Europe – Still between the Superpowers
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12427 |
| Author | Michael Cox |
| Published date | 01 June 2017 |
| Date | 01 June 2017 |
Europe –Still between the Superpowers
Michael Cox
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
Abstract
In a famous study published in 1978, the American diplomat Anton DePorte argued –controversially –that a Europe held in
frozen check between the superpowers was the only sound basis upon which the continent could find peace. The ending of
the bloc system in Europe between 1989 and 1991 put paid to this dystopian vision. Indeed, within only a few years, many
writers were even beginning to suggest that the new united Europe might one day become a superpower in its own right. As
we now know, this early wave of unbridled optimism has given way to an altogether more downbeat mood. In this article, it
shall be argued that the prevalent pessimism about Europe is not just a function of what has been occurring within Europe
itself. It is also a reflection of the fact that the international order, which during the 1990s seemed to be so benign, has
become much less so over the past 15 years. A close examination of Europe’s relationships with the three great powers the
United States, China and Russia indeed suggests that the world is likely to become more, rather than less, difficult for Europe
as it moves forward into the 21st century. Testing times lie ahead.
Policy implications
•In a period of great transatlantic uncertainty, Europe’s priority should be to reinforce its economic, political and strategic
links with the United States.
•Russia’s growing suspicion of, and opposition to, the European Union as a project requires a strong and united response
from all European leaders.
•While the economic benefits of good economic relations with China (PRC) should be recognised, it is important for Euro-
peans to recognise the challenge that the PRC presents to Europe’s vision of the world.
History as prologue
As one war drew to an end, and another longer Cold War
began to announce itself, Winston Churchill took the very
long view about a world that had been so unceremoniously
smashed into fragments after 1914. What we had been
through, he observed, was not a mere political revolution or
a massive clash of arms, but rather something closer to a
‘Second Thirty Years War’(Tooze, 2005, p. 4). Treating the
period like a single unit, he focused unsurprisingly on what
he saw as the long-running struggle by the British Empire
to contain and finally defeat the German challenge. But as
Britain had emerged victorious by 1945, the Empire, in his
view, was now safe. The same could not be said, however,
about mainland Europe itself. Indeed, if one result of total
war between 1939 and 1945 was in the short term to leave
much of the continent in rubble, another much longer term
consequence was to undermine Europe as the axis around
which the world had for nearly three centuries revolved.
Certainly, if we consider the international system in terms
made popular by Paul Kennedy (1987) as an ever moving
canvass of rising and falling great powers and regions, then
by 1945 it was patently clear that the European age had
finally come to an inglorious end.
The question remains whether or not Europe could have
retained the mighty position it had held at the beginning of
the century. The gradual economic rise of the United States
constituted a challenge of the first order, to which Europe
may never have found an adequate response. The British
especially seemed to be concerned about what one British
writer in 1901 termed ‘Americanization’and the impact this
was likely to have on the rest of the twentieth century
(Stead, 1901). However, economics alone would not have
turned the world upside down so fast nor so completely. As
one of the more acute insider witnesses to both wars noted
(Keynes, 1971), Europe’s position at the heart of the world
system was not just undermined by the economic power of
the US, but rather by two wars which left Europe dependent
on American largesse. Continental Europeans may not have
liked this altered state of affairs –and Britain as the once
dominant power may have liked it least of all. But one thing
was clear. The European ‘moment’, which had announced
itself in the late 15th century had finally passed. As one of
the more noted post-war historians pointed out not long
after the end of the Second World War, the ‘collapse of the
traditional European system’had become ‘an irrevocable
fact’.‘Historic Europe’was now ‘dead and beyond resurrec-
tion’(Holborn, 1951).
Naturally, not all Europeans felt especially comfortable
with either their diminished role in world affairs or being
dependent on the United States. Indeed, at least one West
European leader in the form of de Gaulle went on to
Global Policy (2017) 8:Suppl.4 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12427 ©2017 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Global Policy Volume 8 . Supplement 4 . June 2017 9
Survey Article
To continue reading
Request your trial