European identity as a unifying category: National vs. European identification among native and immigrant pupils
| Published date | 01 June 2016 |
| Date | 01 June 2016 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1465116515612216 |
| Author | Mieke Van Houtte,Orhan Agirdag,Karen Phalet |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
European Union Politics
2016, Vol. 17(2) 285–302
! The Author(s) 2015
European identity as a
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unifying category: National
DOI: 10.1177/1465116515612216
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vs. European identification
among native and
immigrant pupils
Orhan Agirdag
Laboratory for Education and Society, University of Leuven,
Belgium; Department of Educational Sciences, University of
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Karen Phalet
Center for Social and Cultural Psychology, University of Leuven,
Belgium
Mieke Van Houtte
Department of Sociology, Ghent University, Belgium
Abstract
This article investigates whether European identity is a feasible and functional alternative
to national identity. We examine the extent, determinants and consequences of national
and European identification among (immigrant) Turkish and native Belgian pupils, with
data gathered from 1629 pupils across 68 Belgian schools. The results show that immi-
grant Turkish pupils identify more strongly with Europe than with Belgium. The groups
are closer to each other with respect to their European identification, while the latter is
not in conflict with national identification. Moreover, European identity is less ethnically
and more civically defined than national identity. Importantly, European identification
was moderately related to academic achievement, though it is hard to make a causal
claim.
Keywords
Academic achievement, diversity, European identity, immigrants, national identity
Corresponding author:
Orhan Agirdag, Laboratory for Education and Society, University of Leuven, Andreas Vesaliusstraat 2 – bus
3761, 3000 Leuven, Belgium.
Email: orhan.agirdag@gmail.com
286
European Union Politics 17(2)
Introduction
Due to the continuing immigration and the increased political tensions after a set of
terrorist attacks in the first decade of the 21st-century, multiculturalist policies have
come in for significant criticism in various Western countries. At the same time, the
issue of national identification is placed at the centre of national policies. That is,
policy makers argue that multicultural policies of the earlier decades undermined
immigrants’ identification with their country of settlement (their host national
identities), while this national identification is considered to be a key determinant
of successful integration into the host society (Kundnani, 2007; Levrau and
Loobuyck, 2013). However, as noted by Verkuyten and Martinovic (2012), the
need for a common identity is not only advocated by assimilationist politics, but
the proponents of multiculturalism as well argue that besides the recognition and
affirmation of distinctive (ethnic) identities, a shared sense of nationhood is import-
ant for a well-functioning society.
There are structural obstacles that make it difficult for immigrants and their
children to develop a sense of belonging to their host nation (see Alba and Foner,
2014; Verkuyten and Martinovic, 2012). Most importantly, in many countries,
national identity is not represented as a civic category, but as an exclusive
ethnic/racial category that does not include the ethnic background of immigrant
minorities. This is particularly the case for second generation Muslim immigrants
in European countries. For instance, labels such as ‘German’, ‘Belgian’ or ‘Dutch’
are commonly used to only refer to the native (Caucasian) majority group, even
though second- and third-generation Muslims are formally citizens of their coun-
tries of residence (Alba and Foner, 2014; Pehrson et al., 2009). As such, in these
sociopolitical contexts where national identity is primarily regarded as an ethnic/
racial category connoted to the native majority, immigrants and their children are
deprived of the legitimacy to claim a national membership (Fleischmann and
Phalet, 2015; Kunovich, 2009).
One possible political strategy to change this situation might be the redefinition
of national categories, so it can be combined with ethnic minority identities,
to open the way for the creation of multiple identities (see Modood, 2005;
Verkuyten, 2004). A second approach – which received less political and scholarly
attention – is to look for an alternative common identity that is functionally
equivalent to national identities. At a higher level, there is supranational identity,
in our case, European identity. Like national identity, European identity is a uni-
fying category. Yet, European identity has an important advantage over
national identities: according to Habermas (2001, 2002), the European citizenship
is not defined in ethnic/cultural terms (like old European nations are), but it
is defined in political terms, that is, by the sharing of democratic cosmopolitan
values. In other words, European identity is more conceptualized as a civic iden-
tity, one which is less determined by ethnic characteristics such as language, reli-
gion or common descent. As such, for immigrant minorities, European
identification might be a more realistic common identity than national identities
are.
Agirdag et al.
287
An interesting immigrant minority group to consider in this respect is the
Turkish group, which is one of the largest minority groups in Europe as well as
in Belgium where this study is conducted. Turks in West-European countries tend
to have low levels of national identification, even lower than other minority groups
such as Moroccans (Vroome et al., 2014). However, less is known about their level
of European identification.
The relevance of European identity for Turks dates at least back to the proclam-
ation of the modern Turkish Republic in 1923. The main goal of the newly estab-
lished republic was to ‘Europeanize’ the economic, political and social structures of
the country. As early as 1959, Turkey applied for associate membership in the
European Economic Community and in 1987 it submitted its application for a
formal European Union (EU) membership (Risse, 2012). Until recently, opinion
polls in Turkey have consistently shown that the majority remains supportive of
the idea of EU membership (Ko¨sebalaban, 2007), even though the support is declin-
ing as a reaction to the slowing of the EU membership process. An important obs-
tacle to Turkey’s membership remains European public opinion, which largely
opposes it due to cultural concerns, i.e. fears of losing one’s national culture
(Gerhards and Hans, 2011; McLaren, 2007). Nevertheless, the Eurobarometer
survey of 2009 shows that 46% of Turkish citizens have a ‘fairly positive’ to ‘very
positive’ image of the EU. This percentage is at the same level as the Dutch and
French citizens’ regard of EU, i.e. both about 44% positive. Although the feeling of
belonging to Europe is in Turkey lower than most European countries, it is com-
parable to British citizens’ connectedness to Europe (see also Ecirli, 2011). Given this
background and the historical, geographical and political relationships between
Turkey and Europe, European identity might be permeable for ethnic Turks in
Western Europe, as an alternative for the low level of national identification.
This study aims to explore these ideas from an empirical perspective by using
data collected in Belgian schools at the end of the primary school; this is the age
when children’s national and European identities get a shape and remain relatively
stable after that (Barrett, 1996; Reizabal et al., 2004). First, we will compare the
levels of national (Belgian) identification and European identification among
Turkish immigrant and native Belgian pupils. By doing so, we will establish
whether both groups are closer to each other with respect to their European iden-
tification than with respect to their national identification. Secondly, we will exam-
ine social and ethnic determinants of both common identifications. Our
expectation, based on Habermas (2001, 2002) is that European identification is
less defined by ‘ethnic’ variables such as language use, religiosity and interethnic
friendships than pupils’ national identifications. Third, even if European identifi-
cation turns out to be a feasible alternative (by which we mean: more strongly
exhibited and less ethnically defined than national identification), the question
arises whether it is a functional alternative. To provide an answer to this question,
we will investigate how both common identities are related to pupils’ successful
incorporation into society, by examining the impact of national and European
identification on the academic performances of pupils.
288
European Union Politics 17(2)
National identification
National identification can be regarded as a part of the individual’s social identity. Tajfel
(1981: 255) defines social identity as ‘that part of an individual’s self-concept which
derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together
with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership’. Drawing upon
this definition, national identification can be considered as the self-identification and
emotive meaning that an individual derives from membership in a national group.
With respect to immigrant and ethnic minorities, for a long time, a one-dimen-
sional model was the dominant framework. Theories based on this model suggest
that national identification and ethnic identification are antipodal, implying that the
strength of ethnic identification is negatively related to national identification. By
contrast, current scholars argue in favor of a bi-dimensional model. They point out
that ethnic...
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