Ethical Quandaries in War Zones, When Mass Atrocity Prevention Fails
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12315 |
| Date | 01 May 2016 |
| Published date | 01 May 2016 |
| Author | Thomas G. Weiss |
Ethical Quandaries in War Zones, When Mass
Atrocity Prevention Fails
Thomas G. Weiss
The Graduate Center of The City University of New York
Abstract
Humanitarians are no longer necessarily viewed as selfless angels in war zones. Their motivations and mastery, their principles
and products are questioned from inside and outside of the community of aid and protection agencies. Like the poor, war vic-
tims will always be with us. Coming to their rescue requires understanding of the ongoing transformations to contemporary
humanitarian action in wars and the evolution of humanitarian culture –its values, language and behavior. An agreed culture
of cooperation has given way to a contested one of competition resulting from militarization, politicization and marketization.
Preventing mass atrocities is preferable to halting them; but the record of preventing them has been dismal. And even with
sufficient political will to act or react, the history of postintervention results also has been abysmal. When mass atrocity pre-
vention fails, a ‘learning culture’is required: more responsible reflection and less rapid reaction. Traditional principles are
unhelpful; guidance to effective action does not require strict adherence to humanitarian ideology but rather to considered
calculations about least worst options.
Policy Implications
•While the use of the military to intervene in humanitarian emergencies is usually considered a last resort, the longer atroc-
ities continue the higher the barriers to entry and the higher the political and military costs. The option of earlier rather
than later humanitarian intervention should be considered.
•The gloss of the ‘humanitarian’adjective should not obscure the fact that the use of military force necessarily involves
death and destruction. Truth in packaging is required about the expected and inadvertent consequences of humanitarian
intervention.
•While individual, corporate, and government donors emphasize effectiveness, the criterion of low overhead costs is unreal-
istic and counterproductive. For contemporary wars, humanitarian agencies must invest in training and research.
•While no one becomes a humanitarian or contributes monies to make a career or profit, fund-raising imperatives and insti-
tutional turf battles are a primary driving force in humanitarian action. More incentives for enhanced cooperation are
required to make the most of limited resources and to save lives.
Humanitarian action in war zones was never easy but has
proved especially daunting in the postCold War era. David
Rieff (2002b) and others demonstrate a misplaced nostalgia
in lamenting ‘humanitarianism in crisis’, because such soul-
searching is not a ‘mid-life version’in that the efforts began
with the 19th-century founding of the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (Forsythe, 2005; Barnett, 2011;
Barnett and Stein, 2012). Whatever the vintage and Steven
Pinker notwithstanding (Pinker, 2011), humanitarians are not
necessarily on the side of the ‘better angels’–their motiva-
tions and mastery, their principles and products are fiercely
debated (Barnett and Weiss, 2011).
Preventing mass atrocities clearly is preferable to curing
them; but just as clearly, the record of prevention is dis-
mal. Even on the rare occasions with sufficient political
will to act, postintervention results also are abysmal (e.g.,
Somalia or Libya are typical rather than Kosovo). Coming
to the rescue requires an understanding of the ongoing
challenges to contemporary action in war zones and the
evolution of humanitarian culture –its values, language
and behavior (Weiss, 2014a).
After a brief introduction, the article discusses how the
culture of cooperation has become a contested one of com-
petition, resulting from militarization, politicization and mar-
ketization. It concludes that a ‘learning culture’of
responsible reflection rather than rapid reaction is required.
Traditional procedural principles are unhelpful; guidance no
longer should emanate from strict adherence to humanitar-
ian ideology but rather considered calculations about least
worst options.
The dominant culture
The ‘good Samaritan’comes to mind because humanitarian-
ism is rooted in morality and principle in efforts at ‘saving
strangers’(Wheeler, 2000). Its central objective is to help vul-
nerable populations, irrespective of who they are, where
they are located or why they are needy. Humanitarian
Global Policy (2016) 7:2 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12315 ©2016 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Global Policy Volume 7 . Issue 2 . May 2016 135
Research Article
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