Energy resources and the risk of conflict in shared river basins
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343318808347 |
| Published date | 01 May 2019 |
| Date | 01 May 2019 |
| Author | Sara McLaughlin Mitchell,Sojeong Lee |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
Energy resources and the risk of conflict
in shared river basins
Sojeong Lee
Howard H. Baker Jr Center for Public Policy, University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Sara McLaughlin Mitchell
Department of Political Science, University of Iowa
Abstract
This study examines the effect of energy resources on the chances for militarized conflict, water related conflict
and cooperation events, and cooperative river treaties between pairs of states on shared international river basins.
We examine trade-offs that riparian states can make between energy resources such as oil or natural gas and fresh
water resources. Integrating upstream and downstream states’ geographical position in a river basin with energy
resource information, we examine four related scenarios of states sharing rivers: (1) Joint energy where both
upstream and downstream countries have energy resources, (2) Downstream energy where only the downstream
state has energy resources, (3) Upstream energy where only an upstream country has energy resources, and (4) No
energy. Theoretically, we argue that Downstream energy dyads are most likely to find cooperative solutions to
conflicts over shared river resources because downstream states can offer oil and natural gas side payments to
upstream states in exchange for greater water supplies. Empirical analyses of dyadic data in shared river basin
dyads from 1945 to 2001 provide strong support for the theory. Riparian cooperation through river treaties and
diplomacy is best achieved in Downstream energy dyads, where the downstream states have energy resources that
can be traded for water resources with upstream states. Militarized conflict and water related conflict events are
most likely in Joint energy dyads. Case illustrations from the Aral Sea and Ganges river basins are used to
demonstrate the theoretical arguments.
Keywords
Amu Darya, conflict, downstream, energy, Ganges, oil, Syr Darya, shared river basins, upstream, water
In August 2013, several Central Asian countries attended the
Dushanbe forum to discuss future water issues involving two
major international rivers in theregion,theAmuDaryaand
the Syr Darya. Negotiators discussed the use of river water
resources with two competing positions arising, the ‘ineffi-
cient use’ position posited by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and
the ‘fair and rational use’ position urged by Uzbekistan.
1
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, both located in upper areas of
the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya, pushed to construct more
hydropower facilities on the rivers to supplement their
deficient energy supplies. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, as
downstream agricultural states, raised concerns about water
shortages caused by upstream power plants.
2
States in the Aral Sea basin have not fully agreed upon
negotiated targets for water release and water distribu-
tion, so disputes over energy and irrigation sectors are
Corresponding author:
sara-mitchell@uiowa.edu
1
Central Asian countri es discuss water coop eration at Dushanbe
forum, Times of Central Asia 28 August 2013.
2
BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit supplied by CCV Worldwide
Monitoring 23 August 2013.
Journal of Peace Research
2019, Vol. 56(3) 336–351
ªThe Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343318808347
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ongoing (Libert, 2008: 35; Siegfried & Bernauer,
2007).
3
In 2007–08, when an unprecedented cold win-
ter was followed by a dry spring and summer, a severe
water crisis arose in the region. Kyrgyzstan extracted
higher than normal levels of hydropower from its dams
ontheSyrDaryarivertoresolveitsnationalenergy
crunch. This created severe water shortages in Uzbeki-
stan and Kazakhstan, harming downstream farmers who
depended on river water for irrigation in the spring and
summer growing seasons (Libert, Orolbaev & Steklov,
2008: 9). Seven months before an August 2013 meeting,
Islam Karimov, the President of Uzbekistan, blamed
upstream countries of the rivers, arguing that those in
the upper stream such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
should know that the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers
are not their own property.
4
While tensions were high,
the riparian states signed cooperative agreements in 1992
and 1998 that allowed for downstream countries to pro-
vide upstream countries with energy resources in
exchange for greater water supplied in the growing sea-
sons. The environmental performance of this interna-
tional regulatory regime has been characterized by low
performance and high variability (Siegfried & Bernauer,
2007), yet states in the Aral Sea Basin have avoided using
militarized force to settle water conflicts.
Thus, while there have been disagreements over water
resources, Central Asian riparian countries have been
willing to cooperate with one another to resolve water-
energy problems through diplomacy (Libert, Orolbaev
& Steklov, 2008: 9). Situations where downstream states
can trade energy resources for water resources from
upstream states may be more cooperative than environ-
ments where the upstream state has exclusive control
over water and energy resources or situations where nei-
ther side has energy resources to trade. We explore these
resource configurations more generally by examining
whether downstream states can promote cooperation
and reduce the chances for militarized conflict by trading
valuable resources like oil.
We analyze the effect of energy resources on the
chances for militarized conflict, water related conflict
events, and cooperative river treaties between states on
shared international river basins. We consider states to
have energy resources if they produce natural gas or
crude oil through onshore or offshore sources. Integrat-
ing upstream and downstream states’ geographical posi-
tion in a river basin with energy resources information,
we examine four related scenarios of states sharing riv-
ers:
5
(1) Joint energy where both upstream and down-
stream countries have energy resources, (2) Downstream
energy where only the downstream state has energy
resources, (3) Upstream energy where only an upstream
country has energy resources, and (4) No energy.We
show that militarized conflict and water related conflict
events are most likely in Joint energy dyads. Riparian
cooperation is best achieved in the Downstream energy
situation, where the downstream state has energy
resources that can be traded for water resources with
the upstream state. Cooperation among Asian riparian
dyads demonstrates this more general pattern.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows.
First, we review the literature on shared rivers and con-
flict between countries. The general arguments linking
shared rivers, energy resources, and interstate conflict are
then discussed. We illustrate the theory using cases from
the Aral Sea and Ganges river basins. We formulate
general hypotheses and conduct a large-N analysis using
shared river basin and petroleum datasets. In the last
section, we discuss the results of the study and identify
avenues for future research.
Conflict and cooperation in shared river basins
Water is vital not only to an individual’s survival, but
also to the survival of a nation’s economy and society
(Brochmann & Hensel, 2009: 394; Wolf, 1998: 252).
With growing concerns for the environment and increas-
ingly limited water resources, states are seeking stronger
footholds to secure water resources for their survival.
States sharing river basins are more sensitive to guaran-
teeing state access to shared river water resources, espe-
cially if they depend on water supplies that originate
outside their borders.
6
To manage shared rivers and
water resources, interaction among riparian countries is
inevitable. Scholars are interested in whether cooperation
3
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan in Central Asia
established the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination
(ICWC) in 1992, based on the formal Soviet system to regulate
the water resource. They signed multilateral agreements to mitigate
regional conflicts and to manage water resources in the shared river
basins.
4
Uzbek President Karimov on the Soviet legacy and territorial
disputes, Times of Central Asia 30 January 2013.
5
Our unit of analysis is a shared river basin dyad that is contiguous
and upstream/downstream in configuration.
6
For example, Iraq and Syria depend, for up to 85% of their total
water supply, on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, which flow from
upstream Turkey into these states.
Lee & Mitchell 337
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