Does decentralisation make a difference? Comparing the democratic performance of central and regional governing systems in the United Kingdom
| DOI | 10.1177/1369148117737519 |
| Published date | 01 May 2018 |
| Date | 01 May 2018 |
| Subject Matter | Original Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148117737519
The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations
2018, Vol. 20(2) 341 –359
© The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/1369148117737519
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Does decentralisation make
a difference? Comparing the
democratic performance of
central and regional governing
systems in the United Kingdom
Felicity Matthews
Abstract
Decentralisation is frequently justified in terms of representation and participation, with its
advocates emphasising the capacity of regional institutions to remedy the democratic deficiencies
of the centre. Yet empirical examinations of the democratic performance of regional governing
systems are scarce, and there is no analysis that systematically compares the operation of different
tiers within the same state. This article responds to this significant lacuna. Drawing upon the tools
of cross-national comparison, it develops an analytical framework that evaluates the effects of
regional and national institutions on the dispersal of electoral payoffs. This framework is applied to
the United Kingdom, to compare the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales with
Westminster. Through this analysis, the article provides important empirical insights regarding
the difference wrought by decentralisation and, in turn, contributes to a burgeoning body of
literature that offers a more critical assessment of the relationship between decentralisation and
such democratic goods.
Keywords
devolution and regionalism, office payoffs and policy payoffs, proportionality, representation,
United Kingdom
Recent decades have witnessed a ‘global trend towards devolution’ (Rodríguez-Pose and
Gill, 2003) as national governments throughout the world have transferred key competen-
cies to their regional counterparts. A myriad of factors has driven this unprecedented
dispersal of powers, including the growing significance of regional parties (Brancati,
2008; Toubeau, 2011) and the effects of European integration (Bache, 2007).
Decentralisation is frequently accompanied by a narrative highlighting its participatory
Department of Politics, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
Corresponding author:
Felicity Matthews, Department of Politics, University of Sheffield, Elmfield, Northumberland Road, Sheffield
S10 2TU, UK.
Email: f.m.matthews@sheffield.ac.uk
737519BPI0010.1177/1369148117737519The British Journal of Politics and International RelationsMatthews
research-article2017
Original Article
342 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 20(2)
benefits (see Barber, 2013; Sorens, 2009), and several scholars have argued that a positive
relationship exists between decentralisation and the realisation of democratic goods (see
for example Diamond, 1999; Hooghe et al., 2010; Lijphart, 2012). There is, however, no
a priori reason to assume that decentralisation will foster a closer connection between
voters and legislators; and the extent to which regional governing systems are more
responsive to citizens’ electoral preferences remains a matter for empirical investigation.
Yet, in contrast to the considerable attention devoted to national ‘patterns of democracy’
(notably, Lijphart, 2012), analyses of the institutional inputs of regional systems of gov-
ernment are scarce. Indeed, despite the fact that decentralisation is often justified in terms
of addressing the perceived deficiencies of central government, there exists no compara-
tive analyses of different tiers of government within the same state. This gap matters as
decentralisation is ‘not simply a phenomenon having inherent virtues’ (De Vries, 2000:
195) and promises that regional governance will revitalise democracy risk raising expec-
tations that may not be fulfilled.
This article directly addresses this lacuna and draws upon Powell’s (2000) Elections as
Instruments of Democracy to develop an analytical framework that compares regional
and national government in terms of the dispersal of electoral payoffs. In particular, and
in contrast to ‘static concepts’ that look at ‘vote and seats alone’ (Blau, 2008: 168), this
framework distinguishes between office payoffs and policy payoffs to examine the institu-
tional opportunities that exist for both executive and non-executive legislators to affect
the policy process. This framework is applied to the United Kingdom to compare the
Scottish Parliament, National Assembly for Wales (NAW) and Westminster. The case of
the United Kingdom merits scholarly attention and offers an important opportunity to
study the effects of ‘varying types of institutions’ within the ‘context and rules [of] an
existing democracy’ (Bohrer and Krutz, 2005: 654–655). The transfer of governing com-
petencies via the Scotland Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 1998 constituted an
important watershed in the United Kingdom’s majoritarian tradition and was explicitly
justified by the then Labour Government in terms of addressing the democratic deficits of
Westminster majoritarianism (e.g. Cm 3658, 1997; Cm 3718, 1997). However, rather
than realising a ‘new politics’, devolution was forged in the shadow of Westminster, and
the existence of different modes of democracy across the United Kingdom has instead
resulted in uneasy asymmetry and ‘bi-constitutionality’ (Flinders, 2005; Matthews and
Flinders, 2017), the implications of which continue to unfold.
Through its analysis, this article makes a number of important contributions.
Empirically, it provides critical insights on the difference wrought by regional govern-
ment in terms of representation and the dispersal of electoral spoils, and by broadly
controlling for factors such as political culture and governing norms, the single-country
research design captures the effects of institutional variables such as electoral rules and
committee systems (see Snyder, 2001). Theoretically, it contributes to a burgeoning
body of literature that promotes a more nuanced understanding of the relationship
between decentralisation and democratic goods (see De Vries, 2000; Fatke, 2016;
Spina, 2004) and dovetails with an important strand of work that examines whether
institutional structures can be configured to deliver an optimum ‘sweet-spot’ between
representation and accountability (Carey and Hix, 2011; see also Aarts and Thomassen,
2008; Kaiser et al., 2002). Methodologically, it develops an analytical framework that
can be applied to different sites of government simultaneously, moving beyond the
‘methodological nationalism’ (Jeffery, 2008; Jeffery and Wincott, 2010) that has hith-
erto predominated. To develop these strands, the article proceeds as follows. In the next
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