ECONOMIC CHOICE AS A PHILOSOPHIC THEORY
| Date | 01 June 1956 |
| Published date | 01 June 1956 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9485.1956.tb00813.x |
| Author | A. L. Macfie |
ECONOMIC CHOICE
AS
A
PHILOSOPHIC THEORY
I
M,ua
interested in the social sciences will recently have felt that
specialisation has there increased,
is
increasing, and also that it ought
to
be
diminished. Perhaps it would
be
truer to say that this specialisa-
tion should at least be balanced by an equal growth in the inter-
relations of these disciplines,
so
that their cross-criticisms should
constantly correct one another, and the whole picture (in practice the
most important one) should not
go
by default.
All
who feel this way
(and many will be Scots) will therefore welcome an important contri-
bution from a Scottish philosopher.' For it cames out one function
of philosophy in this unduly neglected field by criticising economic
doctrine from the philosophical or final aspect. and by fitting the
economic judgment into a logical exposition
of
an ethical and valua-
tional theory.
An author has the right to choose his own assumptions. This is
necessary in a book which, though mainly a critique of economic
method, is ready to develop this process from
a
simple value judgment
(or attribution of goodness) into its links with moral and other values
(pp.
176
and
182-3),
and through this hierarchy of ends to a developed
theory of human freedom. Such wide assumptions, however, involve
consequences which should not and logically cannot be avoided. It
is not here suggested that Dr. Lamont does exceed his assumptions.
But the dangers for his interpreters should be underlined. Dr. Lamont
himself declares that his ethical and valuational positions are here
dogmatically statcd, not proved (p.
305).
This his readers should
accept. But they should also remember the consequences. They
should realise that such assumptions as the limitation of value (and
choice) to the comparative economic judgment (p.
185)
contracts our
view
of
facts and theories, economic as well as moral. Thus economics
is reduced to pure economic theory, though all economists recognise
the formative influence of economic history and institutional study.
and
of
the processes of change-not yet formalised as theory. In
this respect, it is rather surprising to find Marshall, Wicksteed and
Smart quoted as supporters
of
the positive view
;
less
so
for Marshall
perhaps because he did adopt the positive method, though he did
so
for pragmatic reasons and ultimate purposes which were far from
merely positive
;
but this is a long and involved story. On Wicksteed
1
W.
D.
Lamont.
The Value
Judgement
(Edinburgh University Press,
1955.
Pp.
xvi
+
335.
25s.).
146
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