Engagement versus disengagement: How structural and commercially-based regulatory changes have increased government risks in federal acquisitions

Pages135-172
Date01 March 2007
Published date01 March 2007
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1108/JOPP-07-02-2007-B001
AuthorElliott Cory Yoder
Subject MatterPublic policy & environmental management,Politics,Public adminstration & management,Government,Economics,Public Finance/economics,Texation/public revenue
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, VOLUME 7, ISSUE 2, 135-172 2007
ENGAGEMENT VERSUS DISENGAGEMENT:
HOW STRUCTURAL AND COMMERCIALLY-BASED REGULATORY
CHANGES HAVE INCREASED GOVERNMENT RISKS IN FEDERAL
ACQUISITIONS
Elliott Cory Yoder*
ABSTRACT. The purpose of this working paper is to highlight the challenges
and associated risks Federal contracting officers face while conducting
business under commercially-based contracting legislation and, with
concurrent reductions in the acquisition workforce, the potential risks these
changes place on the taxpayer. The researcher’s thorough review of
published articles, along with collegiate discussions with prominent
practitioners and academics indicates that the Federal Government may be
exposed to increased risks due to recent commercial-practice legislation and
structural changes in the acquisition work force. The past decade-long wave
of acquisition work-force reductions and commercially inspired acquisition
reforms has created a responsive and progressive business environment.
Yet, it has done so at the cost of the Federal government becoming less
“engaged” in key oversight and management functions. This disengagement
may be exposing Federal contracting officers and taxpayers to greater
financial, programmatic and performance risks.
INTRODUCTION: THE BACKDROP
Acquisition reform initiatives, commercialization of business
processes, and a decade-long streamlining of the acquisition
workforce have all been aimed at fundamentally improving the
business of acquiring goods and services for Federal agencies,
including the Department of Defense. The National Performance
------------------------------
* Elliott Cory Yoder, MA and MS, is a Lecturer and Academic Associate
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School.
His research interests include federal acquisition and contracting,
contingency contracting, and advanced contract administration.
Copyright © 2007 by PrAcademics Press
136 YODER
Review kicked-off the current era’s wave of reforms—initially
commencing in 1993. Initial efforts at reform gained significant
momentum during the Clinton presidency and, more recently, from
influential reformers such as Jacques S. Gansler, former
Undersecretary of Defense (AT&L) and Representative Tom Davis (R-
VA) of Virginia, who chairs and leads the Committee on Government
Reform.
The impetus for reforming and streamlining the acquisition
workforce stems as much from a move towards greater efficiency as
from the reality of adapting business practices to meet an ever-
shrinking acquisition workforce; likewise, changes have been
catalyzed by a concurrent effort to encourage innovative companies
which traditionally have not conducted business with the Federal
government to enter into contracts for goods and services with
Federal Agencies. Amidst all of the reforms and structural changes
has been a shift in the nature, or make-up, of what the Federal
government procures—from predominantly tangible goods and
hardware to a near fifty-fifty mix of goods and services. Recent
legislative initiatives have created substantive changes in the
business processes that Federal contracting officers have at their
disposal. The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA),1 the
Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA)2 and the Services Acquisition
Reform Act (SARA)3 have all moved Federal acquisition policies and
procedures closer to commercial-industry standard. However, the
concurrent down-sizing of the acquisition workforce, combined with
the move towards commercial-style business processes under recent
legislation, have increased the business risks facing Federal
contracting officers and, ultimately, the taxpayers.
The purpose of this research paper is to highlight the challenges
and associated risks that Federal contracting officers, and ultimately,
taxpayers face while conducting business under commercially based
contracting legislation with concurrent reductions in the acquisition
workforce. It is the researcher’s contention that the past decade-long
wave of acquisition workforce reductions and commercially inspired
acquisition reforms has created a responsive and progressive
business environment. Yet, it has done so at the cost of the Federal
government becoming less “engaged.” In fact, the government has
“disengaged” in key oversight and management functions. This
disengagement may be exposing Federal contracting officers and
STRUCTURAL AND COMMERCIALLY-BASED REGULATORY CHANGES IN FEDERAL ACQUISITIONS 137
taxpayers to greater financial, programmatic and performance risks.
This paper explores the concepts of engagement and disengagement
related to recent acquisition workforce structural changes and
concurrent legislation aimed at commercializing Federal acquisition
business practices.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Engagement and Disengagement Concept Definitions
The concepts of “engagement” and “disengagement” are derived
from their definitions found within the Oxford English Dictionary
(Engagement, 2004; Disengagement, 2004). Engagement, for the
purposes of this paper, is broadly defined as to be bound by or
committed to a cause, to involve or commit to, to mesh with. Within
this context, the researcher defines “engagement” as the means,
capability and willingness of the Federal government to monitor and
oversee the actions of contractors and subcontractors in promise of,
or in actual receipt of Federal tax dollars under federally-awarded
contracts. Conversely, the term “disengagement” means the inability
or unwillingness of the Federal Government to monitor and oversee
the actions of contractors and subcontractors in promise of or in
actual receipt of Federal tax dollars under federally awarded
contracts.
The Push for Greater Efficiency and Effectiveness
The fall of the Soviet Union in December of 1991 prompted senior
US Government leaders to push for a “peace dividend.” Without our
forty-year-old cold war foe, the Government could, it was believed,
apply much of the money previously spent on the military to better
domestic use. The National Performance Review (NPR), commencing
in 1993 (only shortly after the cold war’s demise), really marks the
start of an over-a-decade-long push towards greater efficiency and
effectiveness of Government operations. The NPR, in essence,
created the ideal of having a Government responsive to all its
stakeholders, and its popularity was embraced by the Executive
Branch and legislators alike.
Without a major foe, the military and its supporting personnel
structures were targeted by the legislature and executive branch and
experienced dramatic reductions. The acquisition community was not

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