Does education decrease Euroscepticism? A regression discontinuity design using compulsory schooling reforms in four European countries
| DOI | 10.1177/1465116519877972 |
| Published date | 01 March 2020 |
| Date | 01 March 2020 |
| Author | Sander Kunst,Herman G van de Werfhorst,Theresa Kuhn |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Does education decrease
Euroscepticism? A
regression discontinuity
design using compulsory
schooling reforms in four
European countries
Sander Kunst
Department of Sociology and Department of Political
Science, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam,
The Netherlands
Theresa Kuhn
Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam,
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Herman G van de Werfhorst
Department of Sociology, University of Amsterdam,
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Abstract
Previous research shows a strong and consistent relationship between educational
attainment and Euroscepticism. As a result, education is considered to be a powerful
predictor of attitudes towards European integration. However, these findings are pre-
dominantly found using cross-sectional research designs, therefore leaving open the
possibility of strong selection effects due to pre-adult experiences and dispositions
which both explain educational attainment and political attitudes. To test whether
schooling causally reduces Euroscepticism, this article combines data on the
compulsory schooling age with seven rounds of pooled European Social Survey data
Corresponding author:
Sander Kunst, Department of Sociology and Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam,
Nieuwe Achtergracht 166, Amsterdam 1018 WV, The Netherlands.
Email: s.c.kunst@uva.nl
European Union Politics
2020, Vol. 21(1) 24–42
!The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/1465116519877972
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(2002–2014). Using compulsory schooling reforms within a ‘fuzzy’ regression disconti-
nuity design, the results indicate no conclusive effect of education on Euroscepticism,
questioning the impact of additional schooling. Consequently, this study provides a
novel insight into the much-debated divide in support for European integration
between lower and higher educated.
Keywords
Compulsory schooling reforms, education, Euroscepticism, regression discontinuity design
Introduction
On 23 June 2016, in a historic ballot about the future of the United Kingdom in the
European Union (EU), a small majority of 51.9% voted to leave the EU. Analyses
of the Brexit referendum reveal that the outcome was strongly polarised along
educational lines: a significant portion of those with a lower level of education
voted to leave the EU, while citizens with the highest educational credentials
voted predominantly to remain (Hobolt, 2016). This divide with regards to
Euroscepticism is not only visible in the United Kingdom. Across Europe, those
with less education are consistently found to be more Eurosceptic than those with
higher education (Hakhverdian et al., 2013; Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Lubbers
and Scheepers, 2010). Moreover, this gap has also significantly widened over time
(Hakhverdian et al., 2013; Lubbers and Jaspers, 2011).
Within the literature on Euroscepticism, a number of theories are put forward
which (causally) link education with support for European integration (for an
overview, see Hakhverdian et al., 2013). The literature on Euroscepticism argues
that the higher educated are less Eurosceptic because they have acquired cognitive
skills, have been socialised longer into cosmopolitan values at school, fostering an
open and cosmopolitan outlook on society, and face less competition and insecu-
rity on the international labour market. Whatever the mechanism might entail, all
these explanations share the implicit assumption that more education leads to a
change in attitudes towards the EU.
The association between education and Euroscepticism is most often estimated
within a cross-sectional research design. This is problematic, however, since it is possible
that the relationship between education and political attitudes, such as Euroscepticism,
is confounded by other factors that explain both the cause and the consequence
(Persson, 2015). If so, education could potentially be a proxy for factors such as family’s
socio-economic status, the political socialisation at home and individual differences in
cognitive ability and personality traits, rather than a cause of political outcomes, such as
Euroscepticism (Kam and Palmer, 2008; Persson et al., 2016). Therefore, although it is
evident that there is a strong association between education and Euroscepticism, wheth-
er we can also speak of a causal relation is still uncle ar (Hooghe and Marks, 2018).
Kunst et al. 25
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