Electoral integrity and the repercussions of institutional manipulations: The 2019 general election in Thailand
| Author | Siripan Nogsuan Sawasdee |
| DOI | 10.1177/2057891119892321 |
| Date | 01 March 2020 |
| Published date | 01 March 2020 |
| Subject Matter | Research articles |
Research article
Electoral integrity
and the repercussions
of institutional manipulations:
The 2019 general election
in Thailand
Siripan Nogsuan Sawasdee
Chulalongkorn University, Thailand
Abstract
Thailand’s 2019 election was seen from the beginning to be a ritual to transform a military
junta into an elected government. This qualitative article draws on the critical analysis of
theories in authoritarianism and electoral integrity to shed light on the concept of competitive
authoritarianism. The article, utilizing empirical data and historical narratives, illustrates
Thailand’s legal and political environment governing this election. The electoral results and
post-election political party landscape reveal unintended consequences in manipulating
political institutions. Although the newly introduced electoral system and institutional
manipulations allowed the military co-opted Palang Pracharat party to select the prime
minister even without controlling a majority in the House of Representatives, as projected,
the establishment was inadvertently left with two robust opposition parties, namely the old
Pheu Thai and the new-born Future Forward parties. The former represents the strongest
political machine in Thailand, which has won five consecutive elections, while the latter
symbolizes a new divide in Thai politics, armed with the power of social media, and poses a
bigger threat to the military establishment. Remarkably, the electoral result not only pointed
to a continued polarization, dominated by the cleavages of ultraconservative versus pro-
gressive and an urban-rural, rich-poor cleavage, but also a new division between older and
younger generations. This article maintains that although Thailand’s civil-military government
might be deposed in the future due to several challenges facing them, the undemocratic
political structure of military electoral co-optation polity remains ingrained on account of the
way that the 2017 Constitution was crafted.
Corresponding author:
Siripan Nogsuan Sawasdee, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Henr y Dunant Street, Patoomwan,
Bangkok, 10330, Thailand.
Emails: nogsuan@gmail.com; siripan.no@chula.ac.th
Asian Journal of Comparative Politics
2020, Vol. 5(1) 52–68
ªThe Author(s) 2019
Article reuse guidelines:
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DOI: 10.1177/2057891119892321
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Keywords
competitive authoritarianism, electoral integrity, institutional manipulation, military, Thai political
parties, Thailand 2019 election
Revitalizing competitive authoritarianism
The 24 March 2019 election was the first election for the House of Representatives held on the
basis of the 2017 Constitution. The election delivered a legislative majority to the recently
remade military government; parliament appeared to have turned into the battleground for novel
conflicting ideas that might become the main obstacles to the military-civil government. The
question of whether this will lead to a substantial transformation of the political regime and the
party system must wait until the next round of elections has taken place. However, it is not too
early for some preliminary analysis. The article explores party and electoral activities during and
after the 2019 election and suggests some tentative conclusions about how political actors,
parties and voters have adapted to the new legal and political environment. To provide context
for the analysis, the next section briefly reviews the concept of competitive authoritarianism as a
general framework. Then the management of the election and the electoral results will be
discussed and evaluated. This article intends to draw some preliminary observations relevant
to the issue of how the military junta utilized the institutional mechanics of the election as the
predominant method for retaining power and the prospect that this election will increase the
chances of an inadvertent escalation in conflict.
The practice of holding multi-party elections as an institutional facade of representative democ-
racy while violating liberal-democratic minimum standards in systematic and profound ways is a
major characteristic of competitive authoritarianism (Diamond, 2002; Levitsky and Way, 2010;
Schedler, 2006, 2013). Techniques commonly used in these regimes are, for example, staging
sham elections by preventing real political competition, providing an uneven playing field, sup-
pressing political contestation, and making sure that the rule of law only works at the discretion of
the ruling groups. This phenomenon is known in Africa’s Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Rwanda, for
example; in Latin America’s Honduras, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Nicaragua; in Eurasia’s Russia
and Azerbaijan; and in Southeast Asia’s Singapore, Myanmar, and Cambodia, to name a few. Yet,
the comparative studies have not provided a conclusive finding on the effect of holding periodic
elections and the authoritarian regimes’ longevity. Geddes (2006) and Gandhi (2008) argue that
authoritarian regimes with elections are more durable than their non-electoral counterparts. Jason
(2009) and Hadenius and Teorell (2007) believe that although competitive authoritarian regimes
are not especially prone to losing power, electoral contestations significantly increase the like-
lihood of democratization.
With a devious mix of disguised electoral procedures relying on several tactics, such as system-
atically distorting elections in their favor (Schedler, 2002), imbalanced enforcement of electoral
laws (Birch, 2011; Norris et al., 2014), and highly orchestrated institutional manipulations, in both
visible and invisible ways, Thailand’s March 2019 electoral result has restored and revitalized the
competitive authoritarianism model. This electi on outcome, allowing the newly created civil-
military party to form a coalition government, may have aroused disapproval and harsh criticism,
but it duly served the key purposes of election in many competitive authoritarian regimes: to
provide a venue to co-opt strategic political actors (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006), to deter
defection from the ruling power holder (Magaloni, 2008), and to reinforce and buttress the ruler’s
Sawasdee 53
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