Dyadic Hostility and the Ties That Bind: State-to-State versus State-to-System Security and Economic Relationships
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343304047431 |
| Date | 01 November 2004 |
| Author | Michelle A. Benson |
| Published date | 01 November 2004 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
659
Introduction
What types of ties lead states towards
decreased dyadic conflict? There are two
implicit points of debate in the literature:
first, whether it is states’ ties to the system
leader or instead their ties to each other that
are important in shaping conflict propensi-
ties; and second, whether it is economic or
security ties that are paramount. Power
transition theory suggests that states’ ties to
the international order are what determine
dyadic peace (Organski, 1968; Organski &
Kugler, 1980; Kugler & Lemke, 1996;
Tammen et al., 2000). Recent research in
this perspective has confirmed that two states
with tight security ties to the system leader
are less likely to go to war (Kim, 1989, 1991,
1996; Lemke & Reed, 1996, 2001). On the
other hand, a large body of literature has
focused on the importance of intra-dyadic,
or state-to-state, relationships in reducing
conflict. The interdependence and conflict
literature, for example, suggests that states
with strong bilateral trade ties will be
less likely to engage in conflict (Polachek,
1980; Gasiorowski & Polachek, 1982;
© 2004 Journal of Peace Research,
vol. 41, no. 6, 2004, pp. 659–676
Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA
and New Delhi) www.sagepublications.com
DOI 10.1177/0022343304047431 ISSN 0022-3433
Dyadic Hostility and the Ties That Bind:
State-to-State versus State-to-System Security and
Economic Relationships*
MICHELLE A. BENSON
Department of Political Science, University at Buffalo, SUNY
An important question in the conflict processes literature concerns what types of international relation-
ships are more likely to lead to peaceful interactions. Both security and economic ties have been posited
as powerful determinants of conflict, yet their effects are often examined independently from one
another. Furthermore, a debate exists as to whether it is states’ ties to the international order or to each
other that are most important in determining conflict. A resolution of the competing perspectives
would expect that two states that have a tight network of security and economic relationships, both to
each other and to the international order, should be extremely unlikely to engage in hostile action
against each other. Surprisingly, a series of multinomial logits using non-directed dyads from 1951 to
1985 suggests that dyads with tight economic and security ties at both the state-to-state and state-to-
system levels are only slightly less likely to engage in dyadic disputes than those without such simul-
taneous ties. However, this study finds that both (1) tight security and economic ties to the international
order and (2) tight intra-dyadic security and economic ties have important, independent effects in
limiting dyadic hostility. This suggests that the states within a dyad have two separate paths to more
peaceful interactions – the first lies in tightening ties between states, the second in strengthening dyadic
security and economic ties to the international order.
* I would like to thank the editors and the anonymous
reviewers for their helpful comments. Gregory Saxton,
Jacek Kugler, and Yi Feng gave invaluable advice, while the
John Randolph and Dora Haynes Foundation generously
provided financial support. The data used in this article can
be found at http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets.asp. Stata 7.0
was used to generate the results. Correspondence:
mbenson2@buffalo.edu.
01 benson (ds) 24/9/04 10:55 am Page 659
Gasiorowski, 1986; Pollins, 1989a,b; Mans-
field & Pollins, 2001; Russett & Oneal,
2001). Likewise, pairs of states with strong
security relationships have been shown to be
less likely to engage in disputes (Bueno de
Mesquita, 1975; Altfeld & Bueno de
Mesquita, 1979; Gowa, 1994; Signorino &
Ritter, 1999).
This article posits that multiple levels
of connection (state-to-state and state-
to-system) as well as multiple dimensions of
interest (economic and security) have an
interactive effect on the probability of two
states engaging in conflictual behavior.
However, thus far, recent work has focused
exclusively on the causal relationships
between state-to-system security ties on war
or on the additive effect of state-to-state
trade or security ties on dyadic conflict. This
article suggests that it is reasonable to expect
that both state-to-system and state-to-state
ties in the security and economic dimensions
would have a simultaneous impact on dyadic
conflict propensities.
To test the above argument, it is necessary
to operationalize the independent and inter-
active impact of four types of relationships:
(1) state-to-state (i.e. intra-dyadic) economic
ties, (2) state-to-state security ties, (3) state-
to-system economic ties, and (4) state-to-
system security ties. Using a series of
multinomial logits on non-directed dyads
from 1951 to 1985, I test whether hostility
is related to the similarity of pairs of states’
economic and security ties to the inter-
national system leader, to the strength of
pairs of states’ ties with one another, or to
both of these.
The results corroborate previous work
that suggests security ties to the leader of the
international system decrease the likelihood
of war (Organski & Kugler, 1980; Kugler &
Lemke, 1996; Tammen et al., 2000; Lemke
& Werner, 1996; Lemke, 2002). In addition,
results presented here show that the moder-
ated effect of the degree of economic and
security ties to the system leader is associated
with the likelihood of both the show of force
and war. In short, the interaction of the
strength of security and economic ties to the
system leader significantly affects the likeli-
hood of a state moving from no action to
show of force, from no action to war, and
from the use of force to war. The interactive
effect of state-to-state security and economic
ties likewise produces a strong impact on
dyadic disputes. The dissimilarity of states’
ties to one another is associated with an
increase of all levels of dyadic disputes except
for the threat and use of force.
The interaction of all these factors (i.e. the
dissimilarity of state-to-state and state-to-
system economic and security ties) is shown
to somewhat increase the probability of the
show of force and war, as well as the proba-
bility of moving from the threat of force to
the show of force, from the threat of force to
war, from the show of force to war, and from
the use of force to war. Surprisingly, though,
this finding is somewhat limited in the
magnitude of its effect on dyadic disputes,
suggesting that there are probably two
separate paths to peace for each dyad – one
down the road of similarly tight economic
and security ties to the international system
leader, another down the path of tight
security and economic ties to one other.
Dissimilarity and Hostility
This article considers whether the relation-
ships tying states together are most salient in
determining conflict when assessed in regard
to the international order, to states’ ties to
one another, or to both simultaneously. A
large body of recent literature has focused on
how the relationships or the lack of relation-
ships between states can affect dyadic
disputes. For example, states with similar
alliance profiles have been shown to be less
likely to engage in conflict (Altfeld & Bueno
de Mesquita, 1979; Bueno de Mesquita,
journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume 41 / number 6 / november 2004
660
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