Edmund Burke and the Sociology of Revolution
| Date | 01 December 1977 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1977.tb00459.x |
| Author | Michael Freeman |
| Published date | 01 December 1977 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
EDMUND BURKE AND
THE
SOCIOLOGY
OF
REVOLUTION*
MICHAEL FREEMAN
lJniversi/y
of
Essex
Abstracr.
A
sociological theory of revolution can be found in the writings of Edmund
Burke. This
is
important because modern sociologists of revolution have neglected Burke
in surveying their predecessors; because the modern sociology of revolution has evaded
some of the key questions about revolution raised in classical political theory; and
because many influential writers on Burke have misrepresented and gravely underrated his
theory
of
revolution. This article presents the evidence for Burke’s sociology of revolution
and offers a revisionist critique of the conventional scholarship in this area.
1
WISH
to show that Edmund Burke’s theory of revolution retains considerable
interest for political sociologists today.
In
order to do this,
I
must also show that
most of the prevalent interpretations of his theory are mistaken. My argument is
thus directed towards both those whose interest is
in
the theory of revolution and
those whose interest is
in
the interpretation
of
Burke’s thought.
John Plamenatz wrote in
Man and
Society
that ‘Burke’s conception of society,
as
a
well-integrated whole with long-established institutions supported by
venerable prejudices, made it impossible for him to give a convincing explanation
of anarchy and revolution’.’ This is incorrect. But Plamenatz’ error is not
solely due to an inadequate reading
of
the texts, but also to a misleading method of
interpreting Burke.
This method is quite common in contemporary Burke scholarship.
It
assumes,
plausibly, that Burke was not a systematic political theorist, but a partisan
political activist who dealt with a series
of
‘problems’ throughout his career
in
a
somewhat theoretical way. Thus, Frank O’Gorman, in his study of Burke, has
chapters on party, the British constitution, America, Ireland, India, and the
French Revolution.2 Plamenatz, in
Man and
Society,
divides his chapter on
Burke similarly into the topics of party, America and the French Revolution.
This procedure seems to be justified by the facts of Burke’s life and his own
declared hostility to systematic political theory.
I
shall try to prove that,
if
one
*
This article was written while
I
was a Visitor at Nuffield College, Oxford, supported by
a
Personal Research Grant from the Social Science Research Council.
1
should like
to
thank the
Warden and Fellows
of
the College for their hospitality and the S.S.R.C. for their financial
assistance.
1
have greatly benefitted from comments on an earlier draft by Professor David
Kettler, of Trent University, Ontario, who is, of course, in no way responsible for the faults of
the article. I should also like
to
record the fact that the train of thought that ended here began
in an exchange of correspondence between the late Professor John Plamenatz and myself.
Ironically, the rather sharp way in which
I
have formulated my disagreement with his view of
Burke was in part brought about by his personal kindness and intellectual help. My critique of his
interpretation
is,
I
should make clear, written with gratitude
to,
and respect for, its author.
1
J.
Plamenatz,
Man
and
Society
(London, Longmans,
1963),
Vol.
1,
p.
362.
2
F.
O’Gorman,
Edmund
Eiirke:
His
Political Philosophy
(London, George Allen and Unwin,
1973).
Political
Studies,
Vol.
XXV.
No.
4
(459-473).
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