Economic determinants of public support for European integration, 1995–2018
| Author | Jeffry Frieden,Chase Foster |
| DOI | 10.1177/1465116521994181 |
| Date | 01 June 2021 |
| Published date | 01 June 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Economic determinants
of public support for
European integration,
1995–2018
Chase Foster
Watson Institute for International & Public Affairs,
Brown University, Providence, RI, USA
Jeffry Frieden
Department of Government, Harvard University,
Cambridge, MA, USA
Abstract
European support for integration is shaped by a range of economic, cultural, and
political factors. However, in recent decades, scholars have argued that utilitarian
calculations have become less important as European integration has advanced, and
political entrepreneurs have mobilized nationalist identities. We analyze 24 years of
responses to the Eurobarometer (1995–2018) to assess the influence of economic
factors on public attitudes toward European integration. We find strong evidence
that utilitarian factors are important across the entire panel. The performance of the
macro-economy, as measured by unemployment, and an individual’s position in the
labor market, are consistent predictors of public support for and satisfaction with
the European Union. Collective identity is also associated with attitudes toward the
European Union. However, an individual’s identity is also shaped by economic
circumstances.
Keywords
European integration, nationalism, political economy, public opinion
Corresponding author:
Chase Foster, Watson Institute for International & Public Affairs, Brown University, 111 Thayer Street,
Providence, RI 02912, USA.
Email: chase_foster@brown.edu
European Union Politics
2021, Vol. 22(2) 266–292
!The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/1465116521994181
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Public opinion affects European integration. Early in the integration process, elites
largely led the way, but in recent decades popular attitudes have come to the fore
(B€
orzel and Risse, 2020; Hobolt and De Vries, 2016). Mass movements have arisen
that are skeptical about aspects of European integration (Usherwood and Startin,
2013). Political parties that promote Eurosceptical views have gained increasing
support (Hein€
o et al., 2017). European publics have expressed ambivalence about
widening and deepening the European Union (EU) (De Vries, 2018; Hobolt, 2009,
2014).
The growing politicization of European integration has challenged theories that
view integration as depending on economic interests. Scholarship has increasingly
turned to understanding how national identities constrain public support for the
European project. Hooghe and Marks’ (2009) postfunctionalist theory, which
holds that “identity politics” will rise in importance as political entrepreneurs
exploit the gap between community identity on the national level and governance
on the EU level, has proven to be particularly influential, fostering a rich literature
about the formation of collective identity and its mobilization by political entre-
preneurs. Many of the most influential recent studies on European public opinion
and the success of Eurosceptical political parties emphasize identity politics, cul-
tural cleavages, and/or opposition to immigration (Bechtel et al., 2014; De Vries
and Edwards, 2009; Fligstein et al., 2012; Halikiopoulou et al., 2012; Hooghe and
Marks, 2018; Hutter and Grande, 2014; Lucassen and Lubbers, 2012; Norris and
Inglehart, 2019; Risse, 2015; Werts et al., 2013). Utilitarian considerations are
sometimes acknowledged, but they are often theorized as coming to bear only
when economic costs are high (De Vries, 2018) or the salience of economic factors
is particularly palpable (Hobolt and Wratil, 2015). Future progress in European
integration is seen as revolving around cultural cleavages (Hooghe and Marks,
2018) and hinging on collective identity formation at the European level (B€
orzel
and Risse, 2020; Kuhn and Nicoli, 2020; McNamara and Musgrave, 2020).
Against this backdrop, we assess the relevance of utilitarian theory for explain-
ing public attitudes toward the EU over the last quarter century. We use 24 years
of public opinion data to assess the extent to which economic interests shape
support for European integration. We evaluate both absolute and relative meas-
ures, building on previous scholars’ work on benchmarking (De Vries, 2018). In
light of common arguments that utilitarian factors may have grown less important
as the integration process has advanced, we investigate whether these patterns have
changed since the 1990s and, if so, along which dimensions. Finally, we assess the
robustness of economic factors in the face of alternative, identity-based
explanations.
We find that utilitarian factors are strong predictors of public support for
European integration, and that their impact has not declined over time.
Favorable macro-economic conditions are consistently associated with public sup-
port for integration, with no noticeable decrease in their importance following the
adoption of the euro in 2001, the eastward expansion of the EU’s external borders
beginning in 2005, or the global financial crisis that commenced in 2008.
Foster and Frieden 267
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