Estonian Identity Formations and Threat Framing in the Post-Cold War Era
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343304047435 |
| Date | 01 November 2004 |
| Author | Erik Noreen,Roxanna Sjöstedt |
| Published date | 01 November 2004 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
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Introduction
At the turn of the millennium, after almost
a decade of peaceful relations with Russia, a
majority of Estonian citizens still assessed the
former occupying power as a threat to their
state. According to opinion polls on threat
perceptions, 60–78% of the Estonian people
perceived the Russian state as an ominous
force in relation to Estonia, figures that had
not significantly changed since the 1990s
(Rose, 1997: 54; Rose, 2000: 36–37).
Nonetheless, more recent polls indicate
another trend. Between the years 2000 and
2003, the percentage of Estonians believing
in the probability of being attacked from
another state steadily decreased from 33 to
15 (Estonian Ministry of Defence, 2003).
Even though Russia is not directly men-
tioned in this survey, it is – owing to Estonia’s
historical record – fairly obvious which state
© 2004 Journal of Peace Research,
vol. 41, no. 6, 2004, pp. 733–750
Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA
and New Delhi) www.sagepublications.com
DOI 10.1177/0022343304047435 ISSN 0022-3433
Estonian Identity Formations and Threat Framing
in the Post-Cold War Era*
ERIK NOREEN
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University
ROXANNA SJÖSTEDT
Swedish Institute of International Affairs
This article shows that threat framing by the Estonian elite has changed significantly since the end of
the Cold War. In order to explain these changes, the identity formations salient in Estonian political
discourse are analyzed using discourse analysis and contrasted to two other explanatory approaches: one
based on the ideas of realism, the other on cognitive theory. This demonstrates that the variation of
threat images, as well as Estonia’s wish to join international organizations, is guided not solely by fear
of Russia, but also by a desire to re-establish bonds with an identity formation Estonia once was part
of. Thus, the change of threat images can be explained by the dynamics of identity formations, which
in turn are linked to processes of socialization, as Estonia adapts to the discourse of the West. It is
further argued that previous research on the linkages between identity formations and threat images
has tended to oversimplify this relationship. In contrast to earlier research, this article claims that after
independence, the Estonian Self has not developed in polarized terms vis-à-vis the Russian state and
the domestic Russian Other. Rather, it is concluded that what is at issue is a process of socialization.
This implies not only learning and using language as a means towards the recognition of a multicultural
Estonia and the inclusion of the Russian minority in the Estonian Self, but also the institutionalization
of such a language in terms of official policies.
* An Appendix to this article is available at JPR’s website:
http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets.asp. We wish to thank
Johan Eriksson, Olav F. Knudsen, Stephen G. Walker, Li
Bennich-Björkman, Paula Blomqvist, the four anonymous
referees, and the editors of JPR for their highly useful
comments. This article is a contribution to the Threat
Politics Project, funded by Swedish Emergency Manage-
ment Agency, and the Project on Power Disparity, Identity
and Cooperative Security: The Baltic Sea Region in a Com-
parative Perspective, funded by the Baltic Sea Foundation.
Author emails: erik.noreen@pcr.uu.se; roxanna@ui.se.
05 noreen (ds) 27/9/04 11:14 am Page 733
one has in mind when thinking of a possible
threatening actor. However, the point here is
that this threat image gradually has become
of secondary importance to the average
Estonian in the 21st century. Among the
‘main factors of security instability’ listed in
a press release concerning a survey carried
out in February 2004, international terror-
ism and organized crime ranked highly, but
Russia is not even mentioned (Estonian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EMFA, 2004).
Turning to the political elite, we find that
public threat perception can be largely
regarded as a reflection of the framing of this
elite. The latter appears, however, to have
been much quicker in modifying any
previous assessments of Russia as posing a
severe threat to Estonian security. Previous
research has shown that in the political elite
discourse, the threat stemming from Russia
was downplayed in favor of other issues in
general, and of other threats in particular,
even before the turn of the millennium
(Noreen, 2001; Aalto, 2003). This discrep-
ancy between the political and popular
security discourse apart, it can be concluded
that there has been a shift of framing in terms
of regarding Russia as a threat and that this
is a matter needing further analysis.
In this article, we will investigate the threat
images and framing of the Estonian political
elite during 1992–2003. We will not con-
centrate on Estonian security policy options
per se. It is, however, essential to point out
that owing to the variance in the elite’s threat
framing, the fear of Russia can hardly be the
sole determinant factor for Estonian policy-
makers eagerly wanting to join NATO, and
that any assumed link between threat framing
and policy action must therefore be prob-
lematized further. We would argue that the
emancipation process of leaving the ‘bad’
Soviet Union for the ‘good’ European Union
can be interpreted within the context of
finding a new identity within post-Cold War
Europe, as well as regaining the identity of
independent Estonia in the interwar era. We
assume that the socialization of Estonia as
part of a European and North Atlantic com-
munity is inextricably interwoven with an
altered elite discourse – a discourse in which
the imagined Russian threat receives less
attention than it would have in an alternate
structural setting.
The aim of this study is to investigate and
compare how different theoretical
approaches attempt to provide viable expla-
nations of the case of temporal variance in
the threat framing seen within Estonian
political discourse, placing particular
emphasis on the identity formations that in
turn are linked to processes of socialization.
We attempt to demonstrate how this
approach can present an alternative expla-
nation to more traditional approaches in the
IR literature, particularly regarding the trans-
formation of threat images among Estonian
policymakers.
Previous Research
During the last decade, there has been a fairly
lively academic discussion on Baltic security
policy issues. Many studies have focused on
the roles and positions of the Baltic states
within the European and North Atlantic
security policy context in general, and the
prospects of becoming NATO members in
particular. From an explanatory perspective,
we can discern a tendency, especially during
the 1990s, to more or less explicitly analyze
the Baltic states’ security policy options in
realist terms.
In accordance with the realist way of
reasoning, the structure of the international
system is the most essential explanatory factor
of state behavior. Although the IR literature
lacks consensus regarding a proper terminol-
ogy for characterizing the international system
(cf. Russett, Starr & Kinsella, 2000: 78),
realist/neorealist scholars on Baltic security
issues appear to take the development of a
journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume 41 / number 6 / november 2004
734
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