Elites and the Diffusion of Foreign Models in Russia
| Date | 01 March 2004 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00463.x |
| Published date | 01 March 2004 |
| Author | Sharon Werning Rivera |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Elites and the Diffusion of Foreign
Models in Russia
Sharon Werning Rivera
Hamilton College
Globalization has sparked renewed interest in the diffusion of ideas and norms across boundaries.
Although much work has focused on diffusion at the macro-level and on the groups that trans-
mit ideas, few researchers have studied the cognitive processes of political elites as they weigh the
merits of various foreign-inspired models. Drawing on a series of original, in-depth interviews with
Russian parliamentarians and high-ranking bureaucrats conducted in 1996, this paper makes
two contributions to the study of individual-level borrowing in the Russian context. First, the
openness of Russian elites to foreign borrowing is investigated; despite the public rhetoric about
Russia’s uniqueness, a substantial number of Russian elites are willing to borrow from foreign
experience – particularly from models of European welfare capitalism. Second, three explanations
of why policy-makers prefer to emulate some countries rather than others are tested – because
they are similar to their own country either geographically, historically or culturally (comparabil-
ity); because they have geostrategic prominence (prestige); or because they excel economically
and/or politically (performance). Comparability and prestige are found to be of lesser importance
than performance to Russian elites when considering the merits of various foreign models. Given
that Russia closely approximates a most-likely case for validating explanations stressing compara-
bility, this suggests that the array of foreign ideas that could become part and parcel of Russia’s
transition process is probably wider than is usually assumed. It also implies that, in general, the
regional dimension of diffusion plays a smaller role than previously theorized.
Globalization has eroded barriers to the free flow of information and accelerated
the spread of ideas across boundaries, thus sparking renewed interest in the diffu-
sion of ideas and norms. Researchers studying diffusion as a macro-level phe-
nomenon have traced the spread of policies, ideas or decisions across boundaries
(Majone, 1991; Starr, 1991); investigated the factors that facilitate policy transfer
(Orenstein, 2001; Walker, 1969); analyzed the changes to policy innovations
as they diffuse (Hays, 1996); assessed the strength of diffusion theories against
competing explanations (Hale, 2000; Rohrschneider, 1996); and examined the
conditions of effective institutional transfer (Jacoby, 2000). Others, adopting an
intermediate-level perspective, have focused on the mechanisms by which (or the
groups through which) ideas diffuse and their impact on public policy; they may
approach the issue from different perspectives, but they all contend that transna-
tional advocacy groups, epistemic communities, transnational social movements,
networks of policy entrepreneurs, or policy communities are vehicles for the cross-
boundary spread of ideas (Coleman and Perl, 1999; Evangelista, 1999; Haas, 1992;
Johnson, 2001; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Khagram et al., 2002; Tarrow, 2002).
Although such groups can include state actors, by and large the focus is on com-
munities of experts and activists that pressure the state on policy issues from the
outside.
© Political Studies Association, 2004.
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
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S H A R O N W E R N I N G R I V E R A
In contrast, relatively few researchers have looked microscopically at the ‘receiv-
ing end’ of these policy pressures – the individual policy-makers who are, after all,
the targets of transnational activists. Although many stress the importance of ideas
and learning in policy formation, little is known about the cognitive processes of
political elites as they weigh the merits of various foreign-inspired options. How
receptive are decision-makers in a given state to the transmission of foreign ideas?
Why do policy-makers turn to some countries and not others for ideational inspi-
ration? How do civil servants and elected politicians evaluate the various proper-
ties of foreign models?
This theoretical gap is noteworthy because, although some norms (such as demo-
cratic ideals) may seem to diffuse almost effortlessly (Muravchik, 2002), the actual
implementation of policies based on those norms requires the passage of legisla-
tion or the promulgation of rules by political leaders. So it behoves us to take a
closer look at elite-driven emulation – those instances when officials or policy spe-
cialists are attracted to the experience of a foreign country when evaluating policy
alternatives (Hoberg, 1991, p. 110).
After reviewing the theory, definitions and methodological considerations
that inform this study, I pursue two lines of inquiry at the level of the
individual policy-maker. First, I investigate the openness of Russian elites to foreign
borrowing and show that, despite the public rhetoric about Russia’s uniqueness,
a substantial number of Russian elites are willing to borrow from foreign experi-
ence – particularly from models of European welfare capitalism. Second, I test
three explanations of why policy-makers prefer to emulate some countries rather
than others – because they are similar to their own country either geographically,
historically or culturally (comparability); because they have geostrategic promi-
nence (prestige); or because they excel economically and/or politically (perfor-
mance). I find that comparability and prestige are of lesser importance than
performance to Russian elites when considering the merits of various foreign
models. Given that Russia approximates a most-likely case for the comparability
explanation, this suggests that the array of foreign ideas that could become part
and parcel of Russia’s transition process is probably wider than is usually assumed.
It also implies that, in general, the regional dimension of diffusion plays a smaller
role than previously theorized. I conclude by elaborating on the implications of
these findings for both diffusion research and our understanding of contemporary
Russia.
Theoretical Perspectives on the Selection of Models
Scholars have made great strides in demonstrating how diffusion happens at the
macro-level – in determining which countries or sub-national units are more likely
to adopt policy innovations (Walker, 1969); whether ideas, norms or policies diffuse
in regional patterns (Kopstein and Reilly, 2000; Mooney, 2001); and the reasons
why certain states are viewed as attractive models (Coates, 1999). Implicit in much
of this work are assumptions about how the potential model is viewed by the bor-
rowing state. Yet decisions about the utility of foreign lessons are fundamentally
ones made at the micro-level: an individual policy-maker weighs the merits of
incorporating a given idea from another locale and ultimately decides whether that
E L I T E S A N D T H E D I F F U S I O N O F F O R E I G N M O D E L S I N R U S S I A
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policy should be emulated.1 What compels such an individual to regard a given
region as a potentially viable model?
Three perspectives can be identified in the diverse literature that addresses this
topic. One of the most prevalent explanations stresses comparability. In her study
of political learning in Latin America, Bermeo asserted that ‘events in what one
might call reference states are an especially important source of political learning’
and that nations become a ‘point of comparison for political actors in another state’
because of geographic proximity, cultural similarity and/or a shared history (1992,
p. 283). Weil likewise emphasized comparability in the spread of democratic values
across countries, suggesting that ‘ “demonstration effects” probably flow most effec-
tively among “reference groups” of countries that believe their conditions are com-
parable’ (1993, p. 198; see also Brown, 2000, pp. 186–8). For instance, Spain’s
democratic transition was an influential example for Argentina, and Argentina’s
democratization, in turn, encouraged democratizers in Uruguay, Brazil and Chile
(Huntington, 1991, pp. 102–3). In the social-movements literature as well, schol-
ars have emphasized the importance of ‘activist-adopters’ identifying with ‘activist-
transmitters’ (McAdam and Rucht, 1993; McAdam et al., 2001).
Geographic proximity is usually highlighted as being a particularly important
dimension of comparability. This is because policy-makers are said to be reassured
by what is nearby and therefore familiar; interactions and communications across
adjacent states are likely to be dense; economic and social problems in a given
region may well be similar; and/or states have a tendency to compete with their
neighbors. In many cases, such as Latin America’s Southern Cone states, geographic
proximity and cultural similarity are generally overlapping qualities. But what
about those instances (for example, India and Pakistan, or Estonia and Russia)
when neighboring states may differ greatly along cultural, linguistic or religious
lines? In such cases, one scholar has argued that ‘social psychological proximity’
trumps geographic propinquity in stimulating cross-national policy transfer; for
example, policy-makers in the UK often ignore Ireland and France in favor of the
US, Canada and Australia when searching for public-policy lessons (Rose, 1993,
pp. 105–7).
A second explanation of...
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