Entrusted norms: security, trust, and betrayal in the Gulf Cooperation Council crisis
| DOI | 10.1177/13540661211044197 |
| Author | Vincent Charles Keating,Lucy M Abbott |
| Date | 01 December 2021 |
| Published date | 01 December 2021 |
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https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661211044197
European Journal of
International Relations
2021, Vol. 27(4) 1090 –1113
© The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/13540661211044197
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Entrusted norms: security,
trust, and betrayal in
the Gulf Cooperation
Council crisis
Vincent Charles Keating
Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark, Denmark
Lucy M Abbott
Department of Politics and International Relations, School of Social and Political Science, University of
Edinburgh, UK
Abstract
Combining scholarship on norms and trust in International Relations, this article puts
forward the concept of entrusted norms as a novel means to understand certain
dynamics of cooperation and conflict in international politics. Entrusted norms differ
from non-entrusted norms both in the manner that they are policed and in the reaction
to their infringement. In the first case, there are few formal hedging mechanisms taken
against potential defection. In the second case, when broken, they result in a betrayal
reaction where a return to the behavioral status quo is insufficient to return to the
political status quo. We illustrate the analytical usefulness of entrusted norms through
an examination of the established norms of diplomacy within the Gulf Cooperation
Council, paying particular attention to interactions between Saudi Arabia and Qatar in
the post-Arab Spring period. We argue that the perception of Qatar’s defection from
an entrusted norm, the preservation of individual and collective dignity, contributed to
the 2014 diplomatic rupture between these two states and set in motion a betrayal/
attempted reconciliation cycle, where even Qatar’s attempts to move back to the
behavioral status quo prior to the fallout have been insufficient to fully repair the
relationship. In addition to providing a novel interpretation to this case, this paper
highlights the need for further theoretical consideration of the severity and duration
of punishment after norm transgression within social constructivism, reinforces the
theoretical connection between social structures and emotions, and advocates for an
expansion in the domains of trust that we study.
Corresponding author:
Vincent Charles Keating, Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark, Campusvej 55, Odense,
5230, Denmark.
Email: keating@sam.sdu.dk
1044197EJT0010.1177/13540661211044197European Journal of International RelationsKeating and Abbott
research-article2021
Article
Keating and Abbott 1091
Keywords
Trust, Gulf Cooperation Council, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, betrayal, norms
Introduction
On 5 June 2017, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt each announced the suspen-
sion of diplomatic relations with Qatar (2017). This was quickly followed by a marine,
land, and air blockade and the removal of Qatar from the Arab coalition in Yemen. This
crisis followed a period of unstable relations between key states in the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) and Qatar, starting with the withdrawal of Saudi, Bahraini, and Emirati
ambassadors from Qatar in 2014. Qatar was asked to fulfil numerous demands to lift the
current blockade, the scope of which led many commentators to argue that complying
would result in a complete loss of sovereignty. Qatar, unsurprisingly, did not agree to the
terms and the conflict became entrenched for over 3 years until recent diplomatic initia-
tives in 2021 took small steps to repair the relationship. While the issues underlying this
conflict were not new, they had historically been dealt with internally, without these open
and arguably dramatic ultimatums (Ulrichsen, 2019: 26). So, what might account for this
dramatic and sustained break in diplomatic relations between the states of the GCC?
While most of the literature on the GCC crisis is written from a realist perspective,
this article seeks to put forward a novel explanation for this complete breakdown in a
formerly stable pattern of diplomatic relations by introducing the concept of entrusted
norms. Over the past decades, social constructivist scholars have developed a vast litera-
ture suggesting that international politics is, at least in part, structured by social norms.
States can be socialized into ways of acting and behaving that, though always political
and often contested, can set normative standards that facilitate cooperation. This paper
builds on this work by considering what effect trust might have on these norms. In social
constructivist literature so far, while norms might be weak or strong, respected instru-
mentally or internalized, they have yet to be conceived of as entrusted.
We argue that entrusted norms are worthwhile as empirical objects of study for two
reasons. First, entrusted norms are policed differently. Second, defections against these
norms produce unique political effects. Entrusted norms will be highly socialized and
have weak institutional checks—their entrusted nature means that states simply assume
that the others will behave appropriately, and thus states will have little need to imple-
ment hedging strategies against potential defection. However, if defection occurs, the
reaction is not just characterized by disappointment over the norm being broken, but by
betrayal. While most social constructivist literature recognizes that a norm-breaking
actor will pay some type of cost for their behavior, we argue that betraying entrusted
norms has a unique effect: even if the betrayer returns to the behavioral status quo, this
is insufficient to restore the political status quo.
We argue that the crisis in the GCC can be understood through the politics of entrusted
norms in the organization, specifically, the preservation of individual and collective dig-
nity that drove decision-making by consensus, particularly over contentious issues of
internal security. We seek to demonstrate that this norm reflects long-term social under-
standings held among the GCC states, and there were few institutional hedging strategies
in place to control the possibility of defection. Furthermore, these entrusted norms created
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