Do Bosses Still Love the Closed Shop?
| Date | 01 June 1990 |
| Pages | 17-23 |
| Published date | 01 June 1990 |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/01425459010138430 |
| Author | A.J. Geare |
| Subject Matter | HR & organizational behaviour |
DO BOSSES STILL LOVE
THE
CLOSED SHOP?
17
W
estern Australian attitudes to
compulsory unionism are revealed.
Do Bosses
Still Love
the Closed
Shop?
A.J. Geare
A decade ago Moira Hart wrote a paper, "Why Bosses
Love the Closed Shop", which outlined the advantages
compulsory unionism provided British managers. It is
probably fair to suggest that it was received opinion by
the majority of British and Australasian industrial relations
academics that sensible pragmatic managers — which
would obviously include industrial relations managers
—
saw that the advantages of the closed shop clearly
outweighed the disadvantages. It was thus with
considerable surprise that
the
author discovered the strong
antagonism against the closed shop revealed by Western
Australian managers. While this does not of course,
necessarily indicate that
British
bosses have got over their
love affair
—
a change in attitude
may
well have
occurred.
This article is concerned with the opinions Australian
managers hold about the closed shop. Before examining
the attitudes of a sample of 250 Western Australian
managers, the varying forms of union security are defined
and the history of the Australian experience with union
security and the closed shop are briefly outlined. The
more common theoretical arguments as to the impact,
and desirability or otherwise, of
the
closed shop are then
discussed. The attitudes of
the
managers to these points
are then presented as are some tests to determine the
extent
to
which the attitudes can be explained
by
particular
factors.
Forms of Union Security
The closed shop, or compulsory unionism, and other
forms of preferential treatment for union members,
commonly given the generic description "union security",
has been the goal of
some
unions for many
years.
Indeed
Cordova and Ozaki claim that the closed shop "appeared
with the
first
trade unions some 200 years ago"[l, p. 19].
They also point out that:
Union
security
was
until
recently essentially
an
Anglo-Saxon
practice.
Except
for
Mexico
and
Switzerland,
which have long
accepted certain forms of
closed shop
and
agency
shop,
union
security
was
widely
practised
only
in
Australia,
Canada, New
Zealand,
the
United
Kingdom
and the
United
States[l,
p. 27].
In the UK and the USA, the most common terms relating
to union security are the closed shop (pre-entry and post-
entry),
the union shop and the agency shop. In Australia
and New Zealand there have also been "preference
provisions'' for many years which
in
their strongest form
are equivalent to the post-entry closed shop.
The closed
shop
is in
effect compulsory union membership.
In the USA the term by itself refers to what is called
elsewhere a
pre-entry closed
shop.
The requirement is for
workers to be union members before they are recruited,
and then to remain members. This situation not only
provides compulsory membership, but also severely
restricts an employer's freedom
to
recruit. Consequently
it is more vigorously opposed by employers and is less
common.
A
system which is more acceptable is
the
post-
entry closed shop
(called in the USA a union
shop)
which
allows non-unionists to be recruited as long as they join
the union and remain
unionists.
In practice, some closed
shop situations do not obtain or demand 100 per cent
membership as some persons with certain religious or
conscientious beliefs are tolerated as "conscientious
objectors". These conscientious objectors are frequently
required to make a payment to a charity or the
government. They still benefit from any gains made by
the union
—
but
do
not contribute to the union's expenses.
To overcome this problem, the
agency
shop has been
developed. Under an agency shop system, those who do
not wish
to
join the union may remain non-members but
have to pay a service fee to the union, equivalent to the
union dues. The conscientious objectors do not become
members, thus preserving their sanctity and also
remaining outside union control. Equally, of
course,
they
are unable to influence union policy. The union receives
the service 'fee from them, so they are not "free-riders''
enjoying benefits for which they have not paid.
Preference
provisions
were first introduced into awards in
New
Zealand
in
1896[2]
and within
a
short
time
the practice
was copied in Australia, both in New South Wales and by
the Commonwealth of
Australia[3].
In their weakest form
preference provisions rely on the goodwill of employers
to have any effect as they merely stipulate that employers
should give preference of employment to union members
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