Duties of Charity, Duties of Justice
| Author | Robert E Goodin |
| Published date | 01 June 2017 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0032321716647402 |
| Date | 01 June 2017 |
| Subject Matter | Editors’ Choice |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321716647402
Political Studies
2017, Vol. 65(2) 268 –283
© The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/0032321716647402
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Duties of Charity,
Duties of Justice
Robert E Goodin
Abstract
Everyone agrees we have duties of charity, however restrictive a view they take of our duties of
justice. But duties of charity can sometimes be stronger than duties of justice, and where they
are, those owed duties of justice cannot complain when the duty-bearer discharges that duty of
charity instead. Furthermore, duties of charity, being imperfect, require institutional specification
to render them into perfect duties making clear who owes what to whom. Institutions do that
by “consolidating” imperfect duties of charity. Such institutions would be very similar to those
required by robust duties of justice. Anyone who takes appropriately seriously the duties of
charity that everyone agrees we all have would thereby be led to prescribe broadly the same
institutions as advocates of robust duties of justice.
Keywords
justice, charity, imperfect duties
Accepted: 1 April 2016
Duties of justice are ordinarily thought to be far more compelling than duties of charity.
They are not only thought to be of greater moral importance. They are also thought to be
the sort of thing that the state can justifiably compel people to perform. That is why advo-
cates of the welfare state have traditionally cast their case in terms of “social justice” and
advocates of international poverty reduction theirs in terms of “global justice.” That is
also why opponents of each of those causes insist that they are properly regarded as mere
“duties of charity” instead (Narveson, 1988: ch. 18).
Elsewhere I have argued that both forms of poverty alleviation should be properly
regarded as matters of justice, and I do not in the least resile from those claims. But those
who regard those as duties of justice do not deny that they can also properly be subjects
of duties of charity. If collective duties of justice in those regards are not being dis-
charged, then there remain individual duties of charity until and unless the collectivity
acts (Goodin, 1985: 141). And individual duties of charity are precisely what our oppo-
nents offer in lieu of institutions of justice (Waldron, 1986: 464–466).
Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia
Corresponding author:
Robert E Goodin, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 2601, Australia.
Email: Bob.Goodin@anu.edu.au
647402PSX0010.1177/0032321716647402Political StudiesGoodin
research-article2016
Editors’ Choice
Goodin 269
That there are duties of charity to alleviate poverty, both domestically and internation-
ally, is therefore agreed on both sides of the debate (Barry, 1982: 243, 247; Valentini,
2013: 492). The full implications of that fact have heretofore been underexplored. The
aim of this article is to see just how far those agreed duties of charity would go toward
prescribing institutions and practices akin to those that would be required duties of
justice.
The Optional versus the Obligatory
Duties of justice are “perfect duties.” You are morally obliged to discharge them on every
occasion on which they arise. Duties of charity, in contrast, are “imperfect duties”
(O’Neill, 1986: 138).1 You are obliged to do what they dictate on some occasion or
another, but not on all occasions that arise—and you are morally at liberty to pick and
choose which occasions those are to be.2 That is the standard analysis that I wholly accept.
Insofar as duties of justice are perfect, you have a pro tanto reason to discharge them
on all occasions on which they arise. Insofar as duties of charity are imperfect, you need
not discharge them on all occasions; you only have a pro tanto reason to discharge them
on some occasions. From that it might seem to follow that, whenever the two sorts of
duties clash, the duties of justice (e.g. contractual duties to your business associates or
associative duties to your own family or your fellow citizens) take priority over any duties
of charity you have toward others with whom you stand in no relation of justice.3 That
inference I strongly resist.
Duties of charity are not invariably morally weaker in their demands than duties of
justice, contrary to what is often casually remarked.4 They can be as morally compelling,
or even more so.5 Those who are owed duties of justice cannot complain (in one particular
way, anyway) when someone who owes them a duty of justice chooses instead to dis-
charge a more compelling duty of charity, as I shall show.
Form and Strength Can Come Apart
Imperfect duties, such as duties of charity, are conventionally seen as optional.6 You are
morally required to do something to discharge them sometime or another. But you are not
morally required to do anything to discharge them on any particular occasion. Perfect
duties of justice, in contrast, are morally obligatory. Morally you are required to discharge
them on every occasion on which they arise.7
The one being obligatory, while the other is optional, might be thought to give rise to
a natural pecking order between them. How could the optional ever prevail over the
obligatory? Shouldn’t the obligatory serve to delimit the options over which we are per-
mitted to exercise discretionary control?8
That is a natural way of thinking, but an incorrect one. First, I shall offer some exam-
ples to motivate that thought. Then, I shall provide an analysis to elucidate what exactly
it is that makes that true.
The hackneyed example is that of a child who you see drowning in a shallow pond as
you are en route to keep an appointment (Singer, 1972). You have a perfect duty to keep
your promised appointment (Hart, 1955: 183–184; Searle, 1964), all would agree. Yet, on
balance, the right thing to do is to rescue the drowning child, so long as you can do so at
minimal cost to yourself (particularly if there is no one else who can rescue, such occa-
sions do not arise too frequently, and so on).
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