Electing the experts: Expertise and independence in the UN human rights treaty bodies
| Date | 01 September 2019 |
| Published date | 01 September 2019 |
| Author | Valentina Carraro |
| DOI | 10.1177/1354066118819138 |
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https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066118819138
European Journal of
International Relations
2019, Vol. 25(3) 826 –851
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/1354066118819138
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Electing the experts:
Expertise and independence
in the UN human rights
treaty bodies
Valentina Carraro
Maastricht University, The Netherlands
Abstract
Independent experts are employed in international organizations to carry out
a variety of functions, including conducting independent evaluations of state
performance in a given policy area. In the field of human rights, a well-known
example of the use of independent expertise in public organizations is that of the
United Nations treaty bodies, committees of independent experts in charge of
monitoring state compliance with the major United Nations human rights treaties.
Considering the sensitive tasks that these experts perform, and the fact that they
are elected by states, the question of whether they actually possess the required
levels of independence and expertise to fulfil their role arises. This article proposes
and applies a framework to study the formal and informal processes leading to
the appointment of expert committees in international bodies, and to assess their
level of expertise and independence. Data were collected by means of an original
survey and 40 semi-structured interviews. The article shows that the overall
level of independent expertise possessed by committees is surprisingly high when
considering the highly political electoral process. Therefore, it argues that to study
the expertise and independence of expert committees, one should conceive of
them as groups that might be able to maintain a certain independence from the
states that have elected them.
Keywords
Expertise, global institutions, human rights, monitoring, treaty bodies, United Nations
Corresponding author:
Valentina Carraro, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD,
Maastricht, Netherlands.
Email: valentina.carraro@maastrichtuniversity.nl
819138EJT0010.1177/1354066118819138European Journal of International RelationsCarraro
research-article2019
Article
Carraro 827
Introduction
Independent experts have long been employed by public organizations to carry out a
variety of functions. These functions include providing policy advice, substantiating the
choices made by decision-makers or conducting independent evaluations of state perfor-
mance in a given field or policy area. The use of independent expertise is generally
advocated to provide a better-informed judgement or assessment than would otherwise
be the case, or to legitimize the choices made by decision-makers (Boswell, 2008, 2009;
Dunlop, 2010; Feldman and March, 1981; Haas, 1992; Haverland, 2009; Nowotny,
2000). The use of expertise in public bodies is, however, potentially controversial. How,
and by whom, are these experts selected? What criteria are employed for their appoint-
ment? How is their independence ascertained and maintained?
In the field of international human rights, a well-known example of the use of inde-
pendent expertise in public organizations is that of the United Nations (UN) treaty bod-
ies. The 10 major UN human rights treaties provided for the establishment of committees
of independent experts, called treaty bodies, in charge of monitoring state compliance
with the respective treaty. The main tasks of treaty bodies consist of: examining reports
by state parties on the implementation of the respective treaty; receiving complaints from
individuals for alleged treaty violations by a state party; conducting country inquiries on
their own initiative; and publishing general comments, which are documents concerning
the interpretation of human rights treaty provisions.1
The independent experts composing the treaty bodies are nominated by states among
their nationals, and are subsequently elected by the whole membership of state parties to
the treaty. As a precondition for their appointment, these individuals must possess the
relevant human rights expertise to carry out their tasks and are required to act in a per-
sonal capacity, independently from the state that has nominated them. Yet, the sensitive
tasks that they are required to perform, and the fact that these experts are directly nomi-
nated by states, warrant the question of whether they actually possess the required levels
of independence and expertise to fulfil their role.
Against this background, it does not seem far-fetched to assume that tensions between
individuals’ formal role as independent experts, on the one hand, and their actual levels
of independence and expertise, on the other, might arise. In the case of the treaty bodies,
committee members are expected to possess an adequate level of expertise, and to make
use of this expertise to formulate an independent evaluation of a country’s performance,
free from any governmental pressures. Yet, these experts are nominated and elected by
states, which will determine whether they will be renominated, and thus possibly re-
elected, for subsequent terms of office. Considering the state-led nature of the electoral
process for treaty bodies, then, this article asks: to what extent is the treaty bodies’ elec-
toral process capable of delivering committee members possessing the necessary exper-
tise and independence to perform their role?
The more the subject matter handled by expert committees is perceived by states as
sensitive and sovereignty-intrusive, the more one could expect them to design the process
in a way that allows them to retain a certain measure of control. Human rights are widely
regarded as a matter of national sovereignty: violations committed within a state generally
do not have an impact on other countries, and, in many cases, states are themselves the
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