Embracing ontological doubt: The role of ‘reality’ in political realism
| Published date | 01 February 2017 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1755088216673079 |
| Date | 01 February 2017 |
Journal of International Political Theory
2017, Vol. 13(1) 59 –80
© The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/1755088216673079
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Embracing ontological doubt:
The role of ‘reality’ in political
realism
Kamila Stullerova
Aberystwyth University, UK
Abstract
While a number of scholars argue that classical realism is conspicuously similar to
critical international relations, this article takes an issue with such an interpretation.
It does not challenge the observation that both approaches are comparable when
it comes to ethical concerns and a related critique of modernity, but it puts forth
an argument that they differ fundamentally when it comes to their basic intellectual
motivation and purpose. This also makes classical realism more ready to formulate
normative judgment. To articulate what provides for the ethical impetus in classical
realism, the study turns to the work of Stephen Turner and his collaborators who
illuminate Weberian sources of classical realist social science. Adopting the category
of analyticism from Patrick Jackson, it further puts forth that normative judgment is
linked to classical realism’s inherent ontological doubt, a feature it compensates for by
focusing on epistemology necessitating constant engagement with empirical reality as a
source of its (weak) ontological orientation. As a result, classical realism is reinforced
here as an approach to international relations worth reviving and further developing.
Keywords
Classical realism, critical international relations, Hans J Morgenthau, Max Weber,
normative judgment, social science
The social scientist is a part of history from which his knowledge is constructed; every
tomorrow, that knowledge may have to be revised or abandoned altogether.
WG Runciman (1963: 174)
Corresponding author:
Kamila Stullerova, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth SY23 3FE, UK.
Email: kas@aber.ac.uk
673079IPT0010.1177/1755088216673079Journal of International Political TheoryStullerova
research-article2016
Article
60 Journal of International Political Theory 13(1)
Introduction
The number of works revisiting international relations’ (IR) classical realism which have
appeared in the last dozen or so years is large enough to divulge that the once deprecated
approach resonates with intellectual needs and quests of current IR scholarship. What
exactly are the gaps that classical realism helps to fill in has so far not been systemati-
cally examined, although there is a number of partial accounts along these lines. Classical
realism lends new energy and a particular direction to the theorising of the ethics of
responsibility (Lebow, 2003; Williams, 2005), the virtue of reflexivity (Lebow, 2003),
ethical leadership (Tjalve, 2008) or the need of a fundamental transformation of the state
(Craig, 2003; Scheuerman, 2011). As can be seen already from this brief outline of its
key themes, in its sensibilities, the revival of classical realism is conspicuously close to
critical IR. It is, therefore, crucial to ask whether the classical realist revival is a part or a
new stage of the critical turn in IR, which is both older and more robust than is the pre-
sent turn to classical realism.
Two issues may prevent us from reaching such a conclusion. First, it is the question
of normative judgment. The promise of normative judgment seems to be stronger in
classical realism than it is in critical IR, which is suspicious of normativity’s universal-
ism. If classical realism is a version of critical IR, it must come to terms with the lat-
ter’s unease about normativity. Second, the renewed interest in the works of classical
realists has not yet produced new research into contemporary international politics
which would utilise classical realist theory.1 Unless such research is produced, one
may ask whether the revival of classical realism is anything more than an antiquarian
quest to engage past, oft-forgotten works of one-time giants of our field, which – as is
usually the case – lends a new perspective on what we are already set to do, strengthen-
ing our vision but without fundamentally challenging the way we do research. This
article argues that the two points are crucially intertwined. By asking about the reluc-
tance to produce new classical realist research in IR, we may be able to answer the
question how, if at all, classical realism is distinct from critical IR and where it grounds
its commitment to normative judgment.
Several commentators on the current revival of classical realism point out a striking
similarity between the critical sensibilities of the key protagonists of this revival and the
critical tradition in IR (Cozette, 2008a, 2008b; Hom and Steele, 2010; Steele, 2007).2
Some argue that it is the engagement with the work of classical realists as nurtured by
contemporary critical sensibilities that produces what they call reflexive realism (Steele,
2007); others locate the very critical sensibilities in classical realism itself (Scheuerman,
2008). At the same time, there is also a growing unease with the idea that Morgenthau
et al. should be seen as precursors of the critical turn in IR or even as critical IR theorists
themselves. Daniel Levine (2013) makes a compelling argument why Morgenthau
should not be deemed a critical theorist. Compared to Frankfurt School’s anti-founda-
tionalism, Morgenthau comes across as ‘profoundly epistemologically and ontologically
conservative’ (Levine, 2013: 96). Yet, we must ask whether admirers and critics alike
assess classical realism on its own terms. After all, classical realism fell out of fashion
and ceased shaping our scholarly receptiveness. It might well be that IR’s current critical
sensibilities as well as expectations on what is good scholarship are preventing us from
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