Divisional Court Cases

DOI10.1177/002201835001400303
Published date01 July 1950
Date01 July 1950
Subject MatterArticle
Divisional Court Cases
SIMULTANEOUS
TRIAL
OF
TWO
INFORMATIONS
R. v, Ashbourne
Justices:
ex parte Naden
By sec. 32
(1)
of
the
Criminal Justice Act, 1948 a sum-
mons
may
contain more
than
one information,
but
this innovation does
not
permit
the
trial of
both
inform-
ations
at
the
same
time:
see subsec.
(2)
of sec. 32.
It
has
however for
many
years been
the
practice of
many
courts
of summary jurisdiction to
try
together more
than
one
information where
they
relate to
the
same subject, as for
instance acharge of dangerous driving
and
of driving
without due care
and
attention arising
out
of a single
incident. No objection can be
taken
to
this procedure,
if
the
defendant consents
to
such a course.
In
the
above-mentioned case (1950
W.N.
51)
an
appli-
cation was made for
an
order of certiorari on
the
ground
that
on a charge of dangerous driving
the
defendant
had
been convicted of driving without due care
and
attention
without
the
justices having observed
the
procedure laid
down
by
sec. 35 of
the
Road Traffic Act, 1934. The case
came before a Divisional Court consisting of Lord Goddard
C.J., Sellers
and
Lynskey
JJ.
on
the
13th
January
1950.
The
facts were in dispute
and
Lord Goddard
stated
that
the
Court preferred
the
evidence contained in
the
affidavits
of
the
chairman
and
the
clerk to
the
justices
to
that
of
the
applicant
and
her solicitor. According
to
the
chairman
it
was
the
practice of his court to hear informations for
dangerous
and
careless driving together. The prosecuting
solicitor when opening
the
case referred
to
both
inform-
ations without protest from
the
appellant's solicitor.
It
was
not
clear whether
the
appellant's solicitor
had
been
specifically asked whether he consented to this course.
The evidence for
the
prosecution was heard
and
the
appell-
ant's
solicitor
stated
that
his client was unable to give
260
DIVISIONAL COURT CASES 26i
evidence as owing
to
the
injuries which she
had
sustained
in
the
accident which gave rise
to
the
prosecution she
had
no recollection of
what
had
occurred.
The
justices there-
upon convicted
the
appellant of driving without due care
and
attention.
Lord Goddard giving judgment refusing
the
appli-
cation
stated
that
it
was a sensible practice
to
hear
both
cases of this
nature
together,
but
it
was desirable in such a
case
that
the
question should be specifically
put
to
the
defendant-'
'Do you consent
to
the
two summonses being
heard
together?"
However, upon
the
facts before
them
the
Court considered
that
the
justices were entitled
to
assume
that
the
appellant's solicitor
had
consented to
the
course adopted.
The
Lord Chief Justice
then
pointed
out
that
certiorari was primarily aremedy where a court
had
acted in excess of jurisdiction.
It
was also available where
there
had
been adenial of
natural
justice as when a defen-
dant
was convicted without being given
an
opportunity of
giving evidence (for such a case see R. v. Wandsworth
Justices: ex parte Read (1942, 1
K.B.
281)). Where, how-
ever,
it
appeared from
the
record
that
there
had
merely
been
an
irregularity
the
Court
had
adiscretion. Assuming
in
the
applicant's favour
that
there
had
been no consent
to
the
course adopted
the
whole of
the
available evidence
had
been heard so
that
the
objections of
the
applicant were, in
his view, purely of a technical character. No injustice
had
in fact been
dona
The
Court would accordingly exercise
its
discretion
by
refusing
the
application.
AIDING
AND
ABETTING
Johnson v. Youden &Others
Where
an
offence does
not
involve mens rea aperson
who intentionally assists another
to
do
that
which
the
statute
forbids is guilty as
an
accessory although he
may
not
appreciate
that
abreach of
the
law is being committed.
On
the
other
hand
if he is ignorant of material facts con-
stituting
the
offence his assistance
to
the
principal offender
does
not
render him liable as
an
accessory.
The above general principle is
to
be abstracted from a
recent decision of
the
Divisional Court (1950, 1
A.E.R.
300)

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