Electoral Systems and Policy Congruence
| Author | Benjamin Ferland |
| Date | 01 May 2021 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0032321719895428 |
| Published date | 01 May 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321719895428
Political Studies
2021, Vol. 69(2) 344 –365
© The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0032321719895428
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Electoral Systems and Policy
Congruence
Benjamin Ferland
Abstract
Many studies examined the state of citizen-elite congruence at the party system, legislative and
government stages of representation. Few scholars examined, however, whether citizen preferences
are adequately represented in enacted policies. The article addresses this gap in the literature
and examines the role of electoral systems in fostering citizens-policy congruence. Building on
studies of government congruence and responsiveness, we expect levels of policy congruence
to be greater under majoritarian electoral systems than under proportional representation
electoral systems and as the number of parties in government decreases. In order to test these
expectations, we make use of data from the International Social Survey Programme and examine
the proportions of respondents whose preferences are congruent with government levels of
spending in eight major policy domains. Overall, the results do not support our expectations and
indicate that levels of policy congruence are similar across electoral systems and government
types. In line with recent works on electoral systems and representation, our findings support the
claim that majoritarian and proportional representation electoral systems both have mechanisms
which allow governments to represent their citizens similarly.
Keywords
representation, electoral systems, policy congruence
Accepted: 25 November 2019
Introduction
Congruence between citizen preferences and government positions/policies is often con-
sidered one of the key aspects of representative democracies (Dahl, 1971; Pitkin, 1967;
Powell, 2000). Scholars do not necessarily expect government decisions to always match
the will of the people. In some cases, representatives may or will deviate from their citi-
zens (Rehfeld, 2009). That said, most scholars recognize that a good correspondence
between citizen preferences and governments is generally a sign of a well-functioning
democracy.
School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON, Canada
Corresponding author:
Benjamin Ferland, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa, 120 University, Ottawa, ON K1N 6N5,
Canada.
Email: bferland@uottawa.ca
895428PSX0010.1177/0032321719895428Political StudiesFerland
research-article2020
Article
Ferland 345
Congruence between citizen preferences and their representatives may be examined at
different stages in the democratic process (Golder and Ferland, 2017). Citizens first
express their preferences at elections in casting a vote. Votes are then translated into leg-
islative seats which allow the formation of a government. At the end of the representation
chain, governments take positions on different issues and ultimately adopt policies and
take actions. At each of these stages, it is possible to evaluate whether citizens are ade-
quately represented and what are the factors that favour or impede congruence (for a
review, see Golder and Ferland, 2017). Many studies thus examined the state of citizen-
elite congruence at the party system (Calvo and Hellwig, 2011; Costello et al., 2012;
Dalton, 1985; Matakos et al., 2016), legislative (Golder and Lloyd, 2014; McDonald and
Budge, 2005; Powell and Vanberg, 2000) and government stages of representation
(Ferland, 2016; Golder and Stramski, 2010; Powell, 2000, 2009). In the American con-
text, scholars also considered the relationship between single representatives and their
constituents – that is, dyadic representation (Miller and Stokes, 1963; Page et al., 1984;
Page and Shapiro, 1983).
While all stages of representation are important and may help congruence be achieved
at the next stages, citizens-policy congruence is surely at the centre of what representative
democracy should foster. Significant incongruence between government policies/actions
and what citizens want in terms of policies would represent evidence of a dysfunctional
democratic process. Surprisingly, there is a lack of research on this last stage of represen-
tation. There are indeed many studies of government responsiveness to public opinion. As
we detail below, responsiveness represents, however, a different form of representation
than policy congruence. The most basic conceptualization of policy congruence calls for
an enacted policy that is supported by a majority of the people.1 Some scholars did con-
sider this last stage of representation in the context of American politics (Gilens and Page,
2014; Lax and Phillips, 2012; Matsusaka, 2010). However, to our knowledge, scholars
did not examine the state of citizens-policy congruence in a comparative perspective.
Importantly, we do not know whether different institutional designs may influence the
correspondence between policies and citizen preferences.
The article addresses this gap in the literature and examines the role of electoral insti-
tutions in fostering citizens-policy congruence. We propose two mechanisms by which
electoral systems may influence policy congruence. First, government congruence: gov-
ernments that share positions close to those of their citizens after elections should favour
policy congruence. Second, government responsiveness: governments that adjust their
policies accordingly with citizen preferences between elections should also favour policy
congruence. Building on previous studies of representation that examined the role of
electoral institutions on government congruence and responsiveness, respectively, we
expect levels of policy congruence to be greater under majoritarian electoral systems than
under proportional representation (PR) electoral systems as well as under governments
with a smaller number of parties.
To test these claims, we make use of data from the International Social Survey
Programme (ISSP) across 22 countries and over the 1990–2006 period. Our main empiri-
cal strategy consists in examining the proportion of respondents who are congruent with
government levels of spending across eight major policy domains (environment, health,
police and law enforcement, education, military and defence, old-age pensions, unem-
ployment benefits and culture/arts). Overall, the results do not support our expectations.
This is that levels of policy congruence appear to be similar across electoral systems and
government types. Notwithstanding these null results, our findings contribute to the
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