Enabling autocracy? Peacebuilding and post-conflict authoritarianism in the Democratic Republic of Congo
| Author | Sarah von Billerbeck,Oisín Tansey |
| Published date | 01 September 2019 |
| Date | 01 September 2019 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1354066118819724 |
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https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066118819724
European Journal of
International Relations
2019, Vol. 25(3) 698 –722
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/1354066118819724
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Enabling autocracy?
Peacebuilding and
post-conflict authoritarianism
in the Democratic Republic
of Congo
Sarah von Billerbeck
University of Reading, UK
Oisín Tansey
King’s College London, UK
Abstract
Does peacebuilding shape the regime type of countries where international missions are
deployed? Most peacebuilding missions take place in authoritarian contexts, and seek to
overcome the legacies of conflict by overseeing transitions to democratic rule; however,
most regimes that experience peacebuilding still retain some form of authoritarian rule.
In this article, we examine the extent to which international peacebuilding missions
contribute to the consolidation of post-conflict authoritarian regimes even when
their stated aims involve the promotion of democracy. We argue that international
peacebuilders can act as enablers of authoritarianism in host countries. We distinguish
this category of behaviour from explicit ‘autocracy promotion’, which implies intentional
support to autocracy. Instead, enabling is often an unintended consequence, and we
identify two mechanisms through which enabling occurs: by building the capacity
of incumbent authoritarian leaders and by signalling a permissive environment for
authoritarian behaviour for national actors. We illustrate our argument with the case
of the United Nations peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Keywords
Authoritarianism, Democratic Republic of Congo, governance, peacebuilding,
peacekeeping, United Nations
Corresponding author:
Sarah von Billerbeck, University of Reading, Whiteknights Campus, Edith Morely Building, Reading, RG6
6AA, UK.
Email: s.b.k.vonbillerbeck@reading.ac.uk
819724EJT0010.1177/1354066118819724European Journal of International Relationsvon Billerbeck and Tansey
research-article2019
Article
von Billerbeck and Tansey 699
Introduction
Does peacebuilding shape the regime type of countries where international missions are
deployed? Most peacebuilding missions take place in authoritarian contexts, and seek to
help overcome the legacies of conflict by overseeing transitions to democratic rule. Yet,
despite these efforts, most regimes that experience peacebuilding retain some form of
authoritarian rule (Toft, 2010; Zürcher et al., 2013). In this article, we examine the ways
in which international peacebuilding missions contribute to post-conflict authoritarian-
ism even when their stated aims involve the promotion of democracy.
Our analysis builds upon a range of scholarship that has explored the political trajec-
tories of post-conflict regimes, but that has yet to adequately address the relationship
between peacebuilding and authoritarianism.1 Scholarship on why post-conflict regimes
consolidate authoritarian rather than democratic governance has, to date, focused on
domestic features of the society in question, including levels of economic development,
the nature of the conflict and the kind of political institutions established once the con-
flict ends (Fish and Kroenig, 2006; Reilly, 2001; Reynolds, 2010; Sambanis, 2000).
More recent scholarship has examined the impact of peacebuilding missions, but it has
offered conflicting results and is characterized by a problematic democracy bias (Fortna
and Huang, 2012; Joshi, 2010; Steinert and Grimm, 2015). Indeed, it has principally
focused on the ways in which peacebuilding can contribute to democratic rule, but there
is rarely any in-depth discussion of the causal mechanisms linking peacebuilding mis-
sions to authoritarian outcomes. Furthermore, with few exceptions, the scholarship on
post-conflict political transitions has tended to ignore the recent and vibrant literature
on the politics of authoritarian rule (Art, 2012; Brownlee, 2007; Svolik, 2012). As a
result, the relationship between peacebuilding and authoritarianism is under-theorized.
We seek to address this imbalance and examine the ways in which international
peacebuilding contributes to authoritarian politics in post-conflict settings. We do not
argue that international peacebuilders act as promoters of authoritarianism, but rather
that they act as enablers, through both actions and inactions that provide material and
informational relief to autocratic incumbents. Building on recent scholarship on authori-
tarianism, we identify two causal mechanisms through which international peacebuilders
can bolster authoritarianism. First, by offering aid and assistance to individual ruling
elites and by strengthening key institutions of the state, they can contribute to the state’s
authoritarian capacities. Second, despite having a mandate to promote democracy, peace-
builders often refrain from robustly condemning or punishing authoritarian forms of
behaviour for fear of threatening existing relationships and endangering stability. In
doing so, they send signals to regime elites that lower the perceived costs of non-demo-
cratic behaviour and widen opportunity structures for authoritarian rule.
To illustrate these dynamics, we examine the case of the United Nations (UN) peace
operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Under the leadership of Joseph
Kabila and the oversight of the UN mission, DRC has achieved some progress towards
peace and stability. Yet, despite embracing electoral politics, it has failed to consolidate
genuine democratic rule and the regime has turned increasingly authoritarian. Elections
scheduled for 2016 have been repeatedly postponed, and Kabila’s rule has contributed to
the rise of societal polarization, mass protests and generalized political instability
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