Election Cycles in MPs' outside Interests? The UK House of Commons, 2005–2010
| Author | Benny Geys |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.00956.x |
| Published date | 01 June 2013 |
| Date | 01 June 2013 |
| Subject Matter | Research Note |
RESEARCH NOTE
Election Cycles in MPs’ Outside Interests? The
UK House of Commons, 2005–2010post_956 462..472
Benny Geys
Norwegian School of Management
Politicians often implement popular changes in public policies prior to elections, with the aim of improving their
Election Day outcome. This research note evaluates whether such‘electioneer ing’ carries over also into politicians’
extra-parliamentary activities. Evidence from the UK House of Commons over the period 2005–10 suggests that
adjustments do occur in MPs’ outside activities over the election cycle. The safety of the politician’s seat and his or
her decision to stand for re-election play an important mediating role.
Keywords: outside interests; election cycles; House of Commons
Members of Parliament (MPs) can legally undertake extra-parliamentary activities in many
countries, and these pursuits are welcomed in many traditions of representation. Yet they
are not always looked upon favourably by the mass media and the broader public. Indeed,
often descr ibed as ‘moonlighting’ (Gagliarducci et al.,2010; Geys and Mause, forthcoming),
they have been equated with personal greed, conflicts of interest, neglect of parliamentary
duties and putting private well-being before the nation (e.g., Carlin, 2007; Noel-Baker,
1961). This negative view was strengthened during the recent series of scandals over MPs’
expenses claims (in 2009 in the UK and 2011 in the European Parliament) and acceptance
of ‘cash for influence’ (in 2009 and 2010 in the UK and 2011 in the European Parliament),
‘cash for questions’ (in 1994) or ‘cash for honours’ (in 2006–7) (see also Allen, 2008).
Given voters’ ethical concerns regarding politicians’ behaviour (Allen and Birch, 2012;
Birch and Allen,2010), this popular association between extra-parliamentary activities and
the inappropriate use of office may lead such activities to affect politicians’ public image
negatively. Building on an extensive literature on political budget cycles (i.e., politicians
introducing popular policy changes prior to elections; for a review, see Franzese, 2002), this
research note argues that such a damaging aspect of outside interests makes holding them
less attractive,certainly when elections are approaching.1We test the empirical implications
of this argument using data from the UK House of Commons Register of Members’
Financial Interests over the period 2005–10, thus covering one complete legislative term.
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
A classic argument in political science and economics holds that politicians favour imple-
menting politically costly policies – such as tax increases (e.g., Geys and Vermeir, 2008a;
2008b) – early in the legislative term.When elections are imminent, they instead introduce
tax reductions (e.g.,Ashworth et al., 2006; Mikesell, 1978) or increases in public expendi-
tures (e.g., Hicks and Swank, 1992; Sáez and Sinha, 2010). Such political budget cycles
(PBCs) leave incumbents’ popular policy decisions fresh in voters’ minds on Election Day,
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doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.00956.x
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2013 VOL 61, 462–472
© 2012The Author.Political Studies © 2012 Political Studies Association
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