Emotions, international hierarchy, and the problem of solipsism in Sino-US South China Sea politics
| DOI | 10.1177/0047117819875995 |
| Date | 01 March 2020 |
| Published date | 01 March 2020 |
| Author | Christian Wirth |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117819875995
International Relations
2020, Vol. 34(1) 25 –45
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0047117819875995
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Emotions, international
hierarchy, and the problem
of solipsism in Sino-US South
China Sea politics
Christian Wirth
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies; Griffith University
Abstract
This study offers an explanation for Beijing’s seemingly self-defeating approach to the South China
Sea that distances China ever more from the regional and international communities which it
wants to lead and join while drawing in the foreign military presence that it seeks to keep at a
distance. Combining recent research on the role of emotions and on hierarchy in international
politics, this article shows how the powerful narrative of national ‘humiliation’ and ‘rejuvenation’
has informed Chinese maritime politics. As the South China Sea became incorporated in the
linear timeline of China’s 5000 year civilizational history, the US’ and its allies’ push-back against
Beijing’s territorial claims deepened China’s ideational isolation. The ensuing state of solipsism
increases the risk of violent confrontations.
Keywords
China, emotions, international hierarchy, South China Sea, trauma, United States
Introduction
In November 2012, Xi Jinping, the newly elected General-Secretary of the Communist
Party of China (CPC) and Chairman of the Central Military Commission led the other six
members of the Politburo Standing Committee through the National Museum at
Tiananmen Square. The highly symbolic visit by the party-state’s inner circle provided
the setting for the most powerful leader since Mao Zedong to renew the Party’s pledge to
fulfil its historical mission and make China great again. Walking through the Road of
Rejuvenation permanent exhibition, Xi reportedly paid special attention to exhibits on
the First Opium War (1840–2) and to charts illustrating the humiliating history of ‘how
Corresponding author:
Christian Wirth, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Rothenbaumchaussee 32, 20148
Hamburg, Germany.
Email: christian.wirth@giga-hamburg.de
875995IRE0010.1177/0047117819875995International RelationsWirth
research-article2019
Article
26 International Relations 34(1)
the West had occupied China’s territories, established concessions and carved-out
spheres of influence’.1 Media reports also emphasized him looking at photos of the
Central Committee session at which Deng Xiaoping launched the ‘epoch-making reform
and opening up drive’. In the subsequent speech The Road Towards Renewal, touted as
‘a retrospective on the Chinese nation, a celebration of its present and a declaration on its
future’, Xi reminded his countrymen and women that ‘the Chinese nation had suffered
unusual hardship and sacrifice in the world’s history’ and pointed out that ‘the Chinese
people have never given in, have struggled ceaselessly, and have finally taken hold of
their own destiny and started the great process of building the nation’.2
This speech and media coverage not only located China but also every Chinese citizen
on the linear timeline of development such as it continues to constitute international
hierarchy. Referring ‘to the country’s hard-earned finding of a correct road towards reju-
venation and its remarkable achievements’, that is China climbing upwards in the hierar-
chy, Xi also cited from a poem: ‘I will mount a long wind some day and break the heavy
waves’. The state-guided media clarified that ‘after more than 170 years of hard struggle
since the Opium War, the Chinese nation has bright prospects, is closer than ever to
reaching its goal of great renewal’.3
The emphasis on the trauma of ‘national humiliation’ and the hope for and path
towards ‘rejuvenation’, including the allusion to the seas, proved to be highly conse-
quential. In early 2015, media reports revealed that China had been engaged in large-
scale land reclamation and reinforced several of the disputed reefs and rocks in the
Spratly area of the South China Sea.4 Predictably, the clandestine manner and unprece-
dented scale – fleets of dredging ships had been constructing a ‘great wall of sand’5
through the enlargement of no less than seven features including major runways and
harbours – elicited widespread condemnation. Not only the rival claimants of Vietnam
and the Philippines but also US, Japanese, and Australian policy-makers decried the
Chinese move as provocative, violating international laws and norms, and thereby under-
mining the ‘rules-based international order’.6 Highly publicized and in line with its long-
standing practice,7 the US Navy intensified so-called Freedom of Navigation Operations
(FONOPS) in the South China Sea,8 and the Japanese government dispatched subma-
rines and large helicopter carriers to Southeast Asia with the intention of ‘sending strong
messages’.9 Much to the Chinese government’s dismay, the G-7 leaders repeatedly criti-
cized Beijing’s behaviour too.10 Thus, the Xi administration managed in a few years to
bring about the opposite of Beijing’s principal strategic objectives: To be recognized as
a peacefully developing, responsible member of the international community, and to
safeguard China’s sovereignty by keeping foreign, especially US forces, at a distance.
How is this seemingly self-defeating course of action by a leadership that is deemed
exceptionally apt in strategic thinking and policy-making explainable? Why did the
Chinese government deliberately follow a policy line that would arouse widespread con-
cerns, condemnation, and in turn rekindle Chinese leaders’ and people’s feelings of
national humiliation? Answers to these questions not only address the empirical question
how far the Chinese leadership may be ready to go in defending its claims. The examina-
tion of Sino-US South China Sea politics also provides a case for the study of collective
memory and of emotions through the linking of trauma with a specific instance of inter-
national hierarchy.
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