Divisional Court Cases
| Published date | 01 October 1949 |
| Date | 01 October 1949 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/002201834901300404 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Divisional Court Cases
DRIVING
WHEN
UNINSURED
:
'SPECIAL
REASONS'
Reay v. Young
e.
Anor.
THIS
(1949,1
A.E.R.
1103) was a case
stated
by
Durham
justices sitting
at
Consett.
The
respondents were
husband
and
wife.
The
husband
was charged
with
having
on
the
19th
October 1948
permitted
his wife to drive his
motor-car when there was
not
in force
any
policy of insur-
ance in relation to such user of
the
vehicle.
The
wife was
charged
with
using
the
vehicle under these circumstances.
On
the
22nd November1948
both
respondentspleadedguilty
before
the
justices
and
were each fined £2
but
no disqualifi-
cation was imposed upon either. Upon a case being
stated
at
the
instance of
the
prosecutor
the
justices
stated:
" We
came to
the
conclusion
that
the
facts amounted to a special
reason for
not
disqualifying either of
the
respondents
and
considered
that
the
fines were sufficient punishment."
The
Divisional Court directed
that
the
case should go
back
to
the
justices for
them
to
state
more fully on
what
facts
they
had
reached
the
conclusion
that
'special reasons'
existed.
The
justices
then
stated
that
the
'special reasons'
were
:-
(a)
That
there was no risk of accident because
the
offence occurred on a moorland road where traffic
at
any
time was light
and
at
the
time of
the
offence no other traffic was on
the
road other
than
amotor cycle ridden
by
the
police officer who
stopped
the
respondents
and
discovered
the
offence.
(b)
That
the
husband was in
the
car
with
his wife.
(c)
That
the
car was being driven slowly
and
for a
short
distance (100-150 yds) only.
The
case
with
this further elucidation came on
the
4th
May 1949 before a Divisional Court consisting of Lord
Goddard C.J.,
Birkett
and
Lynskey
JJ.
who dismissed
the
appeal.
372
DIVISIONAL COURT
CASES
373
Lord Goddard pointed
out
that
when
the
car
was
stopped
by
the
police officer
the
wife was holding
the
driving wheel
and
the
husband was sitting
by
her
side. A
question might well arise in a case of this character as
to
whether
the
husband
had
sufficiently
parted
with
the
control of
the
vehicle so as to cease
to
be
the
'driver' (see
Samson v. Aitchison (1992 A.C. 844).
It
was
not
however
necessary
to
consider such aquestion in
the
present case
as
both
respondents
had
pleaded guilty. The Court
must
therefore assume
that
the
only driver of
the
vehicle was
the
wife
and
that
the
husband was permitting
her
to
drive
in
the
full sense of
the
term.
The
Court
had
previously laid down
that
in order
to
constitute a'special reason' within
the
meaning of sec. 35
(2) of
the
Road Traffic Act, 1930
the
reason
must
be special
to
the
offence
and
not
special to
the
offender. Thus
it
was
not
aspecial reason
that
it
was
the
offender's first offence
or
that
he earned his living
by
driving
and
would suffer
hardship
if
he were disqualified.
In
the
present case
the
offence
had
been committed in broad daylight on a lonely
moorland road where there was
very
little traffic
and
the
wife
had
only driven very slowly some 150 yards when
the
car
was stopped. His Lordship added
that
he was far from
-saying
that
the
mere fact
that
aperson
had
only been.
allowed
to
hold
the
driving wheel for a short time would
necessarily constitute a'special reason'.
It
might well be
a serious
matter
if
it
were done in a town or even a village.
In
cases of this
nature
where
the
justices
had
found
the
facts,
it
was a question of law whether those facts could
amount to 'special reasons'. The justices were entitled to
express their opinion upon those facts
and
hold
that
they
amounted
to
'special reasons'.
If
in coming to
that
decision
the
justices applied
the
correct principle of con-
sidering whether
the
facts were special to
the
offence,
the
Divisional Court would
not
interfere with their decision.
It
was impossible upon
the
present facts as found
by
the
justices
to
say
that
there were
not
'special reasons' within
the
meaning of sec. 35
(2)
of
the
Act. The appeal would
therefore be dismissed.
Birkett
J. in
the
course of a brief judgment pointed
out
that
in
the
leading case of Whittall v. Kirby
(1947
11
I.C.L. 158)
the
Court
had
expressly based its decision upon
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