Economic–Security Nexus in the AIIB: China's Quest for Security through Eurasian Connectivity
| Published date | 01 November 2019 |
| Date | 01 November 2019 |
| Author | Giovanni B. Andornino |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12762 |
Economic–Security Nexus in the AIIB: China’s
Quest for Security through Eurasian
Connectivity
Giovanni B. Andornino
University of Turin
Abstract
The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is mainly considered as a commercial connectivity and sustainability-oriented
infrastructure development bank, but there are also international security dimensions to the Bank. China’s geostrategic and
security motivations are said to be behind its spearheading of the AIIB. This essay highlights that China’s national and interna-
tional security calculations have evolved in the period after the Bank’s opening. In the initial phase of the AIIB’s formation,
2013–2017, the Bank’s creation was part of Beijing’s pursuit of a more outwardly ambitious and bold national/international
security agenda of new institution-building, looking to reshape the system of global governance. But since 2017, China’s lead-
ership has responded to sustained international pushback against its ambitious agenda, especially but not exclusively from
the United States, and it has refocused its national security priorities onto protecting national economic growth, national
sovereignty and regime preservation. Beijing has supported moves to put some distance between the AIIB and the Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI), and Chinese strategists have shifted to seeing the AIIB as helpful for mitigating an economic downturn
across Eurasia, and preserving China’s continuing growth and regime survival in what they perceive as a period of external
threat.
How does international security intersect with the economic
and development work of the Asian Infrastructure Invest-
ment Bank? The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)
itself does not refer to ‘international security’factors or
implications in its main policy documents. Nor do the senior
management of the Bank or its Board members normally
talk about the international security considerations of the
AIIB. The preference, or tendency, of the AIIB staff, and its
backers, is to focus on the international development work
or economic considerations of the new Bank. But it is sug-
gested here that international security considerations have
also been a key set of motivations behind the creation of
the AIIB, and continue to underlay the work of this new
international financial institution.
This essay argues that China has been motivated not
only by international development and economic consider-
ations in creating and sustaining the AIIB, but also, impor-
tantly, though more quietly, by national security
considerations, and that these security considerations have
been evolving. The analysis here differs from other litera-
ture that has addressed China’s international security moti-
vations and the AIIB, as it has tended to focus on how the
AIIB fits into the China-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
This is understandable to some extent, as these two initia-
tives were launched by China around the same time per-
iod, and there is overlap between the geography and
substance of the two initiatives, in terms of encouraging
international connectivity and infrastructure development.
The related assumption in much of the literature on BRI is
that it is evidence of China’s attempt to rival the United
States, or the liberal order, for regional or global leadership
–and that the AIIB is basically a tool for pursuing the
expansionist BRI agenda.
There is a tendency especially within the international
relations literature to overstate China’s self-confidence and
assertiveness as a global leader-in-waiting and to conflate
the analysis of the AIIB with the BRI. Here, it is argued,
instead, that although China’s power and capabilities, ambi-
tions, and role in the contemporary world have undoubtedly
been growing, it is also important not to conflate the analy-
sis of the AIIB and the BRI, and to examine the specific inter-
national/national security calculations that underpin China’s
relationship with the AIIB. Moreover, the AIIB is understood
here to be a new multilateral organization that is striving to
meet or exceed global standards and practices, and within
which China is trying to act multilaterally, and not only or
mainly according to its own national self-interests –not a
small challenge for Beijing (see Chin’s‘Introduction’for this
collection). Finally, it is suggested here that China’s national
security calculations have evolved, from when it was sup-
porting the AIIB’s creation (2013–2017), to the current phase
(2017-onwards) when it is helping to sustain the Bank’s
operations, working with 99 multilateral partners in the Bank
(77 ‘effective’members, 99 pledged members). In brief, Chi-
na’s national security motivations have evolved, or shifted in
the last six years (2013–2019), from a somewhat outwardly
ambitious set of goals to more defensive, preservationist
national security motivations.
©2019 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Global Policy (2019) 10:4 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12762
Global Policy Volume 10 . Issue 4 . November 2019
604
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