benefits to them
upsets the overall distribution of benefits and burdens in society. Likewise, theorists of
justice (e.g. Rawls, 1971) who primarily focus on the justice of social institutions –
© 2014 The Author. Political Studies © 2014 Political Studies Association
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C H I A R A C O R D E L L I
hereafter ‘institutionalists’ – have reasons to extend the purview of justice directly to the
practice of friendship. This practice, I argue, shares with the institution of the family several
of those very features that make the latter a legitimate subject of justice (Okin, 1989).
However, both strands of theory fail to provide adequate directives for how principles of
justice should govern friendship. Outcomes-centred egalitarians would seem to be com-
mitted to applying egalitarian requirements directly to friendship choices. Individuals
would be required to pick their friends, and to distribute the benefits of friendship,
according to an egalitarian ethos. Call this mode of application choice extensionism. This, I
will show, would have the undesirable result of compromising the very possibility of
friendship. Attempts to correct choice extensionism by allowing a ‘personal prerogative’
for friendship choices, I will argue, also fail appropriately to reconcile justice and friend-
ship. Choice extensionism is not the appropriate way to extend principles of justice to
friendship.
Institutionalists may attempt to apply principles of justice to the public institution of
friendship, and only indirectly to the choices made within it. Call this mode of application
legal extensionism. However, given the absence of a legal system of rules to frame friendship,
it is unclear how principles of justice could apply to friendship in this way. Also, the
argument that a public institution of friendship should be instituted may be refuted on
moral grounds, or so I will argue. Legal extensionism must be ruled out as well.
I will thus argue that, instead of directly governing friendship choices or regulating the
institution of friendship, principles of social justice should rather assess and govern the set
of social organisations – what I call the ‘relational distributive structure’ – that fundamen-
tally shape the production and distribution of friendships. This normative solution to the
problem of friendship defends personal friendship from liberty-undermining intrusions, but
also has important implications for social and public policy. I conclude by exploring
how governments might shape those relational contexts in which friendships form and
reproduce.
Defining Friendship
Let me begin by clarifying the kinds of friendship that I am concerned with, and how they
differ from other relationships. Friendship is after all a notoriously vague term whose
meaning has radically changed over time (Allan, 1996). Social scientists identify many
different forms of friendship (see Spencer and Pahl, 2006, ch. 3). In this article, I will call
‘friendships’ one particular set of interpersonal relationships, which are voluntary and, to
some degree, affective, as well as non-instrumental. Framed by a distinctively loose
institutional structure, they are further characterised by ‘rough reciprocity’ as their central
norm of exchange.
Friendships, unlike relationships of kinship, are voluntary in that we are not born into
them and (in a sense to be qualified) we ‘choose’ our friends. Yet unlike other voluntary
relationships – for example marriage and many market relationships – friendships are
non-contractual.2 They develop slowly and it is only through the sharing of experiences, as
well as the roughly reciprocal – balanced but not necessarily equal – and trust-infused
exchange of material and immaterial goods (e.g. practical and emotional support) over time
that we express a commitment to be someone’s friend.
© 2014 The Author. Political Studies © 2014 Political Studies Association
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2015, 63(3)
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Further, unlike relationships based on impersonal benevolence and civic friendships, the
friendships I am concerned with are affective and particularistic relationships. Although
friendships can certainly exhibit very different degrees of affection and intimacy, they require,
at least to some degree, the presence of an emotional bond. They cannot therefore come into
existence in the complete absence of those repeated interactions through which attachment
is generated. Further, in order for an action to count as an act of friendship, friends must take
into account the particular identity of their friends qua friends in deciding on right action –
call this condition friendship particularism (Hooker and Little, 2000). Therefore, strangers do
not count as friends in my account, even if they are committed fellow citizens.
However, unlike other affective relationships such as families, friendships are not sensu
stricto ‘institutions’. Although culturally constrained, friendships are not defined by a clear
framework of rules and they lack a clearly spelled out social purpose (see Blatterer, 2013).
This unstructured and flexible nature is what makes friendship, as I hope to illustrate,
particularly vexing for egalitarian justice.
Finally, although friendships can be (and almost always are) grounded on a mix of
different motives (affection, utility and pleasure), purely instrumental bonds are not
included in my account of friendship, unless they also exhibit some degree of non-
instrumental concern. By this I mean that friends must at least sometimes be prepared to
act for their friends’ own sake, as their final goal, rather than as a means towards some end
(Blum, 1980; Stocker, 1976). This excludes from my account of friendship what Liz
Spencer and Ray Pahl (2006) call ‘useful contacts’. It includes, however, so-called ‘con-
fidants’, ‘comforters’ and practical ‘helpmates’ who exchange emotional and/or practical
support to each other over time, and whose bonds generally have both an instrumental and
a non-instrumental character.
Note that by limiting my account of friendship to certain relationships I do not intend
to imply that individuals should value these relationships more than others. Nor do I want
to argue that theorists of justice should ignore interpersonal relationships, recognised by
some as friendships, which my account here excludes. Both ‘civic friendships’ and ‘useful...
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