Divisional Court Cases
| DOI | 10.1177/002201835602000103 |
| Published date | 01 January 1956 |
| Date | 01 January 1956 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Divisional Court Cases
PEDESTRIAN
CROSSINGS AND CARELESS
DRIVING
Gibbons v.
Kahl
TH I S case (1955 3 W.L.R. 596) shows
the
limits of
the
decision in Leicester
~'.
Pearson (1952 J.eL.346) in which it
will be
remembered
that
the
High
Court
dismissed an appeal
by
the
prosecution from adecision of a Metropolitan magistrate
dismissing an information charging abreach of
the
Pedestrian
Crossings Regulations
then
in force on
the
ground
that
the
defendant
had
not been guilty of any negligence.
In
the
present case informations were preferred before
Middlesexjusticessitting at
Edmonton
charging
the
respondent
with-
(a) driving a
motor
vehicle at Bruce Grove,
Tottenham
without
due
care
and
attention contrary to s. 12 (I)
of
the
Road Traffic Act, 1930;
(b)
failing to accord precedence to a foot passenger on an
uncontrolled pedestrian crossing contrary to reg. 4
of
the
Pedestrian Crossings Regulations, 1954.
The
facts proved or
admitted
before
the
justices were
that
atrolley
bus
was approaching apedestrian crossing in
Bruce Grove at a speed of
about
20
m.p.h.
When
20 to 25
yards from
the
crossing
the
driver noticed
three
children step
into
the
crossing.
He
gave a
"slow-down"
hand
signal
and
brought
his vehicle to a stop in front of
the
crossing with its
off-side
about
12 ft. from his near-side kerb.
The
respondent
who was driving aprivate car
behind
the
trolley
bus
in
the
same direction collided with one of
the
children on
the
crossing.
After
the
accident
the
near-side of his vehicle was found to
be 17! ft. from its near-side kerb. After
the
accident
the
respondent told a police officer
that
immediately he saw
the
trolley bus driver's signal he stopped.
The
justices dismissed
both
informations on
the
ground
that
there
was a
doubt
whether
the
respondent had been negligent. Against this
3°
DIVISIONAL
COURT
CASES 31
decision
the
prosecutor appealed by case stated.
The
appeal
was heard on
the
zoth October, 1955 by a Divisional Court
consisting of
Lord
Goddard C.}., Ormerod and Barry
JJ.
With
reference to the charge of driving without due care
and
attention
Lord
Goddard said that
the
Court did not view
with favour appeals against
the
decision of justices in this type
of case.
The
decision almost invariably depended
upon
questions of fact of which the justices were the sole judges.
The
Court had from time to time reversed justices' decisions
dismissing charges of this nature where it had appeared to
the
Court
that
the
conclusion reached was perverse because the
magistrates had ignored some obvious piece of evidence or had
taken into account some matter which was irrelevant.
The
decision of the justices in the present case to give the respon-
dent
the benefit of the doubt could not be regarded as per-
verse.
The
appeal against their decision in respect of this
offence would therefore be dismissed.
Dealing with the charge
under
the Pedestrian Crossings
Regulations, 1954 his Lordship observed that the decision in
Leicester
v.
Pearson (supra) had depended
upon
the very special
findings of fact in that case.
The
magistrate had found that the
site of
the
pedestrian crossing was ill-lit,
that
it was dark
and
raining at the time
and
that
the defendant was not guilty of
any negligence in failing to observe in time that there was
someone on the crossing.
In
the present case it was no answer
for the respondent to say
that
he could not see
the
pedestrians
because
the
stationary trolley bus had obscured his view.
He knew
that
there was a crossing ahead and should have been
prepared to stop at it. Indeed the fact
that
there was a vehicle
stationary on
the
crossing should have indicated to him
that
the
crossing was in use by pedestrians.
Lord
Goddard said
that
he would be sorry to lay down that whenever adriver com-
mitted an offence against the Pedestrian Crossing Regulations
he had been guilty of careless driving. His Lordship said
that
he would allow
the
appeal against the dismissal of this informa-
tion and
the
case should be sent back to the justices with an
intimation
that
the offence had been proved.
Brief concurring judgments were delivered by Ormerod
and
Barry
JJ.
It
would seem from the foregoing decision that cases of
this type really depend
upon
who has discharged
the
onus of
proof. Where amotorist collides with apedestrian on an
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