Divisional Court Cases
| DOI | 10.1177/002201835101500303 |
| Published date | 01 July 1951 |
| Date | 01 July 1951 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Divisional Court Cases
COMMITTAL
FOR
SENTENCE:
GRANTING OF BAIL
In
re Whitehouse
T
HE
above
case
(1951
1
K.B.
673) raised
the
question
whether
the
High Court has
any
jurisdiction
to
admit
to
bail aperson committed to quarter sessions for sentence
under sec. 29(1) of
the
Criminal Justice Act, 1948. The
applicant was convicted
by
acourt of summary jurisdiction
at
Liverpool of receiving property knowing
it
to have been
stolen.
The
court, having obtained information as to
the
applicant's character
and
antecedents as required
by
sec.
29(1), decided
to
commit him for sentence to Liverpool
quarter sessions. On
the
10th
January
1951
the
applicant
served notice of appeal against his conviction
and
also
applied
to
the
High Court for bail. The judge in chambers
referred
the
matter
to
the
Divisional Court
and
on
the
18th
January
1951
the
application came before a
~
Divisional
Court consisting of Lord Goddard C.J., Humphreys
and
Devlin
JJ.
Counsel for
the
applicant contended
that
jurisdiction
to
grant
bail in such a case was conferred upon
the
.High
Court
by
sec. 37(1) of
the
Criminal Justice Act, 1948
the
material terms of which are
:-
"Without
prejudice to
the
powers vested before
the
commencement of this Act in
any
court to admit or
direct
the
admission of a person to
bail-
(a)
the
High Court
may
release from custody aperson
. who has given notice of appeal to a court of quarter
sessions against aconviction or sentence of a court
of summary jurisdiction on his entering into a
recognizance conditioned for his appearance
at
the
hearing of
the
appeal."
The court of summary jurisdiction was obliged
by
the
express provisions of sec. 29(1) of
the
Criminal Justice Act
Q241
242 THE
JOURNAL
OF
CRIMINAL
LAW
1948 to commit
the
applicant in custody
and
had
therefore
no jurisdiction to admit him to
bail:
see R. v. South
Greenhoe I]. :ex parte Director
of
Public Prosecutions
(1950
I.C.L. 277) where
the
justices erroneously granted bail.
Prior to
the
enactment of
the
Criminal Justice Act
1948
Hallett
J.
had
held in ex parte Blyth (1944
K.B.
532)
that
where a convicted person applies to quarter sessions
to
state
a case there was no jurisdiction in
the
High Court
to
grant
bail. The power to
grant
bail in such circumstances
and
also on case
stated
by a court of summary jurisdiction
is expressly conferred
by
paragraphs (b)
and
(c)
of sec. 37(1).
Shortly after
the
decision in ex parte Blyth (supra)
Hallett
J.
held
(In
re Lyttleton
(1945)
W.N.24)
that
the
High Court
had
no jurisdiction to
grant
bail on appeal to
quarter
sessions although
the
justices
had
such power under sec 31
of
the
Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879;
and
in ex parte
Speculand (1946 1
K.B.
48) Lynskey J. held
that
where
justices
had
fixed
the
amount of bail pending appeal
the
High Court could
not
reduce such amount.
The judgment of
the
Court on
the
question of juris-
diction was delivered
by
Lord Goddard C.J. His Lordship
stated
that
what
impressed him was
that
before
the
Criminal
Justice Act 1948 once notice of appeal
had
been given a
court of summary jurisdiction could under sec. 31 of
the
SummaryJurisdiction Act 1879 as amended
by
sec. 1 of
the
Summary Jurisdiction (Appeals) Act, 1933
grant
bail.
There was no doubt, said Lord Goddard,
if
justices refuse
to
admit
a
man
to bail, having jurisdiction to do so, he
could always apply to
the
High Court.
It
looked therefore
as
if
para
(a) could only be referable to such a case as
the
present, where
it
was agreed
that
the
justices
had
no such
power.
It
appeared to
him
therefore
that
the
High Court
had
power to entertain an application for bail of a person
committed for sentence to
quarter
sessions who appealed
against his conviction.
It
will be noted
that
by
inference
the
Divisional Court
disapproved of
the
decision of
Hallett
J.
(In
re Lyttleton
supra)
that
the
High Court
had
no inherent jurisdiction
to
bail aperson who appeals
to
quarter sessions against
conviction.
In
view of
the
terms of para. (a) of sec. 37 (1)
the
point is only of academic interest as this
paragraph
clearly covers such appeals, even
if
apart
therefrom
the
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