Does Ontology Trump Epistemology? Notes on the Directional Dependence of Ontology and Epistemology in Political Analysis
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9256.2007.00287.x |
| Author | Colin Hay |
| Published date | 01 June 2007 |
| Date | 01 June 2007 |
| Subject Matter | Controversy |
Controversy
Does Ontology Trump Epistemology?
Notes on the Directional Dependence of
Ontology and Epistemology in Political
Analysis
Colin Hay
University of Birmingham
There is something both chastening and strangely daunting about responding to the
criticisms of one’s current and former students, especially those as (characteristi-
cally) gentle in their engagement with one’s work as Stephen Bates and Laura
Jenkins. What makes it even more difficult to respond to these – the latest –
criticisms of Political Analysis (Hay, 2002) published in the pages of this journal
(Bates and Jenkins, 2007) is that I agree with so much of the general tenor and,
indeed, only slightly less of the detailed substance, of their comments. Nonetheless,
in the hope of both further clarifying my own position and encouraging others to
reject the designation of myself by Bates and Jenkins as an ‘intellectual gatekeeper’
on questions of ontology and epistemology, I find myself drawn into an albeit brief
response.
Ontology and epistemology are good for you – honest
Bates and Jenkins make a powerful case for the contribution of ontological and
epistemological reflection to the process of instilling in students of politics a range
of critical analytical skills. A number of features of their argument are particularly
interesting. First, it is difficult not to detect in Bates and Jenkins’s remarks on this
point a certain defensiveness with respect to the benefits of ontological and epis-
temological reflection. Like wholemeal bread, temperance and cross-country
running, it seems, ontology and epistemology are good for us! This defensive tone
undoubtedly comes from the not unfamiliar experience of teaching ontology and
epistemology to an, at best, initially sceptical audience. Meta-theoretical reflection,
it seems, requires justification.
This is probably right. Yet there is surely something of a danger in Bates and
Jenkins’s defence of the pedagogic virtues of ontological and epistemological analy-
sis of conceding too much to the sceptics. For the justification they offer is couched
almost entirely in terms of the indirect rather than the direct consequences and
benefits of being able to adjudicate arguments in ontological and epistemological
© 2007 The Author. Journal compilation © 2007 Political Studies Association
116
C O L I N H AY
terms. A couple of points might here be made. First, greater ontological and
...
To continue reading
Request your trial