Doe dem. Williams and Jeffery v Cooper
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judgment Date | 24 April 1840 |
| Date | 24 April 1840 |
| Court | Court of Common Pleas |
English Reports Citation: 133 E.R. 278
IN THE COMMON PLEAS.
S. C. 1 Scott, N. R. 36; 9 L. J. C. P. 229.
dob dem. williams and jeffery v. cooper. April 24, 1840. [S. C. 1 Scott, N. E. 36; 9 L. J. C. P. 229.]The defendant took premises of one H., at a yearly rent, with an agreement for a lease for seven years, or for the lease for lives, under which H. held the property. H. subsequently assigned his interest in the premises to the lessors of the plaintiff, and their attorney, under an impression that the seven years had expired, demanded possession. The defendant said, " I hold on lives, and as long as they live I will hold the premises; you know I have an agreement." The attorney then demanded a quarter's rent which was due, but the defendant refused to pay it, saying, " I hold under H., and I was directed by him to pay K. (who was the superior landlord), and I will do so; for how do I know he will not come and make a demand on me 1" Held, no disclaimer of the title of the lessors of the plaintiff.Ejectment to recover premises, situate in the High-Street, Eyde, in the Isle of Wight.(5) The plaintiff would appear to have been entitled to a verdict on the second and third issues.(c) Dundas led for the plaintiff at the trial; but the cause had been entered and withdrawn at the Summer Assizes, when Wortley was alone for the plaintiff. Dundas, not having been in the cause before the ancient practice of the court was restored, could not have made the motion for a new trial. Serviens ad legem, 332.(a) Saville, who had been examined for the plaintiff on the trial, had stated that after the first dissolution neither he nor Hextall had any thing to do with the part of the premises used by the plaintiff; and when the loss occurred, the insurance office of course would not have paid the loss, unless it had occurred in the detached stove described in the policy; but this particular fact was not before the court in bane.1 MAN & G. 136. DOE V. COOPEE 279At the trial before Coltman J., at the last Hampshire assizes, the lessors of the plaintiff gave in evidence in support of their title, a lease made on the llth of October 1819, by the owners of the fee, to one Barton, for 99 years, if three persons therein named should so long live; an assignment of the 16th July 1825, of part of the premises for the residue of the said term from Barton to one William Kent; an underlease bearing date the 7th of July 1832, of the premises comprised in the above assignment for 86 years (subject to the determination of the lives named in the original lease), [136] from Kent to one James Hillier;-and lastly an assignment of the 24th of July 1837, whereby Hillier conveyed the last-mentioned premises to the lessors of the plaintiff.The defendant relied on the following agreement, made the 2d of May 1832, between him and Hillier :-" Memorandum of an agreement between William Cooper and James Hillier for a store lately used as a coal-store, and held under a lease of lives from Mr. William Kent, and now in the occupation of the above James Hillier; and he herein agrees to let the above store, situated in the High Street, Ryde, to William Cooper, at the yearly rent of 151., to be paid at two equal half-yearly payments, i.e. on the same day that James Hillier shall be required to pay his rent: and he further agrees to let the said William Cooper have a lease for seven years, or for the lease for lives under which he holds the property."A question then arose whether the above document amounted to a demise for seven years, or only from year to year, with an agreement for a future lease; and there being also a dispute whether the diite had not been altered, that point was left to the jury, who found that no alteration had been made in the date of the instrument, and consequently that the term, supposing it to be a lease for seven years, had not expired before the 25th of October 1839, the day of the demise laid in the declaration. For the defendant it was contended, thai the agreement amounted to a lease for seven years; and that even if it established only a tenancy from year to year, the defendant had received no notice to quit. The lessors of the plaintiff insisted that no notice to quit was necessary, as there had been a disclaimer by the defendant, and called their attorney to prove that fact.It appeared that the attorney, acting under the impression that the date of the agreement had been altered, [137] and that the term of seven years had, at any rate, expired, went, on the 14th of October 1339, to the defendant, and demanded possession of the premises on behalf of the lessors of the plaintiff. The defendant, in answer, said, " I hold on lives, and as long as they live, I will hold the premises; I...
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