Does immigration boost public Euroscepticism in European Union member states?
| Author | Eddy SF Yeung |
| DOI | 10.1177/14651165211030428 |
| Published date | 01 December 2021 |
| Date | 01 December 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Does immigration boost
public Euroscepticism in
European Union member
states?
Eddy SF Yeung
Department of Political Science, Emory University, USA
Abstract
A number of studies have established a strong link between anti-immigration and
Eurosceptic attitudes. But does this relationship necessarily imply that more immigration
would increase public Euroscepticism in member states of the European Union? I evalu-
ate this question by analyzing immigration data and Eurobarometer survey data over the
period 2009–2017. The analysis shows no evidence that individual levels of
Euroscepticism increase with actual levels of immigration. This result suggests that a
strong link between anti-immigration and Eurosceptic attitudes does not necessarily
translate into a strong link between immigration levels and public Euroscepticism.
Public Euroscepticism can still be low even if immigration levels are high.
Keywords
European integration, Euroscepticism, immigration, public opinion
Introduction
Does immigration boost public Euroscepticism in European Union (EU) member states?
1
Much of the anti-immigration rhetoric featured in Eurosceptic discourses would lead us to
believe the answer is yes.
2
Indeed, EU public opinion scholars have established a strongly
positive link between anti-immigration and Eurosceptic attitudes (e.g. Boomgaarden
et al., 2011; De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2005; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007).
Recent work has also attributed the electoral success of right-wing, Eurosceptic parties
Corresponding author:
Eddy SF Yeung, Department of Political Science, Emory University, 327 Tarbutton Hall, 1555 Dickey Drive,
Atlanta, GA 30322, USA.
Email: shing.fung.yeung@emory.edu
Article
European Union Politics
2021, Vol. 22(4) 631–654
© The Author(s) 2021
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/14651165211030428
journals.sagepub.com/home/eup
to their emphasis on anti-immigration (e.g. Downes and Loveless, 2018; Downes et al.,
2021; Evans and Mellon, 2019; Treib, 2014).
3
However, it remains theoretically and
empirically unclear whether higher actual levels of immigration would necessarily
increase public Euroscepticism.
One theoretical problem with the assertion of a positive link between actual immi-
gration levels and Euroscepticism is that it assumes public knowledge of actual immi-
gration levels. This assumption, however, is unlikely to be satisfied given a
well-documented misalignment between actual and perceived levels of immigrant
population in EU member states (Figure 1; see also Alesina et al., 2018; Duffy
and Frere-Smith, 2014; Ipsos MORI, 2013) . Another theoretical problem with the
assertion is its failure to consider intergroup contact (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew and
Tropp, 2006). Under this framework, positive contact between immigrants and
local citizens may reduce anti-immigration sentiments, which can decrease public
Euroscepticism in turn.
The relationship between actual levels of immigration and public Euroscepticism is
therefore a priori ambiguous. Surprisingly, virtually no research to date has tested it
empirically.
4
This study thus fills the gap by directly examining the link between
actual immigration levels and public Euroscepticism across all EU member states.
Using multilevel modeling to analyze immigration data and Eurobarometer survey
data over the period 2009–2017, I find no evidence that individual levels of
Euroscepticism increase with actual levels of immigration, regardless of whether the
immigrants are from EU or non-EU member states. The finding thus challenges the
common belief that higher levels of immigration would make EU citizens more
Eurosceptic. Although further EU enlargement implies even more immigration
across EU member states, my results suggest that the future success of the European
project is not inherently doomed, since public Euroscepticism can still be low even if
immigration levels are high.
This study makes three distinct contributions. First, by moving beyond the existing
literature that uses immigration attitudes—instead of actual levels of immigration—to
study public opinion on European integration (e.g. De Vreese and Boomgaarden,
2005; Roeder, 2011), I find that a strong link between anti-immigration and
Eurosceptic attitudes (as suggested by the current literature) does not necessarily translate
into a strong link between immigration levels and public Euroscepticism. This challenges
the common perception that more immigration will increase Euroscepticism. Second, I
expand the literature on EU asylum and immigration policy. While scholars in this
field have invested productive efforts in studying it from a legal or public administration
perspective (e.g. El-Enany, 2008; Geddes, 2008; Guiraudon, 2003; Kaunert, 2009, 2010;
Kaunert and Léonard 2012a, 2012b; Léonard and Kaunert, 2019, 2020), I join recent
studies by approaching it from a public opinion standpoint (Jeannet et al., 2021;
Stockemer et al., 2020; Van der Brug and Harteveld, 2021), suggesting that public
opinion on European integration may not be as sensitive to changes in EU asylum and
immigration policies as one may have previously thought. Third, I contribute to the emer-
ging literature on the political consequences of misperceptions about immigration (e.g.
Alesina et al., 2018; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2020; Herda, 2013). While past
632 European Union Politics 22(4)
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