Divisional Court Cases
| Published date | 01 January 1950 |
| Date | 01 January 1950 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/002201835001400103 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Divisional Court Cases
NOTICE
OF·
INTENDED
PROSECUTION
Venn v. Morgan
By section 21 of
the
Road Traffic Act 1930
:-
"Where aperson is prosecuted for
an
offence under
any
of
the
provisions of this
Part
of this Act relating
respectively
to
the
maximum speed
at
which motor vehicles
may
be driven, to reckless or dangerous driving
and
to
careless driving he shall
not
be convicted unless
.....
(c)
within
the
(said) fourteen days (of
the
alleged
offence) a notice of
the
intended prosecution specifying
the
nature
of
the
alleged offence
and
the
time
and
place
where
it
is alleged to have been committed was served
on or
sent
by
registered
post
to
him."
In
the
present case (1949,2
A.E.R.
562) withinfourteen
days of a road accident anotice was sent to
the
respondent
in
the
following terms
:-
"In
pursuance of
the
provisions of s. 21 of
the
Road
Traffic Act 1930, I,
the
undersigned, do hereby
give you notice
that
it
is intended to institute proceedings
against
you
for an offence against s. 12 of
the
Road
Traffic Act, 1930, namely,
that
you
did drive amotor-
car
on
the
Cambridge-Linton Road, Babraham,
at
approximately 4.25 p.m. on Saturday,
Jan.
29th, 1949."
Thereafter information was preferred against
the
respondent before
the
Linton
(Cambridgeshire) Justices
alleging
that
at
the
time
and
place specified in
the
notice
the
respondent
had
driven amotor-car without due care
and
attention
contrary
to sec. 12 of
the
Road Traffic Act,
1930.
At
the
hearing apreliminary objection was
taken
that
the
notice sent to
the
respondent did
not
comply with
the
requirements of sec. 21 of
the
Road Traffic Act, 1930.
The Justices upheld this submission
and
dismissed
the
information without hearing
any
evidence on
the
merits.
Against this decision
the
appellant, a police inspector,
appealed
by
way of case
stated
to
the
Divisional Court.
On
the
27th
July
1949,
the
appeal was
heard
by
aCourt
4:5
46
THE
JOURNAL
OF CRIMINAL
LAW
consisting of
Lord
Goddard C.J., Oliver
and
Stable
JJ.
who
by
amajority allowed
the
appeal
and
remitted
the
case to
the
justices
to
hear
the
evidence.
Lord
Goddard C.J. in
the
course of his
judgment
pointed
out
that
the
object of section 21
had
been explained
by
the
Court in Milner v. Allen (1933, 1
K.B.
698) where
notice was given of
an
intended prosecution for driving in
amanner dangerous
but
information
had
been preferred
only for driving
without
due care.
In
that
case
the
Court
had
said
that
the
defendant could
not
complain
that
he
had
not
been prosecuted for
the
more serious offence.
Lord
Hewart
C.J.
had
said
that
the
notice served gave
"adequate notice of
the
essential facts".
In
considering
the
notice in
the
present case
it
was to be observed
that
the
marginal note
to
sec. 12 referred
to
it
compendiously as
"careless
driving"
and
it
was similarly so described in
sec. 21.
The
reference in
the
notice to
that
section enabled
the
respondent to ascertain
the
nature
of
the
charge against
him.
The
notice further specified atime
and
place.
In
his opinion
the
objection to
the
notice failed.
Oliver
J.
agreed
with
the
Lord
Chief Justice. He
stated
that
the
notice
had
obviously been carelessly drawn
as
it
did
not
specify which of
the
two offences under sec. 12
(driving
without
due care
and
attention
or
without
reason-
able consideration for
other
users of
the
road) would form
the
subject of
the
prosecution. However, he was impressed
by
the
wording of para.
(c)
of sec. 21 which did not require
the
alleged offence to be specified
but
merely
the
nature
of
the
offence.
The
nature
of
the
offence was driving
at
acertain
time
and
place in a manner which contravened
sec. 12 of
the
Act;
and
the
notice
had
given this informa-
tion.Stable
J.,
who dissented, said
that
he agreed
with
the
decision of
the
justices.
In
his opinion Milner v. Allen
(supra) was distinguishable.
In
that
case all
the
essential
facts
had
been given in
the
notice. This was a criminal pro-
ceeding
and any
condition precedent thereto ought to be
strictly construed.
The
offence against sec. 12 was des-
cribed in
the
following terms
:-
"namely,
that
you
did drive amotor-car on
the
Cam-
bridge-Linton
Road
at
Babraham
at
approximately
4.25 p.m. on Saturday,
Jan.
29, 1949".
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