Equality, Pluralism, Universality: Current Concerns in Normative Theory
| Date | 01 June 2000 |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-856X.00035 |
| Published date | 01 June 2000 |
| Author | Anne Phillips |
| Subject Matter | Article |
British Journal of Politics and International Relations,
Vol. 2, No. 2, June 2000, pp. 237–255
Equality, pluralism, universality:
current concerns in normative theory
ANNE PHILLIPS
Abstract
This article reviews recent debates in normative theory. It argues that work on equality has
bifurcated in a disturbing way, with much of the work on economic equality focusing on the
principles that should regulate the distribution of goods between individuals, and much of
the work on social equality dealing with patterns of oppression that affect the relationship
between marginal and dominant groups. The first literature has been relatively indifferent
to the group nature of contemporary inequality, while the second mirrors this failing by its
lack of interest in the distribution of economic resources. The implications of cultural plural-
ism have also contributed to debates about the status of normative theory and the basis for
making universal normative claims.
Normative theory flourishes best when there is no normative consensus; it
is when we disagree about the principles by which we should live our lives
that we most feel compelled to debate them. It may seem odd, then, that
normative theory is currently in such a healthy condition, for this is sup-
posed to be precisely such an age of consensus. Liberalism has gained an
unprecedented ascendancy over socialism, old-style egalitarianism has
fallen from favour, politicians jostle for the middle ground. With so many
of the traditional oppositions—left versus right, direct versus represen-
tative democracy, equality versus difference—called into question, this
hardly seems a good time for normative theory.
© Political Studies Association 1999. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF and
350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA 237
In this highly instrumental age (when all research has to be tested by its
relevance to ‘user groups’) one might also anticipate a reluctance among
political theorists to describe what they do as normative theory. The
category conjures up distinctions between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, descriptive and
prescriptive; in doing so, it threatens to give too much credibility to the
objectivity claims of political scientists while banishing to the periphery
those other-worldly figures who write about equality, freedom or justice.
No one likes to think of herself as engaged in what John Dunn (1996, 30)
has described as the ‘emotionally self-indulgent recycling of cherished
political pieties’; and, in an era much exercised by what is possible and
viable, no one wants to be regarded as out of touch with practical con-
cerns. Nowadays, normative theory also evokes images of the complacent
ideologue who mistakes local preference for universal truth, who bossily
intervenes to tell others what is right and wrong and fails to register the
great variety of ethical traditions. As we become more conscious of the
ethnocentricity that shapes everyone’s values and ideals, we are less likely
to relish the description.
And yet normative theory carries on apace, with continuing work on
issues of equality, justice and freedom, elaborations of older traditions
such as civic republicanism, and an explosion of new literature on what are
seen as the challenges of diversity and difference. This is not as contra-
dictory as it seems, for as theorists free themselves from some of the earlier
ideological stand-offs, they may be able to develop innovative arguments
that bridge what used to be regarded as opposing camps. Rawls, most
famously, developed a case for economic redistribution that many social-
ists were happy to endorse (he argued that inequalities were justified only
when they could be shown to benefit the least advantaged), but he did this
from within a self-consciously liberal framework. In Real Freedom for All,
Philippe Van Parijs (1995) builds a socialist case for paying all members of
a society an unconditional basic income, and does this on the basis of an
argument about individual freedom. In a series of essays recently collected
under the title Democracy and Human Rights, David Beetham (1999)
argues that the process of democratic reform is not assisted by debating
whether one is ‘for’ or ‘against’ liberal democracy or elaborating what one
conceives to be fundamentally different conceptions of democracy. Devel-
oping an immanent rather than external critique of liberal democracy, he
focuses on the core principles of political equality and popular control that
underpin any conception of democracy, and is impatient with antitheses
between direct and representative, majoritarian and consensual, mass and
deliberative democracy that have (in his view) hampered previous debate.
Anne Phillips
238 © Political Studies Association 2000.
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