Does Theory Lead Technology?
| Published date | 01 September 1978 |
| Date | 01 September 1978 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/002070207803300302 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
COLIN
S.
GRAY
Does
theory
lead
technology?
The
relationship
between
strategic
theory
and
weapon
technology
is
well
known
to be
complex
and
often
ambiguous.
In
the
hope
of
clarifying
the
confusion,
this
article
addresses
the
following
pro-
position:
strategic
theory
educates
policy-makers
to
the
ends
of
or-
dering,
and
planning
properly
to
employ,
new
technologies
and,
more
generally,
to
the
end
of
making military
forces
serve
the
goals
of
foreign
policy.
In
short,
can
one
identify
a
leading
role
for
theory
-
and
if
one
can,
how
is
that
role
effected?
Research,
development,
and
strategic
theoretical
speculation
are
continuous
activities;
though
it
seems
on
occasion
as
if
they
proceed
sequentially with
theorists
outlining
strategies
that
they
do
not
know
how to
implement
and
weapon
designers
retailing
wonderful
machines
that
serve
no
very
obvious
military
purpose.
However, cross-infiltration
of ideas
between
the
technical
and
the-
oretical
sub-communities
proceeds
without
serious
interruption.
Historical
investigation tends
to
show
that
strategic
and
even
tacti-
cal
and
arms
control
ideas
have
a
longevity previously
barely
sus-
pected.
But
because
there
was
extant
a
stock
of
strategic
ideas
adequate
for the
general
guidance
of
the
technologists
and
even
policy-makers
of
a
later
era,
it
does
not
follow
that
those
ideas
were
appreciated
to
any
marked
degree.
Among
the
more
striking
re-
discoveries
of
what should
have
been
very
obvious
indeed
was
the
centrepiece
of
the
new
strategic
theory
of
the
195os
-
(nuclear)
de-
Professional
staff,
Hudson
Institute,
Croton-on-Hudson,
NY.
This
article
is
adapted
from
a
section
of
chapter
3
of
a
forthcoming
book,
Strategic
Studies
and
Public
Policy:
The
American
Experience,
which
was
written
under
a
grant
from
the
Ford
Foundation.
The
views
expressed
in
this article
are
those
of
the
author
and
do
not
necessarily
reflect
those
of
any
institution
with
which
he
may be
associated.
DOES
THEORY
LEAD
TECHNOLOGY?
507
terrence.
There
was
nothing
novel
about
the
notion
that
there
are
essentially
two
negative
ways
to
influence
the
mind
of a
potential
aggressor:
one
may
promise
to
deny him
his
objectives,
or
one
may
promise
to
punish
him
so
severely
for
his
aggression
that
his
gains
will
seem
incommensurate
with
the
losses
likely
to
be
incurred.
The
new
deterrence
theory,
taking
full
(if
not
over-full) account
of
nuclear
weapons
technology,
was
not
unambiguously
incor-
porated
into,
and
adopted
as,
United
States
policy
until
Novem-
ber/December
1953
in
the
context
of
the
Eisenhower
'New
Look."
However,
the
deterrent
ideas
of
the
New
Look
were
familiar
cur-
rency
to those
few
who
had
been
attentive
to
strategic
matters
since
1945,
while
the
notion
of
punishment
by
strategic
air
power
had
been
central
to
the
official
doctrine
of
the
Royal
Air
Force
since
the
end
of
World War
1.2
The
great
public
debate
over
massive
re-
taliation
and
the
requirements
of
deterrence
certainly
postdated
the
announcement
of the
New Look,
but
the
policy
shift
of
1953
was
the
product
almost
entirely
of
official
and
semi-official
contribu-
tions
(by
no
means
all
of
which
were
strategic-intellectual
in
charac-
ter).
The
first
strike/second
strike
distinction,
the
first
law
of
nuclear
strategy
-
that
a
first-strike-only
deterrent
is
no
deterrent
at
all
-
quite
apart
from
being
glaringly
obvious
was
but
the
latest
variant
of
the
ancient
concern
over
surprise attack.
The
war-losing
consequences of
striking
second,
when one
could
not ride
out
a
first
strike,
were
fully
appreciated
by
the Royal
Navy
in
its
search
for
a
secure
Grand
Fleet
anchorage on
the
North
Sea
prior
to
1914.3
They
were
also
understood
by
the French
and
German
armies
in
their
'mobilization
race' of
the
same
period,
while
the
strong
de-
sirability,
if
not
necessity, of
destroying
the
enemy's
air
force
on
the
ground
was
the
operation
that
Guilio
Douhet
contended
was
1
The
standard
treatment
of
the
'New Look'
is
Glenn
H.
Snyder,
'The
"New
Look"
of
1953,'
in
Warner
R.
Schilling,
Paul
Y.
Hammond, and
Snyder,
Strategy,
Politics,
and
Defense
Budgets
(New
York
1962),
pp
379-524.
Also
of
interest
is
Douglas
Kinnard,
President
Eisenhower
and
Strategy
Management:
A
Study
in
Defense
Politics
(Lexington,
Ky,
1977).
2
See
George
H.
Quester,
Deterrence
before
Hiroshima:
The
Airpower
Background
of
Modern
Strategy
(New
York
1966).
3
See
Arthur
J.
Marder,
From the
Dreadnought
to
Scapa
Flow:
The
Royal
Navy
in
the
Fisher
Era,
1904-1919:
1,
The Road
to
War,
z904-1914
(London
1961),
420-7.
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