Divisional Court
| DOI | 10.1350/jcla.2008.72.6.529 |
| Published date | 01 December 2008 |
| Date | 01 December 2008 |
| Subject Matter | Divisional Court |
Divisional Court
Modifying Control Orders: Illuminating the Borderline
Secretary of State for the Home Department vAP [2008] EWHC 2001
(Admin)
Keywords Terrorism; European Convention on Human Rights, Article
5; Liberty and security; Reasonable suspicion; Judicial review
On 10 January 2008, following permission of the court, a control order
was made against AP. Control orders are preventative orders that impose
obligations on an individual for purposes connected with protecting
members of the public from a risk of terrorism. Under s. 2(1) of the
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, the Home Secretary has the power to
impose a non-derogating control order (i.e. a control order that does not
require a derogation from the right to liberty and security under Article
5 of the European Convention on Human Rights) where she has reason-
able grounds for suspecting that an individual is or has been involved in
terrorism-related activity and where she considers it necessary, for
purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of
terrorism, to make a control order imposing obligations on an in-
dividual. An application will usually be made to the court before an
order is made, although in urgent situations the Secretary of State can
make an order pending judicial confirmation within seven days (2005
Act, s. 3(1)–(4)). Following traditional procedures of judicial review, the
court has the power to quash the entire control order or a number of its
obligations, to direct the Secretary of State to revoke the order, or to
modify the imposed obligations (2005 Act, s. 3(10)–(12)). A right of
appeal also exists in s. 10(3) of the 2005 Act against a decision by the
Secretary of State to modify an obligation imposed by a non-derogating
control order without consent of the controlee.
AP lodged an application to review the decision to make the order.
The court considered this application, together with the need for the
order and associated obligations. AP was subjected to a variety of condi-
tions, including a 16-hour curfew together with a requirement to wear
an electronic tag. He was also required to reside at his flat in Tottenham
and to permit it to be searched at any time; he was not permitted to leave
the local area; he was required to report daily to the police station; he
was not permitted any visitors except his mother, brother, or individuals
with prior Home Office approval; he was forbidden from attending pre-
arranged meetings or gatherings without Home Office approval; and he
was forbidden to have internet access. AP was, however, permitted to
use mobile and home telephones; he could also visit one approved
mosque of his choice. The Home Secretary was requested to vary the
obligations restricting AP to one mosque and to remove the prohibition
on pre-arranged meetings. This was refused and formed the basis of a
first appeal. On 21 April 2008, AP was informed that he would be moved
476 The Journal of Criminal Law (2008) 72 JCL 476-487
doi:1350/jcla.2008.72.6.529
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