Do perceptions of electoral malpractice undermine democratic satisfaction? The US in comparative perspective

DOI10.1177/0192512118806783
Date01 January 2019
Published date01 January 2019
AuthorPippa Norris
Subject MatterArticles
https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512118806783
International Political Science Review
2019, Vol. 40(1) 5 –22
© The Author(s) 2018
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0192512118806783
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Do perceptions of electoral
malpractice undermine
democratic satisfaction? The US
in comparative perspective
Pippa Norris
University of Sydney, Australia; Harvard University, USA
Abstract
Doubts about the legitimacy of the 2016 US elections continue to reverberate and deepen partisan mistrust in
America. A perfect storm followed Republican allegations of fake news and massive voter fraud, Democratic
complaints of voter suppression and gerrymandering, discontent with the Electoral College’s awarding of
victory to a presidential candidate who lost the popular vote, compounded by intelligence reports of Russian
meddling. These issues raise the broader question: how serious do perceived electoral flaws have to be to
raise doubts not just about the election but about democracy itself? Do ordinary people actually care about
the quality of their elections or are they more concerned with jobs, growth and taxes and/or influenced
by partisan cues? And how do attitudes vary among electoral winners and losers? The key findings of this
research, based on World Values Survey data, are that doubts about electoral integrity do indeed undermine
general satisfaction with how democracy works.
Keywords
Election, integrity, fraud, public satisfaction with democracy
Introduction
Doubts about the legitimacy of the 2016 United States (US) presidential elections continue to
reverberate and deepen partisan mistrust in America. A perfect storm has heightened concern about
the election following Republican allegations of fake news and massive voter fraud, Democratic
rebuttals claiming voter suppression and gerrymandering, and the way that the Electoral College
awarded victory to the presidential candidate who lost the popular vote.1 These doubts have been
compounded by intelligence reports of foreign cyber-security attempts to gain access to state
election records and Russian meddling through fake news and social media disinformation cam-
paigns (Isikoff and Corn, 2018).
Corresponding author:
Pippa Norris, John F Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
Email: Pippa_Norris@hks.harvard.edu
806783IPS0010.1177/0192512118806783International Political Science ReviewNorris
research-article2018
Article
6 International Political Science Review 40(1)
These events raise the broader question: how serious do any perceived electoral flaws usually
have to be to raise doubts not just about the process and results – or even the legitimacy of the
declared winner – but about democracy itself? Is satisfaction with the performance of democracy
among ordinary citizens influenced most by the perceived quality of their elections (input legiti-
macy), or by policy performance (output legitimacy) and/or partisan cues (the winner–loser the-
sis)? And how do attitudes vary among winners and losers?
To understand these issues, the article begins with a theoretical and conceptual framework,
looking at input and output theories of democratic legitimacy and the role of partisan cues in evalu-
ating elections. We then present the evidence used to investigate these propositions, drawn from
cross-national and US data. To measure the quality of elections, we use the Perceptions of Electoral
Integrity (PEI) expert global and US surveys. For public opinion, we draw upon the sixth wave of
the World Values Survey (WVS) comparing 42 societies, and the seventh wave of the 2016 US
WVS. On the basis of this data we establish key cross-national findings as well as findings relating
specifically to the 2016 US election. We conclude by summarizing the implications of a flawed
electoral process for confidence in democracy.
Conceptual and theoretical framework
Evidence of low or eroding political trust has aroused considerable concern ever since Almond and
Verba’s Civic Culture (1963) theorized that regimes are most durable when built upon political legiti-
macy. Popular support for democratic regimes is thought to rest upon public trust and confidence in
representative institutions connecting citizens and the state, including political parties, legislative
assemblies, the courts and elections, as well as the news media, social movements and interest groups
in civil society. Where the popular legitimacy of these institutions declines, democratic regimes have
fewer effective bulwarks against the risks of backsliding under authoritarian leaders.
These issues resonate today since citizens appear to have grown increasingly distrustful of politi-
cians, cynical about national and global governance institutions, and disillusioned with democratic
processes and principles. Lack of confidence in a broad range of public institutions is believed to have
behavioural consequences – eroding civic engagement, voting turnout and conventional forms of
political participation, while heightening protest politics (Birch, 2010). Loss of trust in governing
authorities – from judges, politicians and parties to bureaucrats, the news media and scientific experts
– is also thought to fuel mass support for authoritarian-populist leaders who exploit suspicions that
votes are stolen, all politicians are corrupt and the system is rigged (Norris and Inglehart, 2018).
Resilient democracies develop a deep reservoir of popular legitimacy over many decades or
even centuries, allowing them to survive particular shocks, such as government corruption, eco-
nomic crisis, or leadership scandals. Hybrid regimes, however, which are neither fully democratic
nor autocratic, are more vulnerable to democratic backsliding under authoritarian-populist leaders
(Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018). Trust in elections is even more important for the peaceful and orderly
transfer of power in deeply divided societies (Norris et al., 2015). If contests are widely regarded
as illegitimate, this may trigger protests and boycotts (Beaulieu, 2014). Snyder (2000) has warned
that elections held as part of post-conflict peace settlements can in fact backfire, exacerbating vio-
lent conflict, inter-communal tension and social intolerance.
Studies of support for political systems conventionally build on the conceptual framework of
David Easton as expanded by Norris (1999) and Dalton (2004). This includes:
1. feelings of belonging to a national community, such as feelings of patriotism and a sense of
national identity;
2. support for regime principles, such as endorsement of the democratic ideals of freedom,
inclusion, tolerance, pluralism and equality;

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