Elite Conflict Orientations in Polish and US Cities
| Author | Samuel J. Eldersveld,Renata Siemienska |
| Published date | 01 October 1989 |
| Date | 01 October 1989 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/019251218901000402 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
309-
Elite
Conflict
Orientations
in
Polish
and
US
Cities
SAMUEL
J.
ELDERSVELD
AND
RENATA
SIEMIENSKA
ABSTRACT.
This
paper
analyzes
the
values of
local
leaders
in
Poland
and
the
United
States.
A
matched
subset
of
cities
is
used.
Interview
data
were
collected
in
the
1983-84
period.
The
focus
is
on
elite
views
about
political
conflict.
Striking
differences
were
found
in
the
types
of
problems
seen
as
serious
in
their
communities.
Yet,
similar
proportions
perceived
and
tolerated
conflicts
today
as
in
1966.
Individual
level
data
on
leadership
position,
party
affiliation
or
status,
length
of
tenure
and
age
revealed
differences.
And
in
both
countries
community
differences
were
considerable.
Elite
values,
particularly
the
extent
of
elite
value
consensus,
constitute
an
important
focus
in
the
analysis
of
any
political
system.
Elite
orientations
toward
social
and
political
conflict
constitute
a
particularly
relevant
aspect
of
such
analysis.
Scholars
have
from
time
to
time
reflected
on
elite
conflict
perceptions
and
beliefs,
and
there
has
been
some
empirical
research
in
this
area.
What
we
don’t
know
very
much
about
are
the
cross-national
patterns
of elite
conflict
orientations
and
the
factors
which
seem
to
be
linked
to
such
orientations.
In
this
paper
we
explore
this
problem
with data
from
two
&dquo;most
different&dquo;
systems,
Poland
and
the
United
States.
The
data
we
use
are
based
on
interviews
completed
between
1982
and
1984 with
local
political
and
governmental
leaders
in
five
Polish
cities
and
seven
US
cities
of
similar
size.
The
exploratory
analysis of the
data
presented
here
we
hope
will
help
us
better
understand
community
political
systems,
and
their
political
leadership,
in
these
two
nations.
More
specifically,
our
aims
are
to:
1.
Describe
local
leaders’
awareness
of
conflicts
in
Poland
and
the
United
States,
their
evaluations
of
the
impact
of
such
conflicts
(whether
harmful
or
salutary),
and
their
personal
predispositions
(or
value
preferences)
about
conflict.
These,
in
a
sense,
are
our
three
&dquo;dependent&dquo;
phenomena.
2.
Analyze
the
factors
underlying,
and
presumably
linked
to,
these
elite
orientations,
relying
on
individual
variables
and
exploring
also
the
possible
relevance
of
310
community
differences.
Our
explicit
interest
here
is
to
see
whether
such
variables
help
explain
cross-national
elite
views
on
conflict.
3.
Assess
the
meaning
of
these
findings
in
the
light
of
conflict
theory
generally,
and
in
the
context
of
the
earlier
crossnational
findings
reported
in
the
&dquo;International
Study
of
Values
in
Politics&dquo;
(Jacob
et
al.,
1971).
There
are,
of
course,
several
assumptions
underlying
this
earlier
research,
as
well
as
the
analysis
presented
here.
We
assume
that
the
cognitions,
perceptions,
and
evaluations
of
elites
regarding
social
and
political
conflict
are
important
orientations,
and
that
if
we
can
discover
and
understand
them
(we
assume
we
can
study
them!)
they
will
provide
us
with
better
knowledge
about
elite
behavior
and
the
nature
of
political
life
in
the
communities
we
study.
They
are
presumably
not
transient,
nor
situational
orientations
but
part
of,
clues
to,
a
basic
view
of
politics.
Presumably
also
they
influence
leadership
attitudes
and
performance,
helping
explain
the
variance
which
occurs
in
the
attitudes
and
behavior
of
such
leadership.
Finally,
we
assume
that
cultural
and
systemic
differences
influence
the
pattern
of
elite
conflict
perceptions
and
evaluations
that
emerge
when
we
do
comparative
analysis.
The
history
of
scholarly
discussion
of
social
and
political
conflict
is
rich,
and
many
great
minds
have
addressed
themselves
to
the
&dquo;big
questions&dquo;
posed
here.
Robert
Angell
argued
that
for
sociologists
the
beginning
was
Georg
Simmel,
particularly
his
piece
on
&dquo;The
Sociology
of
Conflict&dquo;
(1904).
Some
American
political
scientists
would
probably
take
us
back
to
The
Federalist
in
which
Madison
discussed
the
inevitability
of
&dquo;factions,&dquo;
at
the
time
of
the
adoption
of
the
US
Constitution.
Putnam
thinks
we
should
go
back
to
the
disagreement
between
Plato
and
Aristotle
over
the
essence
of
social
relations
(Putnam,
1973:
93-4);
others
would
start
with
the
contrasting
views
of
Hobbes
and
Marx.
Elite
theorists
might
well
call
our
attention
to
the
works
of
Mosca
and
Pareto,
who
recognized
the
conflict
of
interests
in
society,
at
least
implicitly,
while
arguing
for
the
eventual
resolution
of
conflict
leading
to
a
new
&dquo;balance
of
social
forces&dquo;
or a
societal
&dquo;equilibrium.&dquo;
In
the
post-war
years
quite
a
few
studies
dealing
with
the
subject
of
conflict
appeared
(see
among
others
UNESCO,
1957;
Coleman,
1957;
Coser,
1956;
Dahrendorf,
1959,
1969;
Lipset,
1960;
McNeil,
1965;
Gamson,
1968; Janowitz,
1970).
In
the
last
decade
there
seems
to
have been
less
attention
paid
to
the
study
of
conflict
internal
to
society
than
in
the
preceding
decade
and
a
half.
More
attention
has
been
given
recently
to
arms
control,
deterrence,
and
international
conflict
theory.
Our
limited
exposure
to
this
body
of
literature
leads
us
to
suggest,
rather
hesitatingly,
that
many
of
the
key
issues
raised
by
these
scholars
are
still
with
us.
Most
people
will
agree
with
Dahrendorf’s
initial
position,
&dquo;Wherever
there
is
human
life,
there
is
conflict ...
,&dquo;
but
not
everyone
will
agree
with
his
second
position,
&dquo;by
conflict
alone
the
multitude
and
incompatibility
of
human
interests
and
desires
find
adequate
expression
in
a
world
of
notorious
uncertainty&dquo;
(Dahrendorf,
1969:
138-
40).
That
is,
the
first
issue
concerns
how
we
should
view
the
role
of
conflict
in
society-inevitable
and
positive,
or
unnecessary
and
negative,
at
best
only
to
be
tolerated.
Angell
reminds
us
that
great
scholars
like
Parsons
in
The
Social
System
made
conflict
&dquo;appear
as
deviant
or
abnormal&dquo;
(McNeil:
104).
And
Harold
Lasswell
is
considered
by
some
to
have
had
less
than
a
positive
view
of
conflict,
arguing
at
one
point
that
&dquo;the
problem
of
politics
is
less
to
solve
conflicts
than
to
prevent
them ...&dquo;
(Lasswell,
1930:
197).
Sperlich
(1971:
219)
argues
that
David
Truman’s
only
real
interest
in
conflict
was
in
its
resolution
in
order
to
achieve
group
cohesion.
There
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